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ABSTRACT 
 
Queer and trans people have a particularly fraught relationship to the concept of ‘mental 
illness’ due to the longstanding and ongoing pathologizing of gender and sexual 
dissidence. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (LGBQT)  activists have challenged 
the notion that non-normative sexualities and genders are forms of ‘mental illness,’ 
arguing for depathologization on the basis of the healthiness of queer and trans desires, 
relationships, and embodiments. Yet there are troubling consequences of arguing for 
equity based on the assertion of mental healthiness and the disavowal of connections 
between notions of mental distress and LGBQT people. Insights from mad studies 
suggest that this perspective can be seen as perpetuating the positioning of mental distress 
as a deficit as well as sanist ideologies about agency and personhood. Moreover, 
intersectional understandings of sexuality, gender, and disability indicate that there is a 
population of LGBQT people who experience mental distress. Challenges to the 
dominant biomedical model of mental illness have emerged from those who emphasize 
social approaches. These perspectives stress the importance of social context and 
question the efficacy of medical strategies to fully address mental distress.  
This dissertation examines the voices and viewpoints of 37 people who identify as 
LGBQT and who experience mental distress in their everyday lives. Interviewed in 
Toronto and Winnipeg, these individuals offer distinct perspectives on biomedical and 
social approaches to mental distress. The first chapter reviews some of the literature in 
mad studies and discusses methodological decisions. The second chapter outlines some of 
the main critiques of the biomedical model and presents some of the social factors that 
played a role in participants’ experiences of mental distress. Chapter three examines 
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participants’ encounters with mental health care practitioners, analyzing the effects of the 
biomedical model in practice. Chapter four draws on Canada’s national mental health 
strategy and participants’ narratives to examine the concept of recovery. Chapter five 
explores interview data about employment as well as scholarly work regarding ‘invisible 
identities’ to analyze the participants’ workplace experiences. Overall, this dissertation 
uses the intersectional voices and viewpoints of LGBQT people who experience mental 
distress to critique dominant understandings of ‘mental illness.’ 
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Queer and Trans Madness: Biomedical and Social Perspectives on Mental Distress 
 
My mother says psychiatry saved her life. In 1983, after years of experiencing 
intense mental and physical distress for which no doctor could find cause or treatment, 
she was diagnosed with panic disorder. This condition, newly added to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) III in 1980, provided my mother with 
the answers she had been looking for. At long last she had an explanation for the 
nameless force that had so profoundly interfered with her ability to function in everyday 
life. She had panic disorder, an illness like any other and one that could be treated with 
psychiatric interventions and medications. In many ways, her encounters with the mental 
health system contributed to the formation of my academic interest in the ways in which 
mental distress is understood and addressed. 
Though personal and experiential, my mother's narrative reflects an ideological 
position espousing the biomedical model of mental illness. This model categorizes 
various experiences, behaviours, and thought patterns as indicative of biological 
deficiencies that can be scientifically evidenced and universally applied. The biomedical 
model of mental illness is currently predominant; indeed, as Lewis (2006) contends, it 
“has become so dominant that it may seem that there are no alternative models” (p. 108). 
It informs most forms of mental health care, including psychiatry, psychology, and social 
work, but extends far beyond formal medical settings into public policy, popular culture, 
and everyday language. Indeed, the biomedical model of mental illness underpins 
commonplace understandings of health and wellbeing. 
In many ways, this dissertation takes a critical stance towards the biomedical 
model of mental illness, particularly as it pertains to lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and 
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trans (LGBQT) people. The longstanding and ongoing pathologizing of gender and 
sexual dissidence means that LGBQT people have a particularly fraught relationship to 
the concept of ‘mental illness.’ As a young person who fell outside the norm in terms of 
sexuality, I encountered this early on. In high school I started exploring the possibility 
that I could reject heterosexuality. It was the mid-1990s and the term ‘queer’ was quickly 
gaining popularity but had not yet made it into my teenage vocabulary. I made friends 
with other students ‘like me’: femme girls attracted to other girls and sometimes boys. 
When one of us got caught underage in a gay bar, her mother’s response likely exceeded 
what it would have been had she been caught in a straight bar. My friend was sent to a 
psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with gender identity disorder (GID) based on her sexual 
behaviours and desires. It was recommended that she continue "treatment" with the 
psychiatrist for this "condition." As teenagers with little power to protest, we believed 
this was wrong but felt unable to do anything about it. For me, this served as an 
introduction to the ways that psychiatry could be used in the service of policing sexuality. 
My friend’s experience is not an isolated occurrence. Homosexuality was listed as 
a disorder in the first two versions of the DSM in 1952 and 1968, and despite its removal 
in 1973, gender and sexual dissidence continue to be pathologized (Carr, 2005; 
Sedgwick, 1993). As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, lesbian and gay 
activists who pressured the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality 
and related diagnoses from the DSM fought to break the associations between lesbian and 
gay people and ‘mental illness’ and assert the ‘healthiness’ of ‘same-sex’ desire and 
relations. Trans activists have engaged in different struggles because  GID diagnoses 
greatly influence access to the technologies of medical transition, yet the trans movement 
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has likewise employed the tactic of asserting the existence of ‘mentally healthy’ trans 
people as a  means to argue for increased autonomy and depathologization (Lev, 2005; 
Spade, 2006; Winters, 2008). 
As an adult, I found myself subjected to the same diagnosis as my high school 
friend, albeit under different circumstances. In 2011, while working on this dissertation, I 
sought access to the medical technologies of gender transition. My relatively privileged 
position in terms of age, whiteness, community support, and access to Canadian Union of 
Public Employees (CUPE) local 3903’s groundbreaking Trans Fund allowed me to 
minimize (though not eliminate) the extent to which I had to ‘prove’ my gender and be 
deemed ‘authentically’ trans by medical experts.1 I approached the process equipped with 
a perspective that positioned GID as a strategic mechanism facilitating access to medical 
transition rather than as definitional of my sense of self. 
The work that gay, lesbian, and trans activists have done in challenging the 
associations between mental pathology and gender and sexual dissidence have allowed 
myself and others to understand ourselves in a positive light and recognize that medical 
definitions are only a fraction of the myriad ways that we can conceptualize non-
normative genders and sexualities. This work has helped us comprehend that these 
definitions were created by people with very superficial understandings of queer and 
trans lives. Yet there are also troubling consequences of arguing for equity based on the 
assertion of mental ‘healthiness’ and the disavowal of connections between notions of 
mental distress and LGBQT people. This maneuver perpetuates the biomedical 
                                                 
1
CUPE 3903 is a union for teaching assistants, graduate assistants, and contract faculty at York University. 
During collective bargaining in 2005, trans activists in the union successfully fought for a fund for 
members who have financial needs related to being trans. The fund’s inaugural year was 2006/2007. For 
more information about the fund, how it works and what it covers see: http://3903.cupe.ca/410-2/ 
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positioning of mental illness and madness as a deficit as well as sanist ideologies about 
incapacity, agency, and personhood. It also ignores the existence of LGBQT people who 
are diagnosed with a range of other ‘mental illnesses’; the DSM-5 lists over 300 disorders 
that pathologize various aspects of human life and experience. One of the central 
questions motivating my work concerns LGBQT people who experience mental distress 
or who have been deemed ‘mentally ill’ on the basis of any of the other many diagnoses 
in the DSM. What are the experiences of those who live at the intersections of madness 
and LGBQT identities? The qualitative study that forms the basis of this dissertation 
presents material from 37 interviews with LGBQT people who have experienced mental 
distress in two Canadian cities, Winnipeg in Manitoba and Toronto in Ontario, with the 
goal of capturing some of these experiences.  
The question of LGBQT people's relationship to madness is in some ways taken 
up by scholars who position LGBQT people as an ‘at risk’ or ‘vulnerable’ group 
concerning mental health because of the widespread nature of homophobia and 
transphobia. There is a growing body of literature that claims there is a higher prevalence 
of ‘mental health problems’ amongst LGBQT people because of discrimination and 
negative social attitudes about non-normative sexualities and genders (Chamberland and 
Saewyc, 2011; McIntyre, Daley, Rutherford, & Ross, 2011; Morrison, 2011; Rotondi, 
Bauer, Scanlon, Kaay, Travers & Travers, 2011; Rotondi, Bauer, Travers, Travers, 
Scanlon & Kaay, 2011). In this formulation, it is homophobia and transphobia that cause 
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental health problems,’ rather than anything inherent in being 
LGBQT. Providing empirical proof of the negative health impacts of homophobia and 
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transphobia serves the important function of bolstering the legitimacy and necessity of 
struggles to eradicate such oppression across various contexts.  
The results of my study support the contention that oppression of all kinds, 
including homophobia, transphobia, sanism, ableism, sexism, classism, and racism, have 
negative effects on LGBQT people.
2
 Indeed, I argue throughout this dissertation that 
oppression can contribute to or lead to mental distress. However, this is not quite the 
same as the claim that LGBQT people are more vulnerable to ‘mental disorders.’  The 
latter is limited in that it does not challenge the concept of ‘mental illness’ and the 
medicalization of distress.  
 Drawing on social approaches to mental distress, I question the need to 
medicalize experiences and behaviours that get called ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health 
problems,’ not because mental illness is ‘bad,’ but because the medical model does not 
adequately acknowledge social contexts. I also question the efficacy of medical strategies 
to fully address mental distress, especially given the vexed context in which this occurs 
for LGBQT people. Is it possible and desirable to rely on an ideological system that has 
been key in the colonization of Indigenous people and the social control of marginalized 
groups, including LGBQT people, racialized people, and women? (Carr, 2005; Chunn & 
Menzies 1988; Harper, 1988; Hughes, 1993; Jackson, 2002; Kanani, 2011; Kanani 2012; 
Menzies, 2002; Menzies & Palys, 2006; Scholinski, 1997; Vermette, 1988; Winters, 
2008; Yellow Bird, 2004).  
                                                 
2
 Diamond (2013) defines sanism as a term that is “widely used within the [mad] community that refers to 
the inequality, prejudice, and discrimination faced by people who are constructed as ‘crazy’ within 
dominant culture” (p. 77). Perlin (2002) attributes the first use of this term to Morton Birnbaum in 1974 (p. 
684). 
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My main argument is therefore twofold. First, oppression that specifically affects 
LGBQT people exists both within and outside the mental health system, which can be a 
contributing factor to mental distress along with other social factors. Second, the basis on 
which the whole mental health system rests merits examination. In other words, a larger 
question haunts this dissertation; is mental distress best understood, exclusively, 
primarily, or even partially, as the province of science and medicine? I do not attempt to 
provide a full and definitive answer to this, though I do critique biomedicalism and 
explore alternative ways of thinking about mental distress. This question also raises the 
specter of related queries such as the role of biology and genetics and the complex 
interplay between biological and social factors. These are important questions, though I 
do not attempt to engage them, as I believe they are beyond the scope of this particular 
study. At a time when the biomedical model is arguably firmly entrenched in many areas 
of academic scholarship, health care, public policy, and mainstream discourse, I believe 
that consideration of critiques and alternative approaches is important.  
I acknowledge that these are contentious questions to explore. My mother’s story 
is a common one; the Canadian Mental Health Association states that “one in five adult 
Canadians (21.3 percent) will suffer a mental disorder in their lives” (CMHA, 2014). This 
suggests that many are personally affected by the material realities produced by dominant 
understandings of mental health and illness based on their own experiences or those of 
family members and friends. Theoretical discussions about these issues can resonate on a 
deeply personal and emotional level. Challenges to biomedicalism as a way of 
understanding and addressing mental distress can therefore evoke strong emotional 
responses. Those of us with experiential connections to concepts of ‘mental illness’ may 
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have strong personal investments in the truth of the biomedical model of mental illness. 
As someone with a parent who identifies as having a mental illness, I understand this 
affective response and have experienced a range of such responses myself.  
I have found in sharing my work that critiques of the ‘psy-sciences’ (Rose, 1999) 
can be perceived as attacks on the veracity of first-hand experiences of distress. Those 
who have been helped by medical strategies for addressing mental distress or who know 
those who have can feel as if those experiences are being invalidated, dismissed, or 
erased. It is important to be clear that mental distress is real and has material effects on 
the lives of those who experience it. It is also important to acknowledge that some find 
that medical strategies, including psychiatric treatment and medications, are helpful. 
Much like critiques of law enforcement that leave room for the possibility of well-
intentioned individual police officers, critiques of biomedicalism do not necessarily 
preclude the existence of good psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health care 
professionals who espouse the biomedical model of mental illness. For some people, 
including some participants in my study, health professionals operating within a 
biomedical framework and psychiatric medications have been helpful and have made life 
more live-able. However, most of my narrators also recounted experiences that indicate 
that there are problems with the biomedical model, particularly for LGBQT people. As a 
critique of biomedicalism, this dissertation does not attempt to present a ‘balanced’ view; 
participants’ problematic experiences are centred as a way of demonstrating some of the 
problems with this framework. This is not meant to discount the reality that some 
experience biomedical approaches as helpful. 
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The accounts of oppression within the health care system in this dissertation may 
also evoke skepticism in those who have limited or no lived experience of such 
discrimination. A recent newspaper article about racist stereotyping encountered by 
Indigenous women in Canada’s health care system states, “When we walk into a hospital 
or doctor’s office, we all expect our health-care providers to be respectful of us and our 
individual needs. Canada’s aboriginal peoples - and women in particular - deserve no 
less” (Kielburger & Kielburger, 2013). This exemplifies typical mainstream discourse 
representing Canada as an accepting and safe place where ‘we’ will all be respected and 
treated as individuals rather than as representatives of maligned and marginalized groups. 
For those who believe in this liberal fantasy, some of the experiences of the participants 
in this study may evoke feelings of surprise or disbelief. For many of the narrators, 
however, experiences with racism, classism, ableism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, 
and other kinds of oppression mean that they can not take for granted that they will 
always be treated with respect, both within and outside of the health care system. The 
refusal to believe that such things take place is part of what maintains the conditions that 
facilitate their existence, justifying the positioning of interventions as unnecessary or as 
addressing ‘special needs.’ In centering the participants’ first-hand accounts, I argue that 
mental health care practitioners do not simply make ‘objective’ assessments of mental 
health; rather, the process is enculturated and therefore reflects oppressive systemic 
values. This disrupts the notion that all those who seek mental health care receive equal 
treatment and that the mental health system is equipped to address the needs of LGBQT 
people. This may be an unsettling claim for some readers of this dissertation. 
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Madness 
In the first year of my doctoral studies, my youngest cousin killed herself at the 
age of nineteen. As the impact of this tragedy reverberated through my family, I looked 
for ways to make sense of the conditions that led her to end her life. My mother’s 
favoured explanation, that she was a victim of mental illness, left me unsatisfied. This, in 
part, motivated me to take Geoffrey Reaume’s York University graduate course, which 
was titled "Mad People’s History." This was my first encounter with what is now called 
‘mad studies,’ an interdisciplinary body of work that provides an alternative to “psy-
centred ways of thinking, behaving, relating, and being” (Menzies, LeFrancois, & 
Reaume, 2013). This course gave primacy to the voices of those with lived experience of 
mental distress, sidelining those usually considered the ‘experts’ on these matters 
(Reaume, 2006). There is perhaps nothing that can ever fully quiet the ‘why’ that remains 
with those who know someone who committed suicide, but this course offered a 
refreshing change from the biomedical narrative. My interest in mad studies grew, and it 
became the basis for one of my comprehensive examinations and the field in which I 
situate this dissertation. 
When I began writing this dissertation in 2010, mad studies was not widely 
recognized as a field of study. This is beginning to change, as is evidenced by the 
publication of a special issue of Disability Studies Quarterly on madness and the edited 
collection Mad matters: A critical reader in Canadian mad studies, both in 2013. Mad 
studies is an emerging field that owes much to disability studies; indeed, it has been 
referred to as an “in/discipline” of disability studies (Ingram, 2008 as cited in Menzies, 
LeFrançois & Reaume, 2013, p. 12). Menzies, LeFrançois, and Reaume (2013) describe 
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mad studies as interdisciplinary, including work taking place in “health studies, sciences 
and medical faculties, along with departments of law, sociology, psychology, history, 
philosophy, education, communication, English literature, cultural studies, women and 
gender studies, socio-legal studies, disability studies, and social work” (p. 13). Mad 
studies is grounded in the knowledge of those with lived experience of psychiatrization 
and takes a “subversive standpoint relative to the governing paradigm of psychiatric 
‘science’” (Menzies, LeFrançois, and Reaume, 2013, p. 11).  As such, it lends itself well 
to my study, which is critical of biomedicalism and gives primacy to first person accounts 
of the lived experiences of LGBQT people who experience mental distress.  
Lesbian and gay studies, queer studies, and trans studies are also central to my 
study. As I argue in chapter one, some academic work in these areas can be seen as part 
of mad studies. Many scholars in these fields explore the intersections between 
knowledge production and mental ‘pathology’ as it pertains to sexual and gender 
dissidence (Bayer, 1981; Butler, 2004; Carr, 2005; Irvine, 2005; Lev, 2005; Minton, 
2002; Scholinsky, 1997; Sedgwick, 1993; Spade, 2006). Likewise, scholars focusing on 
processes of racialization and racism show how these are imbricated in 
conceptualizations of mental health and illness (Baskin, 2007; Bennett, Blackstock, & De 
La Ronde, 2005; Chunn & Menzies 1988; de Leeuw, Greenwood, and Cameron, 2010; 
Fernando, 2010; Harper, 1988; Hughes, 1993; Jackson, 2002; Kanani, 2011; Kanani 
2012; Menzies, 2002; Menzies & Palys, 2006; Vermette, 1988; Yellow Bird, 2004). As a 
nascent field, mad studies can learn from critiques of disability studies that point to the 
importance of taking up issues of race and racism (Bell, 2006; Bell, 2011; Bolaki, 2011; 
Broeck & Davis, 2011; Gorman, 2013; Jarman, 2011; Mollow, 2006; Tam, 2013).  
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One way of keeping social justice approaches to race, gender identity, sexuality, 
and other forms of social difference at the forefront of analysis is to employ an 
intersectional approach. Mad studies is particularly well-positioned to take up 
intersectionality, and as Menzies, LeFrancois, and Reaume (2013) contend, scholars in 
mad studies have begun to do just that (pp. 16-17). Rossiter and Morrow (2011) argue 
that it is “the dominance of a biomedical paradigm” that has served as an obstacle to 
intersectional analyses in ‘mental health’ research (p. 333). The positioning of ‘mental 
illness’ as an measurable ‘disease’ that can be objectively assessed and universally 
applied and the use of positivist approaches that reify racial difference do not serve the 
interests of intersectional and social justice-based approaches (Rossiter & Morrow, 2011, 
p. 333). Mad studies, in its rejection of biomedical approaches, is well suited to my study, 
which uses an intersectional approach to understand the lives of LGBQT people who 
experience mental distress. 
As indicated by its name, mad studies rejects the language of biomedicalism and 
makes use of alternative language and terminology. Throughout this dissertation I employ 
two such terms: ‘mental distress’ and ‘madness.’ Tew (2011) contends that “perhaps 
more than in any other field of health and social care, language relating to mental health 
issues is contested and contentious” (p. 4). Choices regarding language and naming are 
critically important not only because they are indicative of an ideological stance, but 
because of the violence that can be enacted through labelling. As Price (2011) argues, 
“the problem of naming…acquires a particular urgency when considered in the context of 
disabilities of the mind, for often the very terms used to name persons with mental 
disabilities have explicitly foreclosed our status as persons” (p.9).  
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Psychiatric survivor activists and scholars who critique the biomedical model 
suggest that we refuse to use medical language such as ‘mental illness’ (Boyle, 2011; 
Burstow, 2013; Tew, 2011). Burstow (2013) contends that when this language is used, 
“we are performing our designated role in the work of psychiatry…we are activating it” 
(p. 82). ‘Mental distress’ has been proposed as an alternative, because unlike the term 
‘mental illness,’ it does not “do violence to people’s identities and aspirations” and it 
“does not imply illness, incapacity, or inferiority” (Tew, 2011, p. 5). Likewise, ‘madness’ 
has been politicized by those who resist the medicalization of distress with the goal of 
“reclaiming disparaged identities and restoring dignity and pride to difference” (Menzies, 
LeFrançois & Reaume, 2013, p. 10). ‘Madness’ also captures a “broad historical sweep” 
and acknowledges that biomedicalism is just one of many ways in which such matters 
have been understood (Price, 2011, p. 10). 
In addition to referring to ‘madness’ and ‘mental distress,’ I also make use of the 
phrase ‘mental health,’ as it has been institutionalized as an umbrella term to describe 
mental well-being, various states of mind, and what are often understood as ‘disorders’ 
(for example, by the Canadian Mental Health Association and the Mental Health 
Commission of Canada). Because of this, when the participants in my study and I were 
talking, we often spoke in terms of ‘mental health’; this language structured their 
everyday lives, especially in health care settings but also at work and in everyday 
practices. I therefore also use this term as an acknowledgement of the current context in 
which madness is understood and thus the ways in which the research participants are 
positioned. ‘Mental health’ is the predominant framework available to them to make 
sense of themselves. However, I make use of this term carefully and selectively. As other 
  13   
scholars have argued, ‘mental health’ is no less complicit with biomedical ideology than 
the term ‘mental illness’ (Boyle, 2011; Burstow, 2013). 
Chapter summaries 
This dissertation begins with a literature review that locates this work in mad 
studies. I present a historiography of madness with a focus on the racialized, sexualized, 
and gendered character of knowledge production in this area. This demonstrates how 
ideas about madness have shifted over time and how elite discourses have influenced 
predominant ideologies about madness. I then review more contemporary work that is 
critical of biomedical approaches to mental distress, focusing on the impact of biomedical 
frameworks on those deemed ‘mentally ill.’ I draw on anti-psychiatry studies, lesbian and 
gay studies, queer studies, and trans studies, arguing that work from all of these fields can 
be seen as contributing to mad studies. I contend that these bodies of literature have much 
to say to one another, in that anti-psychiatry studies tends to overlook the perspectives of 
racialized, queer, and trans people, while lesbian and gay studies, queer studies, and trans 
studies could do more to consider the connections between LGBQT lives and experiences 
of mental distress. This chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the key 
methodological decisions that shaped this project. 
In chapter two I challenge biomedicalism as the best way to make sense of 
LGBQT experiences of madness and present social approaches to mental distress as 
another way of making these experiences intelligible. While the biomedical model has 
become so predominant that it is difficult to conceptualize experiences of mental distress 
through any other lens, the participants’ narratives clearly demonstrate some of the 
problems with biomedicalism and point to the benefits of using frameworks that take 
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social context into account. I show that an individualistic model like biomedicalism is 
especially problematic for marginalized groups, as it erases or downplays discrimination 
and structural disadvantage while also serving to perpetuate such oppression. 
 In chapter three I present participants’ experiences with health care practitioners 
in order to examine the biomedical model in practice. I argue that the power relations 
embedded in practice based on biomedicalism create inequitable and sometimes 
damaging relationships between service providers and participants. Further, practitioners 
demonstrate a striking lack of knowledge about LGBQT and racialized cultures, 
relationships, identities, and experiences, often resulting in inadequate care at best. 
Participant narratives show that many service providers continue to pathologize LGBQT 
people through various means, including the positioning of nonnormative sexual and 
gendered behaviours, desires, and practices as deviant, the reliance on diagnostic criterion 
regarding ‘promiscuous’ behaviour, and the use of mental health systems and child 
protective services as tools of (neo)colonial regulation. I argue that this challenges the 
notion that mental health care practitioners informed by biomedicalism perform objective 
assessments of participants’ mental health and points to clearly subjective judgments and 
discriminatory beliefs underpinning biomedical practice. 
In chapter four, I examine the currently popular concept of recovery from ‘mental 
illness.’ Canada’s first national mental health strategy, Changing Directions, Changing 
Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada, published in May 2012, employs 
‘recovery’ as a key concept in envisioning change in the Canadian mental health system. 
Drawing on the sections of the strategy document that focus on race, gender, and 
sexuality, I take a close look at how the state interprets the conditions that lead to 
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recovery from ‘mental illness’ for LGBQT people. I argue that Changing Directions, 
Changing Lives makes a departure from a strictly biomedical view of ‘mental illness,’ but 
falls short of advancing a strong structural understanding of how homophobia, 
transphobia, racism and other forms of oppression shape LGBTQ experiences of mental 
distress, access to services, and recovery. I contrast this with participant narratives about 
the conditions that facilitate being able to cope with mental distress, arguing that there is 
a need to shift the focus more radically toward the social and structural factors that 
influence ‘recovery.’  
In the final chapter, I present participants’ experiences with employment in order 
to examine how mainstream conceptions of ‘mental illness’ affect their work lives. I 
argue that some of the basic tenets of the biomedical model of mental illness are widely 
accepted and position those deemed ‘mentally ill’ as unfit or less preferable for many 
jobs. Drawing on scholarly work about ‘invisible’ identities, I discuss the difficulties this 
creates for participants who must decide whether to disclose information about 
experiences of mental distress, as well as their sexualities and gender identities. I argue 
that such decisions are particularly pressing and high risk at work, given the economic 
stakes, the effects on health and well-being, and the prevalence of discriminatory beliefs 
and practices in the workforce. The participants’ narratives demonstrate that race, gender, 
sexuality, and experiences of mental distress are not ‘private’ or neutral social differences 
in the workplace and in fact structure many aspects of their work lives, including 
obtaining and retaining work, evaluations of job performance, and access to workplace 
accommodations. 
  16   
 This study will be of interest to scholars working in a wide range of fields, 
particularly those with a focus on social justice and marginalization and those working in 
mad studies, disability studies, lesbian and gay studies, queer studies, trans studies, 
women’s and gender studies, social justice and equity studies, and critical race studies. It 
is also relevant to fields with an investment in the biomedical model of mental illness, 
including psychology, psychiatry, and social work. I believe that this study makes a 
contribution to all of these fields in that I take a rare approach that is intersectional, 
qualitative, social scientific, and oriented to social justice, all of which is done in ways 
that give primacy to first-person accounts of LGBQT people who experience mental 
distress.  
The matters I examine in this dissertation are timely. The work of the MHCC has created 
“an important political moment in Canadian history for discussing and debating how best 
to meet the diverse mental health needs of the population” (Rossiter & Morrow, 2011, p. 
314). With more attention being paid to the ‘mental health’ of Canadians, there may be 
opportunities to influence the ways in which LGBTQ people are understood in relation to 
concepts of ‘mental health and illness.’ LGBQT and mad studies scholars and activists 
must employ critical perspectives that question the discourses that have been mobilized 
both within the mainstream and by LGBTQ and mad movements. We must exercise 
caution in relation to mainstream discourses perpetuating biomedical approaches, as well 
as those employed by LGBQT activists in the effort to distance LGBTQ people from 
notions of illness and pathology. Mental distress is a critically important issue for 
LGBQT communities, and the ways in which this gets taken up will have serious 
practical impacts in terms of advocating for and creating services that will best serve 
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LGBQT people. Strong alliances between LGBQT and mad activists and a commitment 
to anti-racism could create positive changes. Further, the ways in which mental distress is 
understood has a profound impact on how we make sense of our experiences, but also our 
very sense of who we are. How mental distress is understood and addressed can 
sometimes mean the difference between life and death.
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Chapter One: Mad Studies: Literature Review and Methodology 
In this chapter I locate this dissertation in mad studies, review some of the 
relevant scholarly literature, and describe the methodology for this project. I begin with a 
discussion of mad studies before proceeding with a critical review of some of the 
historical literature that positions madness as a social construct, focusing on the 
racialized, sexualized, and gendered character of knowledge production about madness. I 
then consider more contemporary literature from anti-psychiatry studies that positions 
psychiatry as a disciplinary force that regulates social behaviour through the creation of 
the categories ‘sane’ and ‘insane.’ I argue that much of this work offers important 
insights about psychiatry, but does not specifically address race, sexuality, and gender. I 
therefore review the work of gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies 
scholars to show how psychiatry has specifically targeted those who are non-normatively 
sexualized and gendered, often through the psychiatric diagnoses of homosexuality and 
gender identity disorder. This literature shows how the sexualities and gender identities 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (LGBQT) people have been constructed as 
pathological. However, most of this work maintains a narrow focus on the specific 
diagnoses that most obviously affect LGBQT people, such as gender identity disorder. 
Most of this literature also does not explicitly address race and racism.  
In the second half of this chapter I discuss the methodological choices I made in 
creating and carrying out this project. This includes a discussion of my decision to use 
qualitative interviewing as a method, the recruitment of participants and the process of 
conducting interviews, my choices about terminology, and the specific ethical 
considerations that have been relevant to my project. 
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Mad studies 
Following LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume (2013), I use mad studies to refer to 
an interdisciplinary field of study that critiques current conceptions of mental illness as a 
biological condition that can be scientifically evidenced and universally applied. Mad 
studies is emergent and loosely defined, but LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume (2013) 
have identified ten common themes that characterize the field. These include the notion 
that mad studies is a “project of inquiry, knowledge production, and political action” that 
critiques the ‘psy sciences’ and is invested in social change (LeFrançois, Menzies, and 
Reaume 2013, p. 13). It is interdisciplinary and “multi-vocal” in that it includes “people 
from every conceivable social position and walk of life” (LeFrançois, Menzies, and 
Reaume 2013, p.13). As such, mad studies is not solely an academic project and it takes 
up any number of theoretical and practical approaches and methodologies. It is grounded 
in the lives and experiences of mad people and is very much rooted in the “grassroots 
advocacy of psychiatrized people” (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2013, p.14). It is 
not proscriptive and includes perspectives from groups who define themselves differently 
in terms of their relationship to madness and mental health and have varying perspectives 
on psychiatry and the mental health system.  
In addition, “mad studies is an exercise in critical pedagogy” and knowledge 
production that employs “subjugated knowledge” to challenge prevailing ideas about 
‘mental illness’ and the psy sciences (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2013, p. 14). It 
is engaged in “historical memory work” in order to show how ideas about madness shift 
over time and to place “mad people at the centre of their own narratives” and demonstrate 
they have existed across time (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2013, p. 15). It pays 
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special attention to structural analyses of power relations and is especially amenable to 
intersectional approaches. Mad studies aims to massively restructure the “‘mental health’ 
industry”, indicating an intention to bridge “the long-standing divide between scholarship 
and activism” (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2013, p. 17). Finally, mad studies aims 
to remain grounded in, and stay relevant to, “the immediate practicalities of everyday 
human struggle” of those who are currently interacting with biomedical approaches to 
mental illness and the mental health system (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2013, p. 
17). 
As a nascent and interdisciplinary field, mad studies has boundaries that are not 
firmly defined. Some of the work I include in this chapter is also part of lesbian and gay 
studies, queer studies, trans studies, and critical race studies. I believe this work can be 
seen as part of mad studies. LeFrançois, Menzies and Reaume (2013) characterize mad 
studies as inclusive of work taking place in “health studies, sciences and medical 
faculties, along with departments of law, sociology, psychology, history, philosophy, 
education, communication, English literature, cultural studies, women and gender studies, 
socio-legal studies, disability studies, and social work” (p. 13). While recognizing that 
these authors certainly do not intend this list to be exhaustive, I believe it is particularly 
important to explicitly name scholarship in lesbian and gay studies, queer studies, trans 
studies, and critical race studies as part of mad studies. These areas of study make 
significant contributions to mad studies, in no small part because the psy-sciences have 
long been heavily implicated in the social control and marginalization of LGBQT and 
racialized groups.  
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The larger goal of this literature review is to provide a context for my own study 
of LGBQT people who experience mental distress. Mad studies is amenable to my own 
study in many ways. These include the focus on challenging the biomedical model of 
mental illness, the value placed on first-person accounts of lived experience and social 
justice perspectives, the attention to structural oppression, and the use of intersectional 
approaches. I use the existing literature to position madness as an ever-changing, 
historically and culturally specific social construct that has great power over people’s 
lives. I also use this literature to show that there is a need for intersectional social 
research that specifically explores the experiences of LGBQT people regarding mental 
distress. My study examines the impact of the biomedical model of mental illness on the 
lives of LGBQT people who experience mental distress. Some of the larger questions 
structuring my research are as follows: What do LGBQT people have to say about their 
identities and experiences concerning mental distress? How do LGBQT people navigate 
dominant understandings of mental health in their everyday lives? How does the 
biomedical model of mental illness impact LGBQT people and how might social 
approaches offer another way of making experiences of mental distress intelligible?  
What is the role of processes of racialization and racism in shaping these experiences? 
My research attempts to address some of the questions that are left unanswered in the 
currently available literature. 
Before proceeding with the review, it is important to note that the existing 
literature on madness (both historical and contemporary) often reflects a singular or dual 
focus, in that authors tend to focus on either race or sexuality and gender. There are few 
sources that analyze how these are mutually constituted. This is not unusual; it is, in fact, 
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typical of many bodies of work, including research on health inequities and mental health 
disparities (Dhamoon & Hankivsky, 2011; Rossiter & Morrow, 2011). While I have 
attempted to conceptualize the literature in a holistic manner, this division between race 
and gender and sexuality in the existing literature is reflected in my review.  
Historiography of madness 
 
Perhaps most famously, Foucault (1961) points to how conceptions of madness 
shift over time and asks questions about how the mad are differentiated from the sane and 
what purposes these distinctions serve. In History of Madness, he constructs a history of 
how madness has been understood in the West from the 16
th
 century to the 19
th
 century, 
arguing that during this period several shifts took place in how madness was 
conceptualized and thus how the mad were treated. He contends that with the decline of 
leprosy at the end of the 16
th
 century, the mad became the despised ‘other,’ a figure 
previously embodied by the leper. At this time the poor, the criminal, and the mad were 
socially excluded, as the leper had been in earlier periods (Foucault, 1961, p. 6). 
According to Foucault (1961), during the 17
th
 century madness was increasingly 
understood as the opposite of reason and a source of shame; in this period the “great 
confinement” or the mass incarceration of the mad began (p. 62). However, the mad were 
not entirely hidden away in these institutions; they were put on display for money, as 
were nonhuman animals. This established new boundaries between madness and sanity, 
as “madness had become a thing to be observed, no longer the monster within, but an 
animal moved by strange mechanisms, more beast than man, where all humanity had 
long since disappeared” (Foucault, 1961, p. 145). Foucault argues that madness was not 
yet understood in a medical or correctional context; rather it was seen as a departure from 
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reason and an entry into an animal-like state. The way to tame animality was thought to 
be through physical discipline and the mad were therefore treated inhumanely (Foucault, 
1961, p. 149). Foucault claims that this age of confinement lasted until the end of the 
18th century, when under the purview of medicine and psychiatry madness was 
increasingly conceptualized as mental illness. Mental illness became positioned as a 
scientifically evidenced disease, something that could be managed through medical 
expertise. Medical strategies and ‘cures’ became a new way of exerting control over 
those deemed mad. For Foucault, the medicalization of madness does not indicate the 
discovery of an objective truth. Rather, his historical work shows that madness is a social 
product and a historical construct. 
Covering a longer time span and providing more specific details, Porter (2002) 
offers a history of how madness has been understood in Western culture from the Greek 
philosophers of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 centuries BCE to the rise of psychiatry in the 20th century. 
In Madness: A Brief History, he seeks to identify who has been deemed mad, what has 
been considered the root of madness, and how the mad have been treated over the course 
of this period. He argues that the ideologies through which madness and the mad have 
been made intelligible have shifted over time from Christianity, through humanism, to 
psychology and psychiatry.  
For example, he argues that for many centuries, supernatural and religious 
explanations of madness held sway. Those deemed mad were thought to be possessed by 
demons and plagued by sins, and thus religious officials were considered the most 
appropriate people to deal with the mad (Porter, 2002, p. 19). He contends that a critical 
shift in thinking occurred with Descartes, as Cartesian dualism defined the mind as 
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inherently rational, positioning insanity as originating in the body. Thus madness came 
under the purview of medicine. As Porter (2002) states, “Safely somatized…[madness] 
could no longer be regarded as diabolical in origin…and became unambiguously a 
legitimate object of philosophical and medical inquiry” (p. 58). He argues that 17th 
century philosophers secularized madness, positioning it as a form of irrationality and 
opening the door for psychological methods, suggesting the possibility for ‘correction’ 
through medicine. The 20
th
 century saw the rise of psychiatric, scientific, and related 
paradigms regarding mental illness. According to Porter, the development of 
psychodynamics, psychoanalysis, and psychopharmacology blurred the boundary 
between the insane and the sane, in that modern approaches suggest that ‘mental illness’ 
is “part of normal variability” as opposed to affecting a select few (p. 208). Porter 
believes that this led to deinstitutionalization and the move toward out-patient and 
community care, as well as the proliferation of psychiatric diagnoses as detailed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which was first published 
in 1952. 
Foucault (1961) and Porter (2002) provide the historical context necessary for 
conceptualizing madness as a social construct. They show that the medicalization of 
madness is a relatively recent phenomenon in a long history of frameworks for 
understanding madness. However, these works by Foucault and Porter do not consider 
how Western knowledge production has long been steeped in racial hierarchy. As Young 
(1995) details in Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, European 
knowledge producers used the concept of civilization as a tool of measurement to 
determine racial inferiority and justify colonization. As he states, “racial hierarchy was 
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established on the basis of a cultural pecking order, with those who had most civilization 
at the top, and those who were considered to have none –‘primitives’ - at the bottom” 
(Young, 1995, p. 95). As Young notes, race and racism became elemental to all academic 
disciplines and played critical roles in defining the Western self. As he states, race 
“became one of the major organizing axioms of knowledge in general,” and “racist 
assumptions remained fundamental to the knowledge of the West and to the Western 
sense of self” (Young, 1995, p. 93). It is therefore important to consider how 
constructions of madness draw on racist ideologies and how racism influences historical 
and contemporary understandings of madness and mental illness. As will become evident 
below, the racialized character of concepts such as ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ that Young 
describes are particularly relevant to the history of knowledge production about madness.  
For example, Fernando (2010) argues that ideas about race and civilization 
informed psychiatric knowledge production as it was first being generated in the mid-
nineteenth century (p. 61). He shows that white Europeans and Americans were seen as 
‘civilized,’ while racialized people such as “Eskimos, Chinese, Egyptians and American 
blacks” were seen as ‘uncivilized’ and ‘primitive’ (p. 61). Nineteenth century 
anthropological and sociological scholars such as Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and 
Francis Galton theorized that racialized people were at a lesser stage of evolutionary 
development than white people (Fernando, 2010, p. 61-62). Fernando (2010) contends 
that “these ideas were taken on board very easily and naturally by psychiatry and western 
psychology” and continues to inform present day thought (p. 62).  
Further, racist ideologies have informed various aspects of psychiatric practice, 
including that of diagnosis (Fernando, 2010, p. 67). Historical psychiatric diagnoses such 
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as dysaesthesia aethiopis during the era of slavery posited that freed slaves would 
develop a ‘condition’ that would cause them to destroy property and create havoc while 
also becoming unable to feel pain when punished (Fernando, 2010, p. 67). Likewise, 
drapetomania was a psychiatric ‘condition’ that would cause slaves to run away 
(Fernando, 2010, p. 67). Fernando (2010) argues that current diagnoses, while less 
obviously racist, are still shaped by ideas about “racial inferiority” (p. 68). For example, 
contemporary dominant discourses that position black people as violent, dangerous, 
inferior, and alien may contribute to more black people being diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, a condition that is “linked” to “alieness” (Fernando, 2010, p. 68). 
Furthermore, racism affects the diagnostic process for psychiatric conditions in many 
ways, including “during the recognition and evaluation of symptoms…in their 
assessment for the purpose of illness recognition; and in making the decision on the 
propriety of designating illness” (Fernando, 2010, p. 69). As just one example, black 
people who talk about racism may be perceived as ‘paranoid’ if racism is not understood 
“as a real threat to black people” (Fernando, 2010, p. 69). 
Indeed, many scholars have argued that mental health diagnoses are racialized and 
have been used to pathologize and control black people (Gilman, 1985; Hughes, 1993; 
Jackson, 2002; Metzl, 2009; Waldron, 2002). One important historical work to consider 
the links between blackness, madness, and racism is Gilman’s (1985) Difference and 
Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness. Gilman does a representational 
analysis of texts from the Middle Ages to the 20th century to examine stereotyping of the 
‘other’ in Western society. In the chapter “On the nexus of blackness and madness,” he 
contends that there is a longstanding association of blackness with illness and pathology 
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in Western culture. He points to the ways in which blackness has long been linked to 
wildness and madness, citing examples from such varied sources as the Judeo-Christian 
Bible, Greek medicine, and the work of Mark Twain. Gilman provides historical context 
for his textual analysis by outlining how this association has been used to oppress black 
people through the creation of racist psychiatric diagnoses. Like Fernando (2010), he 
points to diagnoses such as drapetomania as evidence of how psychiatry was used to 
oppress black people. As he states, “manifestations of the blacks’ rejection of the 
institution of slavery were fitted into the medical model of insanity” (Gilman, 1985, p. 
138).  
Gilman (1985) also considers how Jewish people have been seen as physically 
and mentally ill. He argues that Jewish people were thought to be biologically 
predisposed to insanity, and those who fought for emancipation in the 18
th
 century were 
seen as providing evidence of their madness (Gilman, 1985, p. 162). Gilman argues that 
throughout the 18
th
, 19
th
, and early 20
th
 centuries Jewish people were constructed by 
European doctors as less ‘civilized’ due to their supposedly ‘primitive’ sexual practices, 
which were said to result in degeneration and madness (Gilman, 1985, p. 159). Gilman’s 
description of the theoretical linkage of racialization with sexual practices points to the 
importance of conceptualizing the connections between race and sexuality in the 
production of knowledge about madness and mental illness. 
Psychiatry has also played a role in creating and maintaining stereotypes about 
Indigenous people (Kanani 2011; Menzies & Palys, 2002; Waldram, 2004). Waldram 
(2004) makes an important contribution to understanding the role of race and racism in 
the history of knowledge production about mental health and Indigenous people. Revenge 
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Of The Windigo is a historiography of mental health research concerning Aboriginal 
people in Canada and the United States. Waldram examines knowledge production about 
Aboriginal mental health in anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry in order to critique 
problematic prevailing understandings of Aboriginal people in these disciplines. Under 
the guise of objective science, non-Aboriginal scholars have constructed Aboriginal 
people and culture as homogenous and static, making essentializing generalizations that 
ignore individual and cultural differences. He argues that notions of Aboriginal mental 
health draw heavily on a ‘primitivist discourse.’ This discourse positions Aboriginal 
people and culture as inferior and underdeveloped, yet also “utopian,” in that they are 
depicted as “uncontaminated by the pollutants of civilization” (Waldram, 2004, p. 10). 
Waldram concludes that scholars have generated a large volume of research about 
Aboriginal mental health and capabilities using faulty methodologies and problematic 
assumptions. As he states, “The science upon which portraits of aboriginal mental health 
have been constructed represents a proverbial house of cards, and a close look at this 
construction reveals just how tenuous our scientific knowledge is in these areas” 
(Waldram, 2004, p. 317-318). Waldram argues that psychology and psychiatry are 
particularly resistant to acknowledging the racism inherent in their theorizing, possibly 
due to the deeply positivist character of these disciplines. 
Some scholars have shown that racist knowledge production about mental health 
created and legitimized a high level of incarceration of racialized people in psychiatric 
institutions and racist, violent treatment in these facilities (Chunn & Menzies 1988; 
Harper, 1988; Hughes, 1993; Jackson, 2002; Kanani, 2011; Menzies, 2002; Menzies & 
Palys, 2006; Yellow Bird, 2004; Vermette, 1988). For example, Yellow Bird (2004) 
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recounts the treatment of Indigenous people in the Hiawatha Asylum for Insane Indians 
outside Canton, South Dakota, from 1902 to 1933. Indigenous people were often 
incarcerated indefinitely in the asylum for resisting racist practices and once there were 
treated inhumanely. Such inhumane treatment included locking some inmates in their 
rooms for up to three years and the straightjacketing and chaining of children. As Kanani 
(2011) argues, this use of psychiatric institutions in the social control of Indigenous 
people in Canada and the United States is done in the service of colonization (p. 7). As 
she states, “by regulating Indigenous people through psychiatric institutions (among other 
forms of regulation such as penal systems and residential schools), settler societies have 
been able to permanently subordinate Indigenous people and ensure the transfer of 
Indigenous land to colonial governments” (Kanani, 2011, p. 7). 
The literature described above makes important contributions to the positioning of 
madness as a racialized social construct. There is still, however, a lack of scholarship that 
makes connections between race, racism, and madness (Fearnley, 2008; Kanani, 2011). 
As Fearnley (2008) argues, many scholars still deny the importance of race in shaping 
this body of knowledge or fail to consider it at all. As he states, race is “commonly held 
by scholars to have had little to no effect upon the key concepts and practices of 
psychiatry” (Fearnley, 2008, p. 246). As will be seen later on in this chapter, this limited 
attention to race and racism carries over into some of the contemporary critiques of 
psychiatry and current understandings of mental illness.  
Also important to the historiography of madness is the history of sexual and 
gender identity categories. In the nineteenth century sexological theories constructed 
‘same-sex’ desire and ‘cross-gender’ characteristics as physical and mental disease, 
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arguably laying the groundwork for the psychiatric diagnoses of homosexuality and 
gender identity disorder (GID) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM). Sexological texts such as Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis (1886) 
and Ellis’s Sexual Inversion (1900) are what Somerville (2000) refers to as “hybrid 
texts,” combining theory from “comparative anatomy, with its procedures of bodily 
measurement, and the nascent techniques of psychology, with its focus on mental 
development” (p. 19). 
As will be discussed, these categorizations were constructed by sexologists as 
forms of mental and physical pathology and are thus key in understanding current 
conceptualizations and intersections of madness, sexuality, and gender. The next section 
outlines this history, focusing on work that uses a more intersectional approach that also 
considers the role of race and racism (and to a lesser extent class) in the construction of 
these theories.  
Sexology was developed in Europe and North America in the late nineteenth 
century. During this period sexuality increasingly came under the purview of medicine 
and sexologists seeking to taxonomize human sexual desires and behaviours constructed 
new pathological sexual categories such as “the homosexual, pervert, sadist, masochist, 
and frigid woman” (Bland and Doan, 1998, p. 2). Following Foucault’s (1976) History of 
Sexuality, which traces the rise of the belief that sexual acts and behaviours are indicative 
of a certain type of person, many scholars have analyzed sexology to explore this. For 
example, Weeks (1985) argues that under the guise of objective science, sexologists 
constructed sexuality as the product of nature and created “an elaborate technology of 
control” (p. 63). Certain sexual practices were defined as pathological and as indicative 
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of an underlying perverse nature. As Felski (1998) also claims, “Sexuality was no longer 
simply a question of particular acts, but was expressed in appearance, personality and 
even bodily structure” (p. 4).  
Terry’s (1999) work describes how American theories of homosexuality have 
shifted from the late 19th century to the late 20
th
 century. Drawing on Foucault’s 
theoretical positioning of sexuality as “‘an especially dense transfer point’” for power and 
knowledge, Terry employs discourse analysis to examine how scientists and doctors 
attempted to “maintain social and sexual order” through delineating ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ sexualities (Terry, 1999, p. 6). Terry argues that from 1880 to 1920 American 
medical authorities medicalized homosexuality through labeling it as insanity. She details 
how physicians construed anything outside of “heterosexual monogamous matrimony” as 
“sex perversion” (Terry, 1999, p. 77). These ‘perversions’ were considered hereditary 
and thought to manifest themselves in both physicality and “lunacy” (Terry, 1999, p. 77).  
Terry (1999) contends that this ‘American obsession’ with homosexuality was 
based in anxiety about the challenge it posed to social and biological distinctions between 
genders and sexes. As she states,  
First, inversion signaled the alarming effacement of gender distinctions upon 
which social order (i.e., male dominance) had been based. And, secondly, 
homosexuality further affronted the two-sex system according to which men and 
women, as opposites, were thought to be naturally attracted to one another (Terry, 
1999, p. 78) 
One of few scholars to acknowledge the racialized and classed aspects of these theories, 
Terry also argues that homosexuality was seen as a threat to social divisions between 
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races and classes (Terry, 1999, p. 78). Anxieties about modernity, city living, and the 
resulting interactions between diverse urban populations were reflected in medical 
theories that posited that reproductive interracial sexual relations would lead to sexual 
perversion in offspring (Terry, 1999, p. 88). Homosexuality was also thought to exist 
mainly amongst working class people, who were characterized as morally ‘primitive’ and 
unable to control themselves sexually (Terry, 1999, p. 116). Likewise, the upper classes 
were believed to be susceptible to homosexuality due to their decadent, lascivious 
lifestyles. Thus physicians “were able to underscore a larger segregationist perspective 
that regarded the blurring of classes, races, and sex roles as inimical to the nation” (Terry, 
1999, p. 116). Terry shows how these racist and classist understandings of homosexuality 
portrayed homosexual people of colour and poor people as inherently inferior and thus 
these groups were most negatively affected by the resulting campaigns against 
homosexuality.  
As Somerville (2000) points out, academic work tends to treat the history of race 
and sexuality as separate and parallel rather than examining the ways in which these 
histories are in fact entwined. She argues that struggles over the meaning and creation of 
sexual identity categories occurred at the same time as efforts to define racial categories 
and that these concurrent struggles were not simply parallel but were in fact enmeshed. 
As she states, “negotiations of the color line… shaped and were shaped by the emergence 
of notions of sexual identity and the corresponding epistemological uncertainties 
surrounding them” (Somerville, 2000, p. 3).  
Somerville's (2000) analysis of late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century American 
medical literature written by physicians, sexologists, and psychiatrists shows that theories 
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of sexuality depended on and made use of racial ideologies. For example, she points to 
the presence of scientific racism in the works of Krafft-Ebing and Ellis, arguing that the 
methodologies of racial science provided a model for these sexologists to use in assessing 
‘sexual inversion.’ Racial scientists and sexologists also demonstrated gender-related 
apprehension, focusing on women's bodies as sites of racial and sexual ‘abnormalities.’ 
While race scientists focused on the genitalia and reproductive characteristics of African 
women as markers of racial difference, sexologists saw the bodies of ‘female inverts’ as 
the “visual key to ranking bodies according to norms of sexuality” (Somerville, 2000, p. 
27).  
Sexology also reflected the ideologies of eugenics and white supremacy in that 
the pathologizing of homosexuality was seen by sexologists as a form of ‘degeneracy,’ a 
concept drawn directly from eugenicist theories. Somerville (2000) demonstrates that 
sexologists’ concerns about “mixed bodies” (i.e. ‘inverts’ and ‘intermediate sexes’) 
deployed models already in existence in racial science for pathologizing “biracial” bodies 
or “racial hybrids” as examples of the ‘degeneration’ that took place when ‘racial purity’ 
was not maintained (p. 32). Furthermore, Somerville (2000) argues that sexology made 
use of psychological theories present in racial science in order to cast homosexual desire 
as a form of ‘perversion.’ As she states, “interracial and same-sex sexuality became 
analogous within later conceptions of sexual object choice” (Somerville, 2000, p. 37). 
Feminist theorists have also made important contributions to the positioning of 
madness as a social construct. Many feminist scholars have noted that women have long 
been more likely than men to be deemed mad (Busfield, 1996; Chesler, 1972 Ehrenreich 
& English, 1978; Lunbeck, 1994; Showalter, 1985; Smith & David, 1975; Smith-
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Rosenberg, 1985; Ussher, 1992; Ussher, 2011). Feminists have sought to explain this 
phenomenon through an examination of the role of patriarchy, misogyny, and sexism in 
shaping historical and current understandings of madness.  
Chesler’s (1972) groundbreaking Women and Madness argues that women raised 
in patriarchal cultures develop traits and behaviours such as “self-sacrifice, masochism, 
reproductive narcissism, compassionate ‘maternality,’ dependency, sexual timidity and 
unhappiness, and father-worship,” which are in turn pathologized as madness (p. xxi). 
Chesler bases her arguments on a wide range of materials including 19
th
 century case 
histories of psychiatrized women, contemporary clinical theories and practices, statistical 
data from the 1950s and 1960s concerning mental illness, and sixty interviews she 
conducted with women about their experiences with mental health systems in England 
and America from 1945 to 1971. She concludes that madness has long served as a means 
of patriarchal social control and many women have been exploited and abused in the 
name of ‘treatment.’ 
Following Chesler, Showalter (1985) contends that madness is feminized. She 
shows how social and medical representations of madness are deeply enculturated with 
gendered associations that place women “on the side of irrationality, silence, nature, and 
body, while men are situated on the side of reason, discourse, culture, and mind” (p. 4). 
She examines British social and medical texts from 1830 to1980 to show how psychiatric 
discourse perpetuates madness as a “female malady” that serves to regulate and control 
women (Showalter, 1985 p. 5). Similarly, Ussher (1992) argues that madness is deeply 
gendered and informed by patriarchy, sexism, and misogyny. She contends that madness 
‘others’ women in society and “positions women as ill, as outside, as pathological, as 
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somehow second-rate – the second sex” (Ussher, 1992, p. 11). Ussher employs a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis to show how “discursive practices which create the 
concept of madness” keep women in a subordinate and oppressed position (Ussher, 1992, 
p.14). 
Some feminists have looked at specific diagnoses in order to show how madness 
is gendered and used to oppress women. Ehrenreich and English (1978) argue that 
nineteenth century medicine constructed women as “innately sick” due to their 
reproductive organs, supposedly predisposing them to a life of illness and disability of 
various sorts (p. 147). Hysteria, a nineteenth century disorder characterized by loud fits of 
crying, laughing, and convulsions, is perhaps the quintessential example of this view. 
Hysteria was a highly gendered diagnosis, seen as affecting primarily women of the 
middle and upper classes (Ehrenreich and English, 1978, p. 153). Smith-Rosenberg 
(1985) notes that the symptoms of hysteria overlapped with the characteristics expected 
of normative femininity in Victorian society; “dependency, fragility, emotionality, 
narcissism” (p. 207). She analyzes hysteria as the only social role available to women 
who were unhappy with the demands of family life in a time when women were required 
to devote themselves whole-heartedly to serving the needs of their husbands and children. 
Acquiring hysteria offered women a partial escape from these duties, though “at the cost 
of pain, disability, and an intensification of woman’s traditional passivity and 
dependence” (Smith-Rosenberg, 1985, p. 207). Hysteria was also a way of pathologizing 
and infantilizing women, who were often seen as immature malingerers by hostile and 
sometimes sexually exploitative physicians (Ehrenreich & English, 1978, p. 147).
3
 
                                                 
3
 Sigmund Freud’s talking therapy treatment for hysteria marked the beginning of psychoanalysis 
(Ehrenreich & English, 1978; Smith-Rosenberg, 1985). Hysteria, feminism, and psychoanalysis therefore 
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Ussher (2011) argues that such gendered pathologizing and social regulation of women 
has continued in to the twenty-first century. She positions the diagnosis of major 
depression as the modern day analogue to hysteria, arguing that women are more likely to 
be diagnosed because psychiatry continues to “label women as mad, and regulate 
femininity through psychiatric treatment” (Ussher, 2011, p.63). 
The feminist literature about madness does important work in delineating the 
gendered character of madness and the oppressive effects of psychiatry and psychology 
on women. However, the main focus is on white, middle to upper class heterosexual 
women. Some authors make mention of racialized women, lesbians, and working class 
women, but not substantially. The exception is Chesler (1972), who includes a chapter on 
lesbians. However, her discussion is riddled with stereotypes about lesbians and gay men 
and is at times blatantly homophobic. For example, she states, “I must suggest that male 
homosexuality, in patriarchal society, is a basic and extreme expression of phallus 
worship, misogyny, and the colonization of certain female and/or ‘feminine’ functions” 
(Chesler, 1972, p.189). The feminist literature is also limited in that any consideration of 
gender dissidence is limited to the rejection of women’s social roles by otherwise gender 
normative women. There is no discussion of masculine women, trans women, or any 
gender dissidence in terms of gender expression, performance, or identity. However, the 
importance of feminist work in challenging understandings of madness as neutral and 
objective should not be underestimated. 
Thus far I have reviewed historical analyses that point to the social construction 
of madness, focusing on the racialized, sexualized, and gendered character of knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                 
have a complex relationship and “traverse each other in a complex relation of contestation, implication, and 
solidarity” (Bernheimer & Kahanem 1985). 
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production about madness. This historiography has focused on how understandings of 
madness and mental illness have long been racialized, as well as intertwined with the 
formation of sexual and gender identity categorizations. This review provides an 
understanding of elite discourses about madness, but it is also important to review more 
contemporary critiques that consider the impact on those who have been subject to such 
conceptions of madness. There are several bodies of thought that are important in this 
respect: anti-psychiatry studies, gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies. 
While anti-psychiatry studies provides an understanding of some of the resistance to 
psychiatry in general, gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies provides 
more specific analyses of the pathologizing of non-normative sexualities and gender 
identities. As will be seen, however, anti-psychiatry studies, trans studies, queer studies, 
and gay and lesbian studies do not provide a comprehensive consideration of race and 
racism, drawing attention to the need for an intersectional approach.  
Contemporary critiques: Anti-psychiatry studies 
 
Perhaps one of the best-known authors to critique psychiatry and question how 
medical understandings of mental illness have (re)enforced dominant notions of 
normativity through the creation of the categories ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ is psychiatrist 
Szasz. In The Myth of Mental Illness he contends that mental illness does not exist. Szasz 
(1960) makes the controversial claim that the function of the concept of mental illness 
has been to describe what should rightly be identified as “personal, social, and ethical 
problems in living” (p. 262). He claims that psychiatry acts as a disciplinary institution 
that (re)enforces a code of ethics based on predominant worldviews. He compares the 
concept of mental illness to religion and witchcraft, arguing that they all serve as “social 
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tranquilizers” (Szasz, 1960, p. 193). As he states, “psychiatric diagnoses are stigmatizing 
labels, phrased to resemble medical diagnoses and applied to persons whose behavior 
annoys or offends others” (Szasz, 1960, p. 267). 
In his later work, The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the 
Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement, Szasz (1970) elaborates on this view, 
comparing the belief in mental illness and institutional psychiatry to the Inquisition and 
the belief in witchcraft and arguing that they serve the “same social function” in 
oppressing and controlling the poor and those who transgress social norms (p. xix). Szasz 
argues that institutional psychiatry regards certain kinds of socially undesirable 
behaviours as signs of mental illness in order to exert social control and “to validate the 
Self as good (normal), by invalidating the Other as evil (mentally ill)” (p. xxvii). Szasz 
emphasizes that his arguments apply only to those who are involuntary psychiatric 
patients, thus somewhat sidestepping questions concerning those who voluntarily seek 
psychiatric treatment and self-identify as mentally ill. However, this is an important 
question to consider. Indeed, Szasz has been critiqued for failing to acknowledge the 
‘realness’ of what is known as mental illness for people who experience it and for 
portraying the mad as passive victims of psychiatry (Ruesch, 1962).  
The other author best known for critiquing psychiatry is psychiatrist Laing. Laing 
rejects the assignation of anti-psychiatry to his work because he sees it as a constructive 
contribution to psychiatry and does not dispute the basics of psychiatric science 
(Crossley, 2006, p. 107). Nevertheless, The Divided Self has been identified as the 
“sacred text of anti-psychiatry” (Crossley, 2006, p. 107). In The Divided Self, Laing 
(1960) looks at the case histories of people diagnosed with schizophrenia and uses an 
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existential phenomenological approach to argue that psychosis is misunderstood by 
psychiatrists as a biomedical condition rather than a state of being created through social 
factors. He claims that psychosis is actually a state of detachment from self and others. 
As he states, “There is a rent in his relation with his world…. There is a disruption of his 
relation with himself…. He does not experience himself as a complete person” (Laing, 
1960, p. 17). His goal is to understand the schizophrenic experience “within the context 
of his whole being in this world” (Laing, 1960, p. 17) and claims that psychiatrists who 
treat schizophrenia as a biomedical condition fail their patients because they impose 
problematic medical approaches and do not understand them.  
While Szasz and Laing laid important groundwork for critiquing psychiatry from 
an ‘expert’ perspective, the literature that arose from the anti-psychiatry movement of the 
1960s and 1970s has been key in addressing the impact of positivist understandings of 
mental health and illness on the lives of those considered mentally ill. This literature 
points to how those deemed mentally ill face widespread discrimination, as evidenced by 
a large range of phenomena including the social acceptability of everyday language such 
as ‘that’s so crazy,’ involuntary incarceration in psychiatric facilities, and the exploitation 
of psychiatric patient labour (Burstow & Weitz, 1988; Reaume, 2002; Reaume, 2004). 
Much of this work focuses on the ways in which psychiatry pathologizes, 
oppresses, and regulates the lives of those who are deemed mad. Mostly authored by self-
identified psychiatric survivors, this work has been crucial in exposing the impact of 
psychiatry on the lives of those considered ‘mentally ill’. For example, Burstow and 
Weitz’s (1988) Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada is an 
anthology of personal accounts from Canadian psychiatric survivors who challenge the 
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authority of psychiatry to control their lives and define their identities. Many of the 
authors demonstrate how psychiatry has been used as a tool of social control, drawing 
attention to abuses suffered at the hands of psychiatric healthcare professionals under the 
guise of treatment. They assert their agency by redefining their experiences through the 
deliberate use of language, such as ‘incarceration’ instead of ‘hospitalization’ (Burstow & 
Weitz, 1988, p. 23). Shrink Resistant repositions psychiatric survivors as the “authorities 
on Canada's psychiatric system,” an especially important move for a population whose 
credibility has long been denied (Burstow & Weitz, 1988, p. 32). 
Similarly Shimrat’s (1997) Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad Movement 
shares personal stories that challenge psychiatry and documents Canadian efforts to 
create alternatives to the psychiatric system. Shimrat details her own experiences with the 
psychiatric system that led to her involvement in the mad movement. She also includes 
the personal stories of other Canadian mad movement activists from the Yukon, British 
Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec whom she interviewed between 1994 and 1996. Shimrat 
and her interviewees address the impact of psychiatric abuses such as shock treatment, 
cold wet packs, lobotomy, and psychiatric drugs. They also outline resistance efforts such 
as the creation of the anti-psychiatry quarterly Phoenix Rising in 1980 and the Ontario 
Psychiatric Survivors Alliance in 1990. 
Another prominent Canadian mad movement activist, Capponi (2003), argues that 
much of psychiatry focuses on the biological causes of madness to the exclusion of 
environmental and emotional causes. Capponi argues that social conditions such as 
poverty and abuse can lead to madness if proper care is not forthcoming. She details the 
stories of several abuse survivors including her own, demonstrating how such 
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experiences can have a maddening effect, often made worse by inadequate psychiatric 
care. She concludes that the lives of many psychiatric survivors could be vastly improved 
through the fulfillment of basic needs such as access to adequate housing, employment, 
and friendship. 
Canadian mad movement activist and scholar Reaume has made many 
contributions to this literature. His monograph Remembrance of Patients Past: Patient 
Life at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, 1870-1940 reclaims the history of people who 
lived at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane between 1870 and 1940. Reaume (2000) 
searched patient files for evidence of mad people's voices in order to carefully reconstruct 
a picture of their lives from their perspectives. In doing so he challenges the authority of 
medical professionals to define the existence of their patients and restores personhood to 
the psychiatrized.  
Reaume (2002) also explores the shift in terminology regarding people who 
receive psychiatric treatment. He argues that early shifts in terminology reflected the 
concerns of mental health care professionals, while more recent changes have been 
shaped by those who have psychiatric histories (Reaume, 2002, p. 405). Reaume also 
outlines some of the disagreements amongst those who receive psychiatric treatment as to 
what terminology is appropriate, while emphasizing the underlying common desire to 
have those with psychiatric histories be seen as “a person rather than a label” (p. 424). 
Reaume provides a history of terms that are often thoughtlessly used in common parlance 
today such as ‘lunatic,’ ‘imbecile,’ and ‘idiot’ and examines the politics of labelling and 
self-definition. 
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At the heart of all of these works is the desire to improve conditions for mad 
people. Anti-psychiatry studies have made an important contribution to challenging the 
power of psychiatry and empowering mad people. This literature points to how the voices 
of mad people have long been silenced by psychiatric ‘experts’ as well as by commonly 
held prejudicial beliefs that dictate that mad people are incapable of speaking for 
themselves. Anti-psychiatry studies seek to rectify this and constitute the mad as agents 
in their own right. However, there are few texts that address how current understandings 
of madness and mental illness affect marginalized groups, such as racialized people 
and/or LGBQT people. Indeed, there is little written addressing the experiences of mad 
people who also identify as LGBQT, and the work that does exist is often 
autobiographical (see for example Scholinski, 1997). Even autobiographical collections 
such as the groundbreaking Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada 
and Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad Movement include limited discussion of the 
experiences of marginalized groups such as LGBQT people and/or racialized people. As 
the editors of Shrink Resistant acknowledge, the “psychiatrization of ‘minority groups’” 
is barely covered in the anthology, and they “apologize to the elderly, the disabled, the 
gay community and, most especially, our sisters and brothers of colour for these 
omissions” (Burstow & Weitz, 1988, p. 26). Shrink Resistant was published in 1988, but 
there are still major gaps in the literature regarding racialized and LGBQT people in 
particular. Furthermore, these groups are obviously not mutually exclusive, but it is a 
challenge to find work that is not singularly focused on either race or sexuality. In this 
way, anti-psychiatry studies could benefit from analyses present in work regarding the 
psychiatrization of LGBQT people in gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans 
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studies. Many scholars in gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies have 
examined the issues pertaining to the inclusion of homosexuality in earlier versions of the 
DSM and the current inclusion of gender dysphoria (previously gender identity disorder). 
The next section reviews some of this work. 
Contemporary critiques: Sexuality and gender identity in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
 
Arguably the most important text for understanding current conceptions of mental 
illness, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) outlines 
psychiatric disorders and the diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals. 
DSM-I (1952) and DSM-II (1968) were relatively short and “served largely documentary 
and administrative purposes” (Lewis, 2006, p. 100). The DSM underwent major revisions 
for the publication of the third edition in 1980. These revisions occurred following many 
challenges to psychiatry, including the work of Foucault (1961) and Szasz (1960, 1970) 
(amongst others), the anti-psychiatry movement, and the controversy regarding the 
inclusion of homosexuality in the DSM-I and DSM-II. These challenges “threatened the 
very foundation of psychiatry’s medical and scientific legitimacy” (Lewis, 2006, p. 99). 
Many scholars claim that the revisions to DSM-III re-entrenched the disease model of 
mental illness in an effort to rehabilitate the legitimacy of psychiatry by more firmly 
establishing it as a science (Kurt & Kutchins, 1992; Lewis, 2006; Maracek & Gavey, 
2013; Rapley, 2012).  
This rehabilitation was largely successful; however, the DSM continues to be 
critiqued on scientific grounds, with questions raised, for example, on issues of 
diagnostic reliability and validity (Kurt & Kutchins, 1992; Kurt & Kutchins, 1997; 
Johnstone, 2006; Thomas, 2013). These critiques often also go beyond challenging the 
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DSM’s empirical evidence base and point to the ways in which diagnostic criterion are 
enculturated, as opposed to objective and neutral. The historical debates regarding the 
inclusion of homosexuality and related diagnoses and ongoing concerns with the 
inclusion of GID and gender dysphoria illustrate and support such critiques, showing how 
social values are embedded in psychiatric diagnoses.  
Homosexuality was included as a disorder in the first (1952) and second (1968) 
editions of the DSM. The APA board of trustees voted to remove it in 1973, due in large 
part to pressure from gay and lesbian activists (Bayer, 1981). This decision was 
challenged, leading the APA to hold a referendum on the matter. The majority voted to 
uphold the decision, but at this time the APA also created the diagnosis of sexual 
orientation disturbance to pathologize those unhappy with their homosexuality (Stein, 
2012, p. 110). This was replaced with ego-dystonic homosexuality (EDH) in the DSM – 
III (1980). EDH quickly met with criticism from gay and lesbian activists and did not 
appear in the revised DSM – III – TR (1987). The DSM – III also included the diagnosis 
gender identity disorder for those displaying ‘gender variant’ behavior; the diagnosis was 
required for those seeking sex reassignment surgeries. GID was changed to gender 
dysphoria (GD) in DSM-5 (2013) and continues to be the subject of intense debate (see 
for example Daley & Mulé, 2010). While homosexuality is no longer officially diagnosed 
as a mental illness, GID has been used to pathologize both queer and trans people, as will 
be discussed below. Gay and lesbian studies, queer studies and trans studies have done 
much to explicate the meaning and impact of these diagnoses. 
 For example, Bayer (1981) charts the history of the declassification of 
homosexuality as a mental disease in the DSM, arguing that this struggle provides insight 
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into the relationship between psychiatry and society. Bayer argues that the process 
through which this change took place exposed the normally obscured enculturated nature 
of dominant concepts of health and illness. As he states,  
Because concepts of disease and health take form within cultural contexts in ways 
that often remain hidden from view, the process of change through which certain 
deviations become labelled as normal or abnormal remains difficult to discern, 
becoming clear only when historical or social conditions permit the piercing of 
the veil of ‘the natural.’ (Bayer, 1981, p. 13) 
 Bayer contends that psychiatric designations of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are 
intricately tied to predominant social values and the decision to declassify homosexuality 
took place because the social conditions of the 1960s created a favourable environment 
for gay activists to push for such change. Challenges to prevailing social values from 
various social movements, including the women's movement, the civil rights movement, 
and the anti-psychiatry movement, overlapped with the demands of gay liberation 
activists for acceptance as mentally healthy members of society. Bayer further argues that 
while psychiatry reflects dominant views, it also changes them. The APA decision to 
remove homosexuality from the DSM is one such example, as it helped legitimize 
homosexuality to a certain extent (Bayer, 1981, p. 14).  
Minton (2002) takes a somewhat different approach in that he focuses on how 
gays and lesbians have used science in emancipatory ways. Rather than focusing on the 
ways that science has been used to oppress gays and lesbians, he demonstrates how gays 
and lesbians contributed to scientific knowledge production about sexuality in order to 
fight for their rights, though their work often went unrecognized. In an effort to rectify 
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this lack of acknowledgment, he describes the unpublished work of lesbian and gay 
activist-researchers of the early and mid-20
th
 century. Minton's work highlights gay and 
lesbian agency as well as the positive uses of science.  
Minton (2002) ends with a chapter on the depathologizing of homosexuality, 
focusing on activist-researcher contributions. Under the subheading “Sanity and 
Empowerment,” he describes what he sees as the impact of the APA's decision to delete 
homosexuality from the DSM:  
Thrusting off the straitjacket of sickness empowered gay men and lesbians in two 
ways. First, it accorded them a sense of personal pride and group solidarity, 
resources necessary to resist the power of heterosexist ideology… Second, 
removing the official stamp of illness enabled gay people and their supporters to 
establish a legitimate foundation for communication (such as gay and lesbian 
studies) (Minton, 2002, p. 262 ).  
This is a fairly typical characterization of the benefits of declassifying homosexuality as a 
mental illness. However, it is problematic in that it suggests that pride, solidarity, and 
‘legitimate’ communication are not possible when one is considered mad, ignoring the 
efforts and successes of the anti-psychiatry movement, mad pride, and mad scholarship. 
It also rather uncritically reinforces the notion that legitimacy is tied to being seen as sane 
without acknowledging that this is still a problem for those deemed mad, whether queer 
or not. Minton also seems somewhat glib in suggesting that the official removal of 
homosexuality and EDH from the DSM would put an end to the pathologizing of gays 
and lesbians. 
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As Sedgwick (1993) points out, the first DSM to drop the diagnosis of 
homosexuality (DSM III) was also the first to list gender identity disorder. She contends 
that this new diagnosis continued the work of pathologizing effeminate boys (and to a 
lesser extent masculine girls) that was previously accomplished through the diagnosis of 
homosexuality. Sedgwick claims that the gay movement has been reluctant to protest this 
new diagnosis and its impact on effeminate boys, as it is eager to distance itself from the 
association of effeminacy with homosexuality and the attending conflation of gender and 
sexuality. She contends that psychiatry is one of the many institutions that work towards 
the eradication of gay people and that GID is just one more tool in the arsenal. Written in 
1993, this article does not consider the impact of GID on trans people or the ways in 
which the trans movement has engaged the diagnosis.  
More recently Butler (2004) has outlined current debates within gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, queer, trans, and intersex (GLBQTI) communities about whether or not gender 
identity disorder (GID) should be removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). Some argue that the listing of GID in the DSM allows trans 
people access to medical services they might not otherwise be able to obtain, thus 
enabling trans autonomy. Butler acknowledges the need for access to body modification 
procedures, but argues that the access to services enabled by GID comes at the cost of 
submission to the pathologizing discourse of psychology. As she states, “One must be 
subjected to a regulatory apparatus…in order to get to the point where something like an 
exercise in freedom becomes possible” (Butler, 2004, pp. 90-91). She argues that GID is 
particularly dangerous for youth, who may not have the resources and support to resist 
the pathologizing force of the diagnosis. Butler contends that GID (re)produces and 
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(re)enforces gender norms, acting as a form of social violence as well as a form of social 
recognition. 
Like Butler (2004), Spade (2006) argues that GID is a form of social violence. He 
uses his experiences of seeking sex reassignment surgery (SRS) to examine the ways in 
which GID enforces normative ways of being gendered. He finds that those who present 
a gendered sense of self that does not fit the diagnostic criteria for GID are seen as not 
‘truly’ transsexual and unsuitable candidates for SRS procedures. Many trans people feel 
compelled to perform their gender according to “their prior knowledge of the diagnostic 
criteria” to be seen as ‘authentically’ trans by medical practitioners and gain access to 
hormones and surgeries (Spade, 2006, p. 326). Spade argues that the imperative to 
present a narrative that heavily ascribes to normative conceptions of masculinity and 
femininity serves to eradicate “norm-resistant possibilities” (Spade, 2006, p. 325). He 
concludes that a “disability– or disease-based understanding” of gender variance 
denigrates trans people and is “too high a price to pay for a small hope of conditional 
tolerance” (Spade, 2006, p. 329). 
Lev (2005) examines how the diagnosis of GID is problematic in that it 
pathologizes both trans and homosexual people. Lev argues that trans people are seen as 
mentally ill by virtue of being trans, as a “mental illness model leaves no room for the 
recognition of mentally healthy and functional transgender and transsexual people who 
may desire sexual reassignment treatments” (p. 48). Further, GID is also sometimes used 
to diagnose gender variant homosexuals who are not transgender by clinicians who 
continue to see homosexuality as a mental illness (Lev, 2005, p. 50). Lev contends that 
GID is often used to target gender variant children (who may grow up to be either 
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homosexual or transsexual) under the guise of protecting them from peer bullying. She 
also points to the sexist character of the diagnostic criteria, which rely on “stereotypical 
definitions of ‘normal’ male and female behaviour” (Lev, 2005, p. 51). Lev concludes 
that GID is an example of psychology using moral criteria to pathologize behaviour that 
does not conform to social norms. She suggests that GID should be reformed in such a 
way that would depathologize gender variant behaviour, yet still allow for access to 
medical treatment for transgender and transsexual people. As she states, “approval for 
medical treatment should not depend on being mentally ill, but on being mentally sound 
enough to make empowered and healthy decisions regarding one's body and life” (Lev, 
2005, p. 59). 
More recently, Daley and Mulé (2010) wrote a position paper in response to the 
APA’s solicitation of input into revisions proposed to various diagnoses for the 
publication of DSM-5 in 2013. Regarding gender identity disorders, they recommend the 
removal of the proposed diagnosis of gender incongruence in children (formerly gender 
identity disorder in DSM III and IV) on the basis that this results in the “surveillance and 
pathologizing” of children who are non-normatively gendered and sexualized and the 
reinforcement of gender and sexual norms (Daley & Mulé, 2010, p. 3). Regarding the 
inclusion of gender incongruence in adolescents and adults (formerly gender identity 
disorder in DSM III and IV), they state that they are politically aligned with the position 
of removing it altogether, but recognize that a diagnosis is still necessary for trans people 
to access health insurance coverage. Echoing Lev (2005), they call this “gate keeping” 
that represents “systemic abuses of power” and urge governments to makes changes to 
these regulations to allow trans people to access insurance coverage without a diagnosis 
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(Daley & Mulé, 2010, p. 4). They note that a change to the regulations is “a keystone” in 
the depathologizing of trans people (Daley & Mulé, 2010, p. 4). Further, they recommend 
listing gender identity disorders and sexual paraphilias under Axis IV (psychosocial and 
environmental factors contributing to the disorder) rather than Axis I (clinical disorders), 
where they are currently listed, in order to “support recognition of the social, cultural and 
political forces  related to the social construction of sexual and gender identities as mental 
illnesses and marked distress as a result of the stigmatization of, and discrimination 
against, diverse sexual and gender identities” (Daley & Mulé, p. 11). Daley and Mulé 
(2010) also support a number of the proposed changes, including the name change from 
gender identity disorder to gender incongruence, as this would “avoid establishing a 
‘natural’ association between discomfort/distress and one’s experience of gender 
incongruence as might be implied…by the use of the term gender dysphoria” (p. 5).4 
This focus on the problematic pathologizing of LGBQT people is very important. 
However there is a lack of research that addresses the experiences of LGBQT people who 
do in fact self-identify as mad and/or those who have had been given a mental illness 
diagnosis aside from GID. In some respects the common emphasis in the literature on the 
importance of distancing LGBQT people from mental illness may reflect and promote 
ableist beliefs about madness. For example, Spade’s (2006) critique of a disability-based 
understanding of transsexuality fails to unpack the ableism inherent in medical discourses 
about gender variance and the role of ableism in the desire to reject a disability-based 
model. Likewise, Lev’s (2005) analysis raises the question of how we decide who is 
“mentally sound enough” to exercise decision-making power. In doing so, she leaves 
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 Gender identity disorder was changed to gender dysphoria in DSM-5. Gender dysphoria in children was 
not removed. Gender dysphoria is no longer listed under ‘sexual disorders’ (as was GID), and has its own 
chapter. DSM-5 discards the multi-axial diagnostic scheme altogether. 
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intact the ableist assumption that those who are ‘mentally ill’ are incapable of making 
“healthy decisions” about their own lives.  
The distancing of marginalized groups from the notion of disability as a tactic of 
fighting for equality has a long history. Baynton (2001) points to the history of “women’s 
suffrage, African American freedom, and immigration restriction” as examples of the 
ways in which oppressed groups have been labelled disabled as a way of justifying 
oppression and inequality (para. 1). He argues that the efforts to combat marginalization 
in these three contexts focused on resisting the label of disability, rather than arguing that 
disability is not grounds for inequality. He contends that this suggest that there is “tacit 
acknowledgement across the political spectrum that when disability is present, inequality 
is indeed justified” (Baynton, 2001, para. 8). Gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and 
trans studies must be careful not to perpetuate ableism and sanism in the service of 
arguing against the pathologization of LGBQT people. In this way gay and lesbian 
studies, queer studies, and trans studies could benefit from analyses present in anti-
psychiatry activism that advance critiques of ableism and sanism and reclaim madness as 
a source of pride and solidarity. 
These types of concerns are evident on both a theoretical and an everyday level. 
At a recent Canadian Institute for Health Research (CIHR) funded Café Scientifique 
regarding LGBT people and mental health, frustration erupted during the question and 
answer period.
5
 Some members of the audience were angry about the lack of 
acknowledgment of LGBQT people in Toronto's mad community, as well as the lack of 
acknowledgment of mad people in queer and trans communities. Others expressed anger 
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 Rewriting a History of Pathologization: LGBT People and Mental Health Research in Canada, hosted by 
the Sherbourne Health Centre in collaboration with CIHR, June 8, 2011, at the Gladstone Hotel, Toronto 
ON. 
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about the white-centricity of both communities. Some audience members told of ableist 
experiences in queer communities, often based on efforts to distance queerness from 
madness. Some felt that the Café Scientifique did not go far enough in addressing these 
concerns and was simply capitalizing on mad LGBQT people as another academic trend. 
The presence of these concerns in both the academic literature and the everyday lives of 
mad people indicates the need for respectful social research that addresses these issues 
and highlights the potential concerns in doing so. In the final section of this chapter, I 
explain my methodological decisions in carrying out my research. 
Qualitative interviewing 
 
For this project I conducted 37 qualitative interviews with LGBQT people about 
their experiences of mental distress. Nineteen participants were recruited in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, and 18 in Toronto, Ontario. I chose to interview in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and 
Toronto, Ontario, in order to allow for the possibility of making comparative assessments 
and exploring the differences between living in a metropolis with a strong psychiatric 
survivor community and a smaller city with fewer community resources.  
Toronto, the biggest city in Canada with a population of about 2.79 million and 
5.5 million in the Greater Toronto Area, is much more heavily populated than Winnipeg, 
the capital of Manitoba, which has a population of approximately 700,000. Yet the two 
are both ‘big cities’ in that Winnipeg is the largest city in Manitoba and larger than the 
second biggest city, Brandon, by approximately 68,000 people. According to the 2011 
census, Toronto has the largest number of residents who are immigrants, at 49% 
(Statistics Canada, 2013a). In comparison, 28% of Winnipeg residents and 21% of 
Canada’s total population are immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2013b). Forty-nine percent 
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of Toronto residents identified as “visible minorities” as opposed to 21% in Winnipeg 
and 19% nationally (Statistics Canada, 2013a; Statistics Canada, 2013b). The top three 
visible minority groups in Toronto are South Asian (12% of Toronto’s total 2011 
population), Chinese (11%), and Black (9%) (Statistics Canada, 2013a). In Winnipeg the 
largest groups are Filipino (9% of total 2011 population), South Asian (4%) and Black 
(3%) (Statistics Canada, 2013b). The most commonly reported “ethnic origins” amongst 
Toronto residents are English (13% of Toronto’s population), Chinese (12%) and 
Canadian (11%) (Statistics Canada, 2013a). In Winnipeg the biggest groups are English 
(21% of Winnipeg’s population), Scottish (17%) and Canadian (17%) (Statistics Canada, 
2013b). Toronto’s Aboriginal groups make up 0.8 percent of the total Toronto 
population, compared to 11% of Winnipeg’s and 4.3% nationally (Statistics Canada, 
2013a; Statistics Canada, 2013b).  
As these numbers show, Toronto is unusual in that it is home to significantly 
more immigrants and ‘visible minorities’ than any other Canadian city. In this respect, 
Winnipeg is a more typical Canadian city, and including it as a research site allows me to 
extend my analysis beyond Toronto. Further, as the province with the largest population 
and 40 universities, Ontario is often the site of Canadian research studies. Southwestern 
Ontario and Toronto in particular, with its large and diverse population, is a common 
choice for researchers.
6
 Adding a second, less researched site broadens the perspective 
and shows what commonalities exist, despite any provincial and local differences. 
Indeed, I found that there were far more similarities than differences in the participants’ 
narratives, and these are emphasized throughout the dissertation. 
                                                 
6
 Of these 40 Ontario universities, 23 are publicly funded and 17 are privately funded religious institutions. 
In comparison, Manitoba has 7 universities, three of which are publicly funded and four of which are 
privately funded religious institutions. 
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I began interviewing in August 2010 and completed the interviews in February 
2012. Qualitative interviewing offered a unique opportunity to engage in meaningful 
dialogue and collect rich data. The participants were generous with their time and stories 
and shared extensively with me. This kind of data can not be acquired through most other 
methods. A quantitative study on this topic would provide an interesting statistical 
overview, but would not yield in-depth experiential accounts. The voices of mad LGBQT 
people are rarely represented in textual sources, so my interviews are an invaluable 
source of first-person accounts of everyday life experience. 
Indeed, one of the benefits of using qualitative interviews as the research method for 
this project is to ensure the presence of the participants’ voices in this dissertation. This is 
particularly important when studying marginalized groups, since their voices have often 
been ignored and silenced. As Gamson (2000) contends, qualitative research methods 
“make more room for voices and experiences that have been suppressed” (p. 347). 
Indeed, queer, feminist, and antiracist researchers often make use of qualitative methods 
for this reason (Browne & Nash, 2010). Qualitative interviews allow more space for 
exploring and presenting participants’ voices than other methods such as surveys or 
questionnaires. As Fine and Kidder (1997) argue, the nature of qualitative data “is not 
simply that they are ‘not numbers,’ but that they are analyzed with an ear for what 
informants are saying rather than an eye on predetermined categories and hypotheses” (p. 
47). 
More specifically, ensuring the presence of participants’ voices is crucial for projects 
that include participants who have been positioned as ‘mentally ill,’ as the knowledge and 
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experiences of mad people have long been discounted. As Lapsley, Waimarie, & Black 
(2002) state,  
Traditionally, users of mental health services have been stigmatised, regarded as 
unreliable sources, and denied a voice in the literature of mental health. Linking 
mental illness (madness or lunacy) with unreason, excess, incapacity and 
unreliability are historically entrenched attitudes in Western societies. These 
attitudes sit alongside the growth of power and expertise in the medical and 
helping professions which have led to the denial of a voice for clients/consumers 
(p. 4). 
I believe it is very important to privilege the participants’ voices as experts on their own 
lives and experiences. For this reason I make use of long block quotations throughout this 
dissertation and minimize my own paraphrasing and rewording of their experiences. I 
offer a critical analysis of the interview material and frame interviewees’ responses 
through my choices about which questions to ask and which quotations to use. However, 
I tend to present the interview material as it stands, rather than extrapolating from what 
participants have said. This is my attempt to minimize the potential of perpetuating 
“oppression and stigmatization of consumers through the reinterpretation of lived 
experience” something that Phillips (2006) contends is a widespread phenomenon (p. 
173).  
Qualitative interviewing also allows for a certain amount of flexibility in the 
interview process. I created an interview guide of open-ended questions about identity, 
health, work, and community that functioned as a base from which to start. Additional 
questions arose throughout the individual interviews. Listening carefully to interviewees 
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and adding new questions accordingly can make the interviewer, the interview, and the 
study more “interviewee oriented” (Bart & O’Brien as cited in Reinhartz, 1992, p. 21). 
The open-ended interview format allowed me to follow up on various comments made by 
participants with new questions, although I always returned to the interview guide in 
order to maintain some consistency among interviews. 
Another advantage of qualitative interviews is that they allow space for a more 
nuanced discussion of self-identity. As Warner (2004) states, “Any attempt to quantify 
homosexuals, heterosexuals, etc., assumes a commonality between the individual’s 
desires and lives that is suspect. Qualitative approaches have a better chance of 
accounting for queer experiences in the same terms as the actual people living these 
experiences” (p. 335). Warner is referring specifically to sexuality categories, but I think 
his point is also applicable to gender, race, class, and dis/ability. To get a sense of how 
participants identify, I asked the open-ended question, ‘How do you describe yourself in 
terms of sexuality, gender, race, class, and disability?’ Many of the participants provided 
complex discussions of many aspects of their identities, which points to the difficulties of 
quantifying or simplifying any aspect of identity, not just sexual identity. For example, 
one participant described his race, class, sexuality, gender, and disability as “liminal” and 
“not easily defined as one or the other.” He discussed being perceived as white, 
racialized, able-bodied, disabled, and a long list of queer, trans, and cisgender identities, 
depending on the circumstances. As he told me, “everything about me is so complicated 
and hard to point out.” This participant’s response points to the limitations of identity 
categories to capture the experiences of those who don’t consistently pass as “one or the 
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other.” I found that qualitative interviewing allowed for more detailed discussions of 
these complexities.  
However, it is not my intention to argue that there should be an imperative for 
queer, feminist, and antiracist scholars to make use of qualitative methods only. As 
Browne and Nash (2010) argue, there is no single “queer method” and it is unwise to 
discount quantitative methods. As they state, “There is a danger in... asserting that queer 
epistemologies, methodologically, require the use of qualitative methods only, or must 
always contest traditional and conventional techniques” (Browne & Nash, 2010, p. 12). 
While I believe that qualitative interviewing is the best choice of method for my project, I 
would argue that a thorough consideration of methodological choices and ethics in 
research practice is equally if not more important than the method. 
Terminology and methodology 
 
The depth of discussion of identity elicited in the interviews was very important, 
but also created challenges for my writing in terms of choosing language for referring to 
the study participants as a group. I asked participants to self-identify using whatever 
words they felt most comfortable with instead of choosing from a list of my creation. I 
made this choice because I believe that self-identification is particularly important for 
groups who have long been defined by others. When it came time to write a demographic 
breakdown of the study participants, I struggled with creating a coherent description from 
the long and varied list of terms used by the participants. I have made sense of this as 
follows (see Appendix A for a chart version of the following). 
The research participants were between the ages of 20 and 49, with 51% (19) in 
their 20s, 35% (13) in their 30s, and 14% (5) in their 40s. In terms of gender, 49% (18) of 
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participants identified as female and 38% (14) identified as male. Of the female 
participants, 17% (5) also identified as trans and/or genderqueer, as did 50% (7) of the 
male participants. The remaining 14% (5) of participants did not specify either male or 
female, identifying simply as trans and/or genderqueer. Many participants used more than 
one term to describe their sexuality; 62% (23) identified as queer, 22% (8) as gay, 14% 
(5) as lesbian, 8% (3) as bisexual, 5% (2) as pansexual/omnisexual, and 3% (1) as 
heterosexual. The participants also used many terms to describe their race and ethnicity, 
but broadly speaking 59% (22) of participants identified as white and 41% (15) identified 
as racialized. In addition to identifying as white, 5% (2) identified as French Canadian, 
5% (2) as Eastern European, 3% (1) as Western European, 3% (1) as Scottish, and 3% (1) 
as Jewish. Of the participants who identified as racialized, 11% (4) identified as black, 
11% as Métis (4), 11% (4) as mixed race/biracial, 5% (2) as Aboriginal, 3% (1) as brown, 
3% (1) as Korean, 3% (1) as East Asian, 3% (1) as South Asian, 3% (1) as Middle 
Eastern, 3% (1) as Indonesian, and 3% (1) as Muslim. Just over half of the participants 
(51%) (19) identified as low income and the remaining 49% (18) identified as middle 
class. In terms of disability, 51% (19) of participants identified as having one or more 
physical and/or mental disabilities. It is important to note that the numbers for sexuality 
and race do not add up to 100 because many participants identified with more than one 
term
7
. 
In the initial stages of researching and writing I used the phrase ‘queer and/or 
trans,’ and ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and/or trans’ (LGBQT) to refer to the 
participants as a group. I envisioned ‘queer’ and ‘trans’ as umbrella terms that would 
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 This sample is limited in that it does not include youth and those over 50, those who are incarcerated in 
prisons or psychiatric institutions, those who do not have documented status in Canada, and those who 
identify as Filipino or Latin American. 
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encompass a longer list of identity categories such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender, transsexual, and genderqueer. However, after careful consideration of the 
demographics I have decided to use ‘LGBQT’ to refer to the participants. While many 
(62%) used the term ‘queer’ to describe themselves, there are enough who did not to 
warrant the use of ‘LGBQT.’ It is important to note that ‘LGBQT’ still subsumes some 
identities. Notably, the ‘T’ that stands for ‘trans’ still serves as an umbrella term for the 
participants who identified as trans, transgender, transsexual, and genderqueer.
8
 
However, ‘LBGTQ’ is more inclusive of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual participants who 
did not use ‘queer’ to describe themselves. 
While I have chosen to use ‘LGBQT’ to refer to the participants, I do make use of 
‘queer’ throughout this dissertation. At times, I employ ‘queer’ as an identity category. 
Early uses of ‘queer’ in the late 1980s and 1990s by academics and activists such as 
Queer Nation were often anti-identitarian. ‘Queer’ was seen as impossible to fully define, 
“a zone of possibilities” (Edelman, 1994, p.114). ‘Queer’ shifted the focus from identity 
to acts, desires, bodies, and performances, drawing attention to “mismatches between sex, 
gender and desire” (Jagose, 1996, p. 3). While queer still references such mismatches, it 
has also been taken up as an identity category. As Gamson (2000) contends, the term 
‘queer’ can be used to “mark an identity that, defined as it is by a deviation from sex and 
gender norms either by the self inside or by specific behaviours, is always in flux” (p. 
349). 
The participants who used ‘queer’ to describe themselves used it as an anti-
homonormative identity category that is expansive and fluid enough to encompass 
attractions, bodies, desires, and sexual practices that challenge normative understandings 
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 None of the participants identified as two-spirit. 
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of sex, gender, and sexuality. For example, when asked what ‘queer’ means to him, one 
participant said, “it is a way of positioning myself outside of gay and lesbian politics.” He 
went on to describe how ‘queer’ also solved some of his difficulties in explaining his 
sexuality to others. As a trans person attracted to “a variety of different bodies and 
sexualities” including those who don’t identify as male or female, this participant saw 
‘queer’ as “much more inclusive” term and more capable of conveying “the multi-
dimensionality of desire.” For this participant, as for many, the term ‘queer’ serves both 
political and identitarian functions and encompasses a complex set of attractions, desires, 
bodies, and sexual practices. When I make use of the term ‘queer’ throughout this 
dissertation, it is often in this sense: to reference politics, identity, and gender and sexual 
dissidence. 
When it came time to compose the call for participants, I also struggled with what 
terminology to use in terms of mental health in order to reach the people I was interested 
in interviewing. In my dissertation proposal, as above, I stated that I would be conducting 
interviews with those who self-identify as mad or mentally ill or who had been deemed as 
such (or, alternatively, psychiatric survivor, psychiatric service user or consumer) and 
who also identify as queer, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and/or trans. I chose this terminology 
to describe the participants I sought in order to be as inclusive as possible. I included the 
language ‘deemed as such’ as well as ‘self-identify’ in order to indicate that I was 
interested in speaking with those who have a medical diagnosis concerning their mental 
health as well as those who do not, in order to avoid perpetuating the notion that medical 
authorities should be the ones to distinguish the ‘sane’ from the ‘insane.’ I was not 
interested in framing my population sample in terms of how the participants have been 
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diagnosed, as I believe this ascribes too much weight to medical categorization, and I 
wanted to capture a range of attitudes towards diagnosis and self-identification. For 
example, I anticipated that some participants may reject medical labels altogether, some 
may use them in certain contexts and not others, and others may fully embrace them. 
Indeed, the reasons for these kinds of choices and the process of self-identification will 
be among the topics I explore in this dissertation.  
However, I found that my initial call for participants was unsuccessful in 
conveying who I was looking for. I asked several people who had indicated to me that 
they would be interested in participating when I described my project verbally for 
feedback on the written call for participants. I was told that the terms ‘mad’ and ‘mentally 
ill’ were too ‘strong’ and that both conveyed pathology and sickness in a way that was 
not appealing. With this helpful feedback in mind, I revised my call for participants to 
state that I was looking for those who felt that mental health had personally and directly 
affected them. Though I would argue that we all have a personal and direct relationship to 
mental health, this phraseology in combination with a more specific list of identities 
(psychiatric survivor, mad, psychiatric service user, consumer, and mentally ill) was 
successful in reaching a more inclusive group of people. Interviewees used a large variety 
of terms to refer to their identities in terms of mental health, including various psychiatric 
diagnoses, crazy, mad, psychiatric service user, psychiatric survivor, consumer, and 
mentally ill. This assortment of terms reflects the participants’ range of approaches to 
conceptualizing madness or mental health. Some participants rejected the medical model 
of ‘mental illness’ and eschewed medical labels altogether, choosing more politicized 
terms to describe themselves. Some used medical model language strategically, for 
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example to make themselves intelligible in certain contexts such as in healthcare facilities 
and the workplace. Others embraced the medical model and employed the term mentally 
ill unequivocally. Though the participants used a wide variety of terms, I have chosen to 
use the terms ‘madness,’ ‘mental distress,’ and ‘mental health’ in my written work for the 
reasons described in my introduction. 
Recruitment and conducting interviews 
 
Participants were recruited through posting notices in various health-related 
and/or queer-centered locations and through online means. In Winnipeg I posted hard 
copy notices at the Rainbow Resource Centre, Nine Circles Community Health Centre, 
Manitoba Harm Reduction Network, Sage House, Four Rivers Medical Clinic, Mount 
Carmel Clinic, Klinic Community Health Centre, and the Canadian Mental Health 
Association. I sent online notices through the Rainbow Resource News, the listserv for 
the University of Winnipeg’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans Centre, and the listserv for 
the Sexuality Education Resource Center Manitoba (SERC).  
In Toronto I posted hard copy notices at the Centre for Women and Trans People 
at York University and the office space for the Trans, Bisexual, Lesbian, Gay Allies at 
York University (TBLGAY). I circulated a call for participants on the Mad Student 
Society Listserv, the Consumer/Survivor Information Centre Resource Bulletin of 
Toronto, York University’s listerv for the Centre for Women and Trans People (CWTP), 
the Trans, Bisexual, Lesbian, Gay Allies at York University (TBLGAY), the Lesbians, 
Gays, Bisexuals, and Transpeople of the University of Toronto (LGBTOUT), and on the 
Rainbow Health Ontario website. I also recruited through personal networks of friends 
and acquaintances in both cities through word of mouth, e-mail, and Facebook. I believe 
  63   
that 37 interviews provided an adequate amount of data that allowed me to hear a range 
of voices and identify major themes. 
Setting up the interviews took place mainly over e-mail, with only a few 
interactions taking place over the telephone. Participants were given the option to choose 
any public space where they felt comfortable to do the interview. Most Winnipeg 
participants chose my suggestion of the University of Winnipeg and most Toronto 
participants chose my suggestion of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE). 
While I hesitated to suggest potentially intimidating academic institutions, I chose to 
suggest the University of Winnipeg and OISE for their centrality and the availability of 
more private spaces for interviewing.  
Participants were informed that the digitally recorded interview would be 
approximately 45 minutes to 2 hours in length, that they were free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without penalty, and that they were not required to answer any 
questions considered to be inappropriate, invasive or offensive. Participants were 
informed that there was no compensation for participating in the study. All participants 
were given the option to receive a transcript of the interview after it was transcribed in 
order to review it and make any changes before I made use it. Twenty-six participants 
asked for a copy of the transcript and 4 made minor revisions by clarifying and adding 
additional comments. Transcribed interviews were coded for common themes using 
NVivo coding software. 
Ethical research practice 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity are important aspects of ethical research practice. 
On the interview consent form I gave participants the option to use their legal name or to 
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choose a pseudonym. I phrased this as follows, “You have the option to use a pseudonym 
or to use your real name. Please indicate the name you would like used.” I provided a 
blank space following the words, “pseudonym or name.” I also explained this option 
verbally as participants were filling out the consent form and made sure they were aware 
of what they were agreeing to. In the space provided, 4 participants gave their legal first 
and last names, 14 gave a pseudonym or asked me to choose one, and 19 gave their legal 
first name only. For the sake of consistency, I make use of first names only, whether legal 
or pseudonymous. 
Another salient ethical issue specific to my population sample is the prevalent 
well-founded distrust of academic research and researchers based on the exploitation of 
marginalized groups by academics. Many scholars have pointed out that disabled people 
and specifically those with psychiatric disabilities have been subjected to unethical 
research practices and treated in ableist ways by researchers (see for example Oliver, 
1992; Phillips, 2006; Shakespeare, 1996b; Wilton, 2004). Research has often been used 
against the best interests of people with disabilities, and as Wilton (2004) argues, those 
working for psychiatric survivors’ rights “have critically interrogated the motivations of 
researchers, and with good reason given the way in which scholarship has been used to 
legitimate the social and spatial exclusion of people with physical and psychiatric 
disabilities” (p. 117).  
The methodological literature concerning people with psychiatric disabilities 
tends to compare this exploitation and the resulting suspicion of researchers on the part of 
people with disabilities to what has happened to ‘other’ oppressed groups. Wilton (2004) 
exemplifies this common comparison when he states, “Like other oppressed populations, 
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disabled people have come to regard academics, especially non-disabled academics, and 
academic research with suspicion” (p. 117). This comparison is problematic because it 
assumes that people with psychiatric disabilities are oppressed only on the basis of their 
disability, suggesting that they are therefore white, heterosexual, cisgender, and class 
privileged. As Grillo and Wildman (1991) have pointed out, similar analogies made about 
gender discrimination and race discrimination naturalize whiteness and erase the 
experience of those who experience various forms of oppression as indivisible and 
mutually constitutive. As they state, 
To analogize gender to race, one must assume that each is a distinct category; the 
impact of which can be neatly separated, one from the other. The essentialist 
critique shows that this division is not possible. Whenever it is attempted, the 
experience of women of color, who are at the intersection of these categories and 
cannot divide themselves to compare their own experiences, is rendered invisible. 
(Grillo & Wildman, 1991, p. 404) 
Though Grillo and Wildman are referring here to comparisons made specifically about 
sexism and racism, their argument applies to the assumptions made in the methodological 
literature about people with psychiatric disabilities. This does not mean that analogies 
should never be made; presumably it is possible to analogize without erasing those who 
experience discrimination as mutually constitutive. However, it is not possible to isolate 
one dimension of experience and identity as the only or most salient factor in creating 
mistrust of researchers. 
Many of the people I interviewed occupied multiple subject positions that may 
have led to well-founded suspicion of academic research and researchers. Trans people, 
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queer people, racialized people, low income people, and people with disabilities have all 
been the object of knowledge production that has either erased their existence or 
otherwise exploited them. My population sample included people from all of these 
identity categories, many of whom, of course, identified with more than one of the above. 
It is possible that more transparency about my own subject position could have 
helped ease fears about exploitative academic researchers. Many feminist researchers 
argue that such transparency is part of establishing rapport with participants and 
balancing power relations in the research process (see for example England, 1994; 
McDowell, 1992). I respect researchers who take this approach, but decided not to do so 
myself. I did not explicitly disclose anything about my subject position to participants 
unless they asked. The participants who were recruited through personal networks or who 
recognized me from queer and trans communities in Winnipeg and Toronto no doubt 
knew more about my subject position than those who were strangers. However, my self-
presentation read as queer and genderqueer at the time of the interviews and it is my 
sense that all of the participants understood me as such.  
I also did not discuss my own relationship to mental health unless asked. A few 
participants asked probing questions about my interest in the topic. In these cases I 
provided both academic and personal reasons for my research interests. I also made my 
ideological positions as clear as possible with all participants, emphasizing that I respect 
how people define their own identities and experiences. It is my hope that my demeanor 
also helped reassure participants. I related to them as a peer, rather than as a distant 
professional. This was not forced; it reflects how I felt about the interviewees. ‘Coming 
out’ to participants can be powerful, but it is not always necessary in order to achieve 
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rapport and combat well-founded fears of exploitation. Nor does researcher transparency 
about subject position guarantee respectful research practice. It is my sense that I 
managed to make participants feel comfortable and I received positive feedback 
confirming this from several interviewees.  
It is also important to note that what constitutes ethical research practice is 
subjective. As Philips (2006) states, “The interpretation of what constitutes morally right 
and ethical research is a matter of agreement among members of a particular group at a 
given time; unsurprisingly, different groups will interpret this in different ways” (p. 175). 
The truth of this was brought home to me during the research process. One participant 
told me that upon hearing about her involvement in my study, a friend expressed dismay 
and concern that a researcher who was not professionally trained as a clinician would 
undertake research regarding mental health. I believe that this kind of concern reflects an 
inability to conceptualize research about mental health outside of a medicalized context 
and positions mad people as fragile, volatile, and in need of protection from medical 
professionals.  
This type of ethical concern; when it comes to interviewing people about mental 
health, is widespread. As Holland (2007) argues, ethics review boards often take a 
paternalistic approach when reviewing projects that propose to interview those who have 
been deemed ‘mentally ill’. Holland describes the ethics review feedback on her own 
proposed research regarding mental health, which questioned her qualifications as a 
humanities-based scholar and detailed concerns about her and her supervisory 
committee’s lack of clinical training. The ethics board was also concerned about whether 
or not participants could be considered “well enough” to participate in her project 
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(Holland, 2007, p. 901). She contends that this concern raises questions about the 
definition of ‘well enough’ and who gets to decide whether or not a participant qualifies 
as such. As Holland states, “The concept of ‘well enough’ is difficult to define and third-
party judgments of ‘well enough’ potentially could be based on anything from perceiving 
people as too vulnerable, too emotional, too angry, too resistant, too passive, or too much 
of a threat to the researcher” (p. 901).  
Holland (2007) also points to the contested nature of mental illness and the failure 
of ethics boards in recognizing this and understanding the mad as those who have been 
medicalized rather than as patients (p. 900). She concludes that questioning the ability of 
those who have been deemed mentally ill to consent to participate in social research is in 
fact a violation of human rights and that ethics boards need not assume that ethical 
problems are present solely because of a medical diagnosis of mental illness (Holland, 
2007, p. 910). Though I did not encounter the kinds of problems Holland describes 
during the ethics review process at York University, I believe that the aforementioned 
comments from a participant's friend reflect the kind of attitudes she describes and 
highlights a significant issue in thinking through ethics in relation to my project. 
This also highlights what I see as one of the contributions of my project: that it 
approaches the study of mental health from a social science perspective. The fact that I 
am not using a positivist, medicalized approach may indeed have been part of what 
enticed some interviewees to participate in my project. Many participants expressed a 
dislike for the paternalistic and pathologizing ways in which they had been treated by 
medical professionals. As a researcher coming from outside of medicine or psychology, I 
may have inspired more trust in some participants rather than less. For some participants, 
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especially those who have had negative experiences at the hands of clinicians and 
medical professionals, my project was something they wanted to contribute to precisely 
because it offers ways of understanding mental health outside of a medicalized context. 
In this chapter I critically reviewed some of the literature that I consider to be a 
part of mad studies. I looked at historical work regarding madness, focusing on the ways 
that knowledge production about madness is racialized, sexualized, and gendered. This 
historiography showed how conceptions of madness change over time and how elite 
discourses have shaped dominant worldviews about madness. I then outlined more 
contemporary critiques of psychiatry from anti-psychiatry studies, gay and lesbian 
studies, queer studies, and trans studies in order to discuss the impact of dominant 
discourses of madness on those considered mad. In outlining these critiques I showed the 
ways that anti-psychiatry and gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies 
could usefully inform one another. I argued that anti-psychiatry has made important 
interventions, but has neglected the voices of racialized, queer, and trans people. 
Likewise, in the rush to critique the ways that LGBQT people have been pathologized by 
psychiatric diagnoses, gay and lesbian studies, queer studies, and trans studies have failed 
to take up the other ways that concept of ‘mental illness’ plays a role in the lives of 
LGBQT people. 
I then discussed the methodological decisions regarding this project, emphasizing 
the importance of the inclusion of mad people’s voices through my chosen method of 
qualitative interviewing. I also discussed the recruitment of participants and the 
terminology regarding sexuality, gender, and madness. I concluded with an exploration of 
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some of the relevant ethical considerations, demonstrating the value of a social sciences 
approach in understanding madness. 
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Chapter Two: Making Sense of Madness: Social Approaches to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Queer, and Trans Experiences of Mental Distress 
 
In the last chapter I outlined some of the literature in mad studies that highlights 
the socially constructed character of madness, the gendered, sexualized, and racialized 
nature of knowledge production about mental distress, and the negative impact of 
psychiatric practices on mad people. I also examined scholarly work in queer studies and 
trans studies regarding the problematic pathologizing of non-normative sexualities and 
gender identities. I argued that while these bodies of literature have made important 
interventions, anti-psychiatry studies fails to specifically address the psychiatrization of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (LGBQT) and racialized people, while queer and 
trans studies tends to reflect ableist beliefs about madness and focuses on specific 
diagnoses in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) such as 
homosexuality and gender identity disorder (GID). These attempts to ‘rescue’ LGBQT 
people from the categorization of madness and the accompanying discrimination 
associated with being considered ‘mentally ill’ leaves the biomedical model and all of its 
attending problems intact. Homosexuality and GID are not the only diagnoses that affect 
queer and trans people, and some of the critiques of these diagnoses can in fact further 
alienate LGBQT people who experience mental distress.  
How, then, do we discuss specific issues regarding the psychiatrization of 
LGBQT people without falling prey to ableist ideologies? How do we critique the 
pathologizing of LGBQT people while avoiding the pitfalls of dichotomous thinking that 
reinforces the sane/insane binary as well as the oppression associated with being mad? In 
this chapter I argue that advancing a broader critique of the biomedical model as a whole 
while paying special attention to the ways in which it specifically affects LGBQT people 
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can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the issues facing LGBQT people 
who experience mental distress. The purpose is to understand experiences of madness by 
locating them within social contexts, rather than simply attributing them to individualized 
pathologies. This is particularly salient for LGBQT people, who as members of 
marginalized groups often experience distress related to homophobia, transphobia, and 
other forms of oppression. This chapter is therefore simultaneously a critique of the 
biomedical model of mental illness and an argument for the use of social approaches to 
make sense of LGBQT experiences of mental distress.  
I begin with brief descriptions of the biomedical model of mental illness and 
social approaches to mental distress. I then outline some of the main critiques of the 
biomedical model articulated by my study participants in their explanations regarding 
their dis/identifications with various terminologies related to madness. In some cases, 
these critiques also clearly point to the usefulness of social approaches to mental distress 
as a way to explain their experiences. I then turn to a discussion of psychiatric diagnosis 
as a way of making sense of mental distress in order to further explicate the limitations of 
the biomedical model of mental illness. Finally, I present some of the social factors 
identified by the participants that played a role in their experiences of mental distress, 
arguing that social approaches render these experiences more fully intelligible. 
Making oneself intelligible: The importance of language 
 
 Discussions about mental distress are overdetermined by biomedical model 
frameworks and discourses. I am reminded of this every time I describe my research to 
someone new, both within and outside of academic settings. Inevitably I am met with 
questions or comments about my research regarding ‘mental illness’ or my study 
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population of ‘mentally ill’ participants. Despite my best efforts, I have yet to find a way 
to explain succinctly that my research is not about ‘mental illness’ and ‘the mentally ill.’ 
This speaks to the success of the biomedical model in pervading and dominating both 
academic and mainstream consciousness. It also indicates the importance of language in 
structuring frameworks of intelligibility.  
Many scholars who theorize social approaches to understanding mental distress 
underscore the importance of language in this endeavour (Boyle, 2011; Johnstone, 2006; 
Tew, 2005; Tew, 2011). As Boyle (2011) contends, “linguistic devices” are crucial in 
foregrounding social context, and it will be difficult to do this “without entirely 
abandoning medical language, including the term ‘mental health,’ because using this 
language is the quickest and most effective way of implying lack of intelligibility and 
suggesting a pathological or deficient individual” (p. 41). Boyle is referring here to 
mental health practitioners and researchers and acknowledges that this will be a difficult 
task given the predominance of “context-free and context-lite language” (p.41). It is 
perhaps even more difficult for those who are medicalized and at a power disadvantage to 
insist on an alternative language. Yet many participants did indicate resistance to 
biomedical terminology and perspectives. It is therefore important to explore the different 
implications and possibilities that arise when biomedical model language is challenged or 
rejected.  
This challenge is not simply a matter of semantics. As Beresford (2002) argues, 
“the interest of mental health service users/survivors in exploring difference conceptual 
frameworks and approaches has become visible through their development of a different 
language, which replaces the idea of ‘mental illness’ with terms like ‘madness’ and 
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‘mental distress’” (p. 582). This chapter will therefore draw on the conversations I had 
with participants about their dis/identifications with various terms, identities, and 
diagnostic categories. However, this is not simply a discussion of the different ways in 
which participants self-identified. As will be seen, the participants’ rationales for 
rejecting or embracing various terminologies often pointed to some of the fundamental 
problems with the biomedical model itself and indicated the value of social approaches to 
mental distress.  
The ways in which participants discussed these matters indicates that language 
use and identity formation is complex and sometimes seemingly contradictory. For 
example, even those who spoke about rejecting medicalized ways of understanding 
themselves often used diagnostic categories to make parts of their experience intelligible. 
Again, this exemplifies the difficulties of talking about mental distress in a way that it is 
not medicalized. In some cases, this was due to the permeation of diagnostic terms into 
colloquial language, such as ‘depression’ and ‘anxiety.’ For example, Esther, a white, 
queer, cisgender woman in Winnipeg, said that she does not “trust the medical system 
very much” and so does not “really identify with most of the terms that are coming out of 
that system.” She had “read a little bit about anxiety disorders and always felt like those 
didn’t apply,” yet she needed a name for what she was experiencing. As she said, 
‘anxiety’ “was the closest one that I could find, without actually doing a whole lot of 
research or asking of hard questions. It’s also a mild word compared to some other 
words.” When I asked her what she meant by ‘a mild word,’ she replied, “I feel like that 
word gets used a lot. People will say ‘I’m feeling anxious’ or ‘there was a lot of anxiety 
in the room at that event’ or things like that. And so it’s a word that gets used in everyday 
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conversation a lot. And maybe for that reason it doesn’t have as much heaviness.” As 
Esther’s comments also indicate, diagnostic categories can provide a shorthand way of 
‘making sense’ of sets of experiences, thoughts, or behaviours that do not have other 
readily available names, even when the participant does not ‘put much stock’ in the 
legitimacy of such categorizations.
9
 This is indicative of the ways in which ideologies 
that can be theorized as discrete are not necessarily experienced as such in everyday life. 
For the sake of coherency, I therefore very loosely refer to participants as those who 
make use of medicalized frameworks to understand themselves and those who challenge 
such perspectives based on whether or not this was mostly the case. However, the reader 
should bear in mind that most participants demonstrated an overlapping mixture of 
ideologies in their narratives and that participants’ perspectives and identities are not 
static and shift over the course of time. Moreover, while I expected that there might be 
some strong differences in terms of how participants identified given the presence of mad 
activist groups in Toronto and the lack of such groups in Winnipeg, this was not the case, 
perhaps because none of the participants were involved in mad activism. I therefore do 
not make distinctions between the Toronto and Winnipeg groups. 
The biomedical model of mental illness 
 Despite the prevalence of the biomedical model of mental illness, there may be 
some confusion as to the specifics of what is being referred to. Lewis (2006) describes 
the main tenets of this model as follows: ‘mental illness’ is a disabling, biological 
deficiency that is “accompanied by physical pathology,” and can be “classified as distinct 
disorders that have characteristic common features” (p. 107). Further, the causes of 
                                                 
9
 The reader will note that I do not identify participants using diagnostic categories to avoid legitimizing 
medicalized perspectives as ‘the truth’ about the participants’ experiences and identities. 
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‘mental illness’ can be explained “in terms of physical illness” such as brain structure, 
genetics and biochemistry (Lewis, 2006, p. 107). While psychiatry, as a medical science, 
is most obviously informed by biomedicalism, this perspective also extends to 
psychology. As Rapley, Moncrieff, and Dillon (2011) state, “Mainstream 
psychology…while sometimes appearing to offer alternative approaches, essentially 
supports the positivist psychiatric project of codifying human suffering into disease-like 
categories” (p. 1). There are versions of psychiatry and psychology that place more 
emphasis on social context, but as Beresford (2005) claims, even these “have taken as 
given the over-arching medicalized framework of ‘mental illness’, although differing in 
the extent to which they saw it as a consequence of nature or nurture” (p. 36). The same 
claim has been made about social work practice and education (Poole et al 2012). 
Seemingly ubiquitous, the biomedical view of mental illness extends well beyond formal 
medical contexts. It is evident in anti-stigma campaigns that compare ‘mental illness’ to a 
‘disease like any other,’ in news stories that attribute violent behaviour to ‘mentally ill’ 
perpetrators, and in television shows like Mental (2009) and Cracked (2013) and 
blockbuster movies such as A Beautiful Mind (2001) and Black Swan (2010). Therefore, 
when I refer to the biomedical model of mental illness, I am invoking a concept much 
larger than simply that which forms the basis of the medical practice of psychiatry. 
As other scholars have argued, there is inadequate evidence to support biomedical 
explanations of ‘mental disorder,’ yet it remains the predominant framework (Beresford, 
2002; Johnstone, 2006; Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011; Tew, 2011). As Lewis (2006) 
contends, there are any number of problems with the biomedical model of mental illness, 
including the ways it serves to “naturalize and reify ‘mental illness,’” perpetuates the 
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“medicalization of deviance,” upholds “psychiatry as an agent of normalization, state 
control, and multicultural oppression,” supports the pharmaceutical industry, and 
precludes the use of multiple approaches to understanding madness (p. 109). Perhaps one 
of the most significant problems is that ‘service users’ find it largely unhelpful 
(Beresford, Nettle, & Perring, 2010).  
One of the biggest challenges to the veracity of the biomedical model of mental 
illness is the lack of identifiable causal biological factors. Diagnosis of any illness is 
based on “clusters of symptoms” (subjective complaints such as fatigue, inability to 
concentrate) as well as “signs such as measures of blood sugar, white cell blood 
counts…which are objectively verifiable by others” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 85). As 
Johnstone (2006) and others have pointed out, such objective ‘signs’ or measures do not 
exist when it comes to psychiatric illnesses. Further, the diagnostic criterion (for example 
“flat affect” or “peculiar behaviour”) outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) are largely “examples of beliefs, experiences and behaviour” 
rather than “complaints about bodily functioning,” making them subjective judgments 
based on social expectations and norms (Johnstone, 2006, p. 85). As Johnstone (2006) 
states, “It is relatively simple, in principle, to work out how the body ought and ought not 
to function, it is an entirely different matter to decide how people ought and ought not to 
think, feel and behave” (p. 85). Johnstone’s observations point to the obviously 
enculturated character of psychiatric diagnosis and the problems with positioning ‘mental 
illness’ as an ‘illness like any other.’ 
There is a critique to be made of Johnstone’s claim that scientific judgments about 
bodily function are objective and free from the influence of social norms. Following  
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Khun, (1962) amongst others, a larger case could be made for addressing the enculturated 
character of science, medicine, and the biomedical model more generally. One could 
argue that there is no such thing as ‘objectivity’ in the positivist sense and that biological 
‘signs’ or measures for physical illnesses are interpreted and made sense of through 
social and cultural norms. This critique is made on different, though interrelated, 
grounds; the enculturated character of supposedly objective biological measures as 
opposed to the lack of such measures altogether. As I have already described, the 
‘objective’ signs or measures of mental illness do not exist and diagnoses are therefore 
based on criterion more widely agreed upon to be ‘subjective.’ While this should, in 
theory, make it more vulnerable to critique, the biomedical model of mental illness has 
thus far proved itself to be remarkably tenacious and pervasive. To allow for a detailed, 
in depth critique, my focus is on biomedical and social approaches to mental distress; a 
critique of the biomedical model more generally is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Social approaches to mental distress 
 
The limitations of the biomedical model have led some to call for social 
approaches to understanding madness (Ballou and Brown, 2002; Beresford, 2002; 
Bracken et al. 2012; Carr, 2005; Johnstone, 2006, Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011; 
Tew, 2006). Social approaches are multidisciplinary and reflect many different 
perspectives. Tew (2006) argues that the goal is not to create “one singular and internally 
consistent ‘social model,’” but rather to honour “complexity and diversity of experience” 
through the development of a multiplicity of social perspectives (p. 16). However, he 
contends that social approaches share the following main tenets: normalizing experiences 
of mental distress by challenging dichotomous thinking that categorizes people as either 
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‘normal’ or ‘mentally ill,’ taking into account the social contexts related to people’s 
experiences of madness, respecting and legitimizing people’s accounts of their own 
experiences, and using anti-oppressive principles that consider power, discrimination, and 
oppression. Furthermore, social approaches foreground agency and position those 
experiencing mental distress as active and capable of making decisions about their own 
lives (pp. 16-18).  
The literature emphasizing social approaches to mental distress tends to remain at 
a theoretical level or in some cases is based on the authors’ experience as mental health 
care practitioners. Social frameworks value the perspectives of those who experience 
mental distress and social research is well poised to gain access to these perspectives. 
These approaches are also particularly useful for making sense of LGBQT experiences 
because of the focus on power relations and oppression. However, there are few social 
approaches that specifically address the experiences of LGBQT people in a 
comprehensive manner. This chapter will begin to address these gaps, though it is not 
meant to offer a proscriptive or rigid framework.  
The biomedical model as a deficit model: Insights from disability studies 
 
Social approaches to mental distress have roots in disability studies and activism 
(Beresford, 2004). The social model of disability made key interventions by challenging 
the positioning of disabled bodies as deficient and in need of repair (Barton, 1996; Drake, 
1999). Social theorists of disability have critiqued the biological essentialism inherent in 
the biomedical model, which “focuses on physical difference” and defines disabled 
people “as that group of people whose bodies do not work; or look different or act 
differently; or who cannot do productive work” (Shakespeare, 1996a, p. 95). Disability 
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theorists and activists have also challenged oppressive beliefs concerning disabled 
people. Social model theorists accomplish this by defining ‘impairment’ as an embodied 
state and ‘disability’ as a product of the way in which society is constructed to exclude 
people with disabilities through the built environment and social attitudes (Barnes et al., 
1999; Oliver, 1990; Oliver, 1995). Scholars and activists have also countered the 
positioning of disabled people as tragic, pitiable victims with pride about disabled 
identities and embodiments (Butler & Bowlby, 1997). 
The social model of disability focuses primarily on physical disabilities and was 
not developed in ways that address experiences of madness and mental distress 
(Beresford, 2004). It is therefore not directly applicable to conceptualizing madness. 
Perhaps one of the most significant limitations is the conceptualizing of impairment, 
which has been critiqued for a number of reasons, including the ways that it replicates the 
biological essentialism of the biomedical model (Shakespeare & Watson, 2002). As 
Beresford and Wallcraft (1997) point out, many who experience mental distress do not 
identify as having an impairment or a disability and associate this idea with “the 
medicalization of their distress” (p. 67). This was particularly salient for my study 
because the participants were not unanimous in identifying their mental distress as a 
disability. When asked whether or not they characterized their mental health status as a 
disability, 38% (14) responded yes, 38% (14) responded no, 19% (7) said they did 
sometimes or had in the past, and 5% (2) were unsure. 
However, there are some insights from disability studies that are applicable to 
understanding mental distress, particularly the critique of the biomedical model as a 
deficit model. The deficit model ideology was especially apparent in the narratives of 
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those who made use of biomedical model approaches to understand their bodies and 
experiences. For example, Lisa, a white, Portuguese, French-Canadian, lesbian, queer 
person in Winnipeg described herself in the following way: “Borderline [personality 
disorder] is fifty percent neurosis and fifty percent psychosis. So there is wiring wrong 
with my brain and then the rest of it is learning the wrong way.” Another participant, 
Mary, a racialized, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto said, “I do identify as [mentally 
ill], but I’m not ready to, if that makes any sense. I feel that it has so much negativity 
with it, like, you know, not able and not healthy and not like normal enough that it kind 
of scares me.” While Mary feels that she ‘should’ define herself as mentally ill, she is 
reluctant because of the underlying ideologies about abnormality and deficiency and the 
ways that this affects her self-concept as well as the ways that others may perceive her.  
For those who reject medicalized language, part of what they reject is this 
underlying ideology of being somehow defective or deficient. As Aaron, a racialized, 
gay, cisgender man in Toronto said about a friend who identifies as mentally ill, “It’s 
really disabling and limiting to identify as someone that’s mentally ill because I feel like 
it informs his ideas of what’s possible, his ideas of how well he can do and it makes it 
really limiting.” Similarly, Caleb, a white, bisexual, trans man in Toronto indicated that 
adopting ‘mentally ill’ as an identity would position his “head space” as “being in need of 
repair.” Furthermore, he believes that “it’s really easy to be stigmatized if you’re 
describing yourself as mentally ill.” Caleb rejects the term ‘mentally ill’ as an identity 
because it suggests that there is something wrong that needs ‘curing.’ As his comments 
also suggest, this has an effect on his self-understanding as well as the way he is 
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perceived by others, as the biomedical model is profoundly linked with the widespread 
‘stigma’ or discriminatory beliefs regarding ‘mental illness.’  
Indeed, disability studies scholars have shown how the biomedical model 
construction of disability encourages oppressive views of people with disabilities by 
positioning them as inherently, biologically inferior people in need of ‘correction’ 
(Barton, 1996; Drake, 1999). While ‘stigma’ is not limited to the biomedical model, this 
framework does encourage the ‘othering’ of those experiencing mental distress. Theorists 
of social approaches to mental distress have also taken this up. As Fernando (2010) 
argues, “psychiatric stigma may not be unavoidable in a context where a biomedical 
model of illness predominates but may be extremely difficult to counteract given the way 
in which the model is interpreted in society today” (p. 39). As he states about the way the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is interpreted, it is “associated with dangerousness, violence, 
confusion and, more than anything else, alienness that renders people afflicted with it as 
being beyond understanding, irrational and bizarre; that is the way they are” (p.39). He 
therefore believes that the way to combat stigma is to abolish the biomedical model.  
Indeed, as will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter, the biomedical 
model is based on a problematic mad/sane dichotomy, positioning those who are deemed 
‘mentally ill’ as naturally ‘disordered.’ As Read and Haslam (2004) contend, this 
essentialist and dichotomizing approach is deeply problematic. As they state,  
Believing in immutability may promote pessimism and avoidance. Believing in a 
biological essence promotes the view that the disorder represents uncontrollable, 
untamed nature. Believing in discreteness promotes the view that sufferers are 
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categorically different, rather than sharing in our common humanity. These 
essentialist beliefs form a toxic ensemble (p. 141).  
Naming this toxic ensemble ‘stigma,’ however, does not do it justice. ‘Stigma,’ a term 
used to indicate a belief system that denigrates ‘mental illness’ and those deemed 
‘mentally ill,’ might more aptly be called sanism and discrimination. As White (2009) 
argues, the concept of ‘anti-stigma’ is often used in such a way as to reinforce rather than 
challenge “dominant representations of madness as a disease, and of mental illness as a 
national (social, political and economic) problem” (p. 1) through focusing on “deviance 
and stigma” as opposed to “human rights and discrimination” (p. 5). Likewise, Kanani 
(2012) argues that “focusing on stigma” can obscure “relevant structural power 
dynamics” such as the structural racism that “shapes many people’s encounters with 
medical and psychiatric institutions” (p. 1). In other words, the concept of stigma is often 
used in the service of the biomedical model of mental illness, sidestepping social and 
structural processes that marginalize those considered ‘mentally ill.’ For these reasons I 
henceforth use the terms ‘sanism’ and ‘discrimination,’ though some participants used the 
word ‘stigma’ to describe their experiences. 
The negative impact of sanism was evident in most participants’ narratives, and 
self-directed or internalized sanism was particularly evident in the narratives of those 
who did not question medicalized approaches. One such participant, Barb, a white, 
lesbian in Winnipeg said,  
It just needs to be elevated to be not so much of a stigma. Because lots of times 
you don’t want to admit it because it’s embarrassing. The counsellors will say 
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‘don’t say that’ but it shows weakness, I think. These are things that I’ve felt, that 
it shows weakness or that you’re lesser. 
Similarly, Crabitha, a Métis, lesbian, cisgender woman told me, “in terms of how I 
identify with myself, I would say I consider myself damaged,” which she defines as 
“feeling like there’s something really wrong with you deep inside that other people don’t 
have.” Barb and Crabitha have internalized the ideas inherent in the biomedical model 
that they are defective and inferior. 
For some participants, this was a reason not to identify as ‘mentally ill’ even if 
they saw themselves as such and used a medicalized approach to understanding 
themselves. As Lisa, quoted above, said,  
I’m definitely mentally ill but I don’t call myself that because I don’t want to see 
myself as sick. I tell people I have issues [laughs] and they understand that. 
People accept that easier. If I say I have a mental illness they automatically think 
I’m crazy. You say ‘mental illness,’ too, they won’t necessarily take you seriously. 
You say ‘issues’ they understand that it could be a range of things anywhere from 
physical to mental, which is kind of accepted.  
Lisa avoided using the term ‘mentally ill’ even though she sees herself as such because it 
is a term that is so heavily steeped in sanism. She was concerned about the ways in which 
she would be perceived by others if she were to identify as ‘mentally ill.’ Like Lisa, many 
participants were concerned that they would be reduced to their diagnosis and perceived 
as incapable by others if they identified as ‘mentally ill.’ 
While internalized sanism was not necessarily limited to participants who 
accepted the biomedical model, those who critiqued it often also articulated some 
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resistance to sanism. This is consonant with Schrader, Jones, and Shattell’s (2013) claim 
that those who claim a politicized identity are “more likely to resist internalizing public 
stigma” (p. 63). As will be discussed in more detail throughout this chapter, social 
approaches understand mental distress as a non-pathological part of human experience. 
Perhaps those who held such beliefs were better equipped to resist oppressive beliefs that 
position them as pathological ‘others.’  
Challenging the mind/body dichotomy and embracing a more holistic approach 
 
 Participants who rejected medicalized language often critiqued the biomedical 
model’s approach to understanding the mind as distinct from the body. As Porter (2002) 
argues, the mind/body dualism is characteristic of Western medicine and positions 
‘mental illness’ as a distinct phenomenon from ‘physical illness.’ Betty, a white, 
cisgender, queer woman in Winnipeg described the reasons that she does not trust 
psychiatric approaches to ‘mental illness’ as based on a critique of this dichotomy. As she 
said,  
We separate brain and body and it’s stupid. It makes no frigging sense at all. 
Because of that I don’t trust people because I think that is a big fucking mistake. 
And it’s a lie, also. You can’t separate those two things. So having people 
committed to an entire industry where that’s what they do, I’m like, ‘your entire 
freaking practice is based on bullshit so how am I really supposed to trust that 
much of what you have to say?’ It’s the same problems that I have with the 
mainstream Western medical model.  
  86   
For Betty, as for other participants, the belief in the mind and body as distinct casts doubt 
on the veracity of psychiatric ideologies and practices. Similarly, Esther, quoted above, 
said:  
All the aspects of my being are really inter-connected and it’s impossible to 
separate them into one issue or one piece of myself that can be sick while the 
others are not or vice versa. So ‘mentally ill’ is problematic for me in that sense, 
because that implies that there isn’t that inter-connection. 
Esther does not define herself as ‘mentally ill’ because it implies that mental and physical 
health are mutually exclusive. Another participant, Viki, a racialized, queer, gender-fluid 
woman in Toronto, explained how this ideology is problematic for making sense of her 
experiences: 
If your mind is unwell, that can take a toll on your body in lots of ways. Stress can 
weaken your immune system. But also if you’re in a bad emotional mental place, 
then you can also not take care of your body in the way that you normally would. 
And that has an impact on your physical health. For me personally I have PTSD 
[post-traumatic stress disorder] and my seizures are very much a unification of the 
two because trauma and certain situations and stress trigger a physical 
manifestation. And I don’t really understand how that happens and the doctors 
don’t either. But I see them as together.  
Viki explained how her experiences of mental distress are intimately connected to a 
physical manifestation that takes the form of seizures. Indeed, as Rogers and Pilgrim 
(2010) contend, there is a direct link between mental distress and what is characterized as 
‘physical’ ill-health. They state, “Physical disturbances can sometimes produce profound 
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psychological disturbances. Given that emotional distress has a well-established causative 
role in a variety of psychosomatic illnesses, like gastric ulcers and cardiovascular disease, 
the mutual inter-play of mind and body seems to be indicated on reasonable grounds” 
(Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010, p. 3). As Mike, a white, omnisexual trans man in Toronto 
described, the term ‘mentally ill’ implies that this cannot be the case: 
Oh, mentally ill. Oh, well, I hate that one. Because that just says that some people 
are healthy and some people are ill and I’m one of the ill people. And mental 
health is separate from physical health and it’s, you know, I have mental problems. 
Yeah, so that one does not sit well with me. It sounds like something that a doctor 
would call a patient in a not-helpful way.  
Mike succinctly summarizes a number of issues with the term ‘mentally ill,’ including the 
implied mind/body binary, as well as the problematic mad/sane dualism and the power of 
health care professionals to define the experiences of others, points which will be 
revisited later in this chapter.  
Resisting the pathologization of marginalized groups 
 
 Those who refused to take on the label ‘mentally ill’ often did so on the basis of 
resisting the pathologization of marginalized groups. For example, Brock, a white, gay, 
cisgender man in Winnipeg pointed to how medicalized language can be used to label the 
behaviour of marginalized people: 
I am averse to using ‘mentally ill’ as a descriptor. Especially because it’s so 
ambiguous. You know, I use the example of a woman who’s homeless on the 
street begging for money… , kind of mumbling to herself and rocking back and 
forth and not making eye contact with anyone. And then you have down the street 
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a man coming, dressed sharp….who steps over her… , looks at her, scoffs ‘get a 
job’ and continues to walk away. Who is mentally ill? It’s such a weird term that 
someone who shows signs of ‘mental health problems,’ and then you have 
someone who can be so cruel when they have the means to offer maybe an iota of 
support.  
Brock rejects the label ‘mentally ill’ because it is often applied to those who engage in 
behaviour that is perceived to be morally reprehensible, which as Brock’s comments 
indicate is a subjective judgment based on social values that tends to target the 
marginalized. He therefore does not refer to himself using medicalized terms and has 
chosen to call himself a “mad man with a box.” Brock describes having the freedom to 
challenge medicalized language and create alternatives as part of his privilege as a young 
white man living in the global North: 
I’m a twenty-year old white male living in North America, I’m the least oppressed 
person on the continent, so it kind of plays to my benefit to challenge stereotypes 
and archetypes. And it’s almost my duty, it’s all of our duty if we’re able, to rise 
up and fight oppression systematically and institutionally.  
Brock feels that his privilege gives him the freedom and obligation to challenge 
oppressive beliefs.  
Conversely, some participants had a heightened awareness of the possible 
negative effects of pathologization based on their experiences with oppression. For 
example, Laila, a racialized, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto, explained that as a 
teenager, she tried to avoid being psychiatrized at all costs. She told me that she had 
experienced the many “stereotypes of brown people and brown fathers especially” that 
  89   
characterize “young brown girls” as “victims of this patriarch.” Laila was asked by 
counsellors to “validate this narrative” and feared that her behaviours would be 
categorized as symptomatic of ‘mental illness’ and would validate racist stereotypes 
about her family. As she said,  
It would have torn into my family. It would have made it very difficult for us to 
continue the way that we were…. To feed into this idea of this patriarchal brown 
male with young daughters would have been really hard. That’s why I wouldn’t 
talk about any of these things and I was aware enough to hide the things that I was 
doing. 
Laila’s experiences point to the problematic pathologizing of racialized people that is 
characteristic of the biomedical model. As Fernando (2010) contends, psychiatric 
practices are enculturated and are thus implicated in perpetuating racism. As he states, 
“Political, social and ideological pressures current in society always impinge on the 
diagnostic process by influencing questions of intelligibility, common sense, clinical 
opinion, pragmatism and tradition. And racism acts through these pressures” (p. 68). 
Laila therefore rejected medicalized terms. In response to my questions as to why, she 
responded:  
Well [laughs] because they’re fucked up. Why do I reject them? Because they are 
socially constructed and they are used to discipline people and regulate people 
and especially people who are located in certain spaces or have other experiences 
of oppression as well. So it’s pathologization of certain behaviours used to govern 
people. That’s why I feel I can’t accept that language.  
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Laila draws attention to the ways in which medicalized terms are not ‘just words’ but 
reflect underlying ideologies that can be used as tools of social control, targeting 
marginalized groups in particular. She was successful in avoiding the psychiatric system 
and the forceful application of labels such as ‘mentally ill.’ For this reason, she also does 
not use any reclamatory terms like ‘psychiatric survivor’ or indeed, as she put it, “any 
identity-based categories related to mental health or madness.” Instead, she simply states: 
“I guess the closest I would come would just be to say that I relate to madness without 
necessarily taking it on.”  
Trans participants also had experience with the effects of pathologization and 
were therefore often critical of the biomedical model and its terminology. For example, 
Caleb, quoted above, said:  
‘Mentally ill,’ I don’t know if I’ve ever actually considered that as something that 
I would use to describe myself.... I don’t ever really want to define myself as ‘ill.’ 
That’s just another way to pathologize myself in a way that doesn’t feel comfy 
and fun like ‘crazy’ sometimes.  
Caleb implicitly suggests that he is already familiar with (and rejects) the negative effects 
of internalizing pathologization, (“just another way to pathologize myself”) perhaps on 
the basis of sexuality and gender identity. He calls himself a ‘psychiatric survivor’ in 
order to indicate “the abuses I’ve had at hand of the system and how I’ve survived that 
instead of just kind of pinning myself with a very pathologized idea.” 
Likewise, Smith, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto, likened his rejection of the 
term ‘mentally ill’ to his rejection of the pathologization of his trans identity. He said that 
while others would label him as ‘mentally ill,’ he does not take on this label:  
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Similar to not feeling wrong about being trans, I don’t feel ill. You know, I feel 
like I have hard things that happen in my life, but so does everybody else and so 
it’s a process of trying not to minimize that but also finding what works for me 
and I am really wary of psychiatric avenues.  
Smith has managed to avoid psychiatric services for many years and therefore also does 
not take on terms such as ‘psychiatric survivor’ or ‘psychiatric service user.’ The term he 
chooses to self-identify with is ‘pervert’:  
It’s something that’s been applied to queer and trans folks for a really long time. 
And then to add the element of being kinky into that is interesting because I feel 
like it’s really normalized within queer communities, but when I think about it 
outside of that, most people would consider how I live my life and do my 
relationships and sex to be really perverted. But I also kind of enjoy that. That’s 
part of being queer for me, is being something that’s really unpalatable to 
heteronormative society. I feel like I gain a lot of power from that label. It feels 
like part of a big ‘fuck you’ to standards of what relationships and sex should look 
like.  
Smith reclaims ‘pervert,’ a term that has its origins in medicine, as a way to pathologize 
non-normative sexualities, genders, desires, and behaviours, and in doing so also resists 
the positioning of gender and sexual dissidence as illness. 
Challenging the sane/insane binary 
 
 Smith’s comments about the everyday nature of distress also challenge the 
distinction that is generally made between those who are mad and those who are sane. 
Attempts at understanding mental distress as a part of everyday life experienced by many 
  92   
people challenges one of the fundamental characteristics of the biomedical model: the 
dichotomous categorizing of people as either ‘sane’ or ‘mentally ill.’ A critique of the 
binary distinction between mad and sane and the pathologizing of the mad that 
accompanies this dichotomy is common amongst scholars seeking other ways to 
conceptualize madness.  
 For example, Bentall (2003) argues that “the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction has had a 
number of very serious negative consequences for those living at the mad end of this 
spectrum,” including the suppression of the voices of those deemed mad, harmful 
medical ‘treatments’ such as insulin induced comas, electroshock therapy, leucotomy, 
and in the case of Nazi Germany, mass extermination” (p. 496). According to Bentall, the 
evidence shows that “we are mad to varying degrees, that the boundaries of madness are 
subject to negotiation, and that some of us get on very well despite being (in psychiatric 
terms) quite psychotic for much of the time” (p. 496).  
 Many of the participants reflected this view in their explanations of why they did 
not identify with the term ‘mentally ill.’ For example, Rob, a white, queer, gay, cisgender 
man in Winnipeg depathologized his experiences of depression and anxiety, stating that 
he does not describe himself as ‘mentally ill’ because he thinks of his mental health as 
“not being perfect but as par for the course” because “a lot of people deal with 
depression, whether it’s acute or temporary or long-term.” Another participant, Allison, a 
Torontonian who identifies as white, queer, and genderqueer, told me that she does not 
use the terms ‘mentally ill’ or ‘mad’ because they both carry “a lot of stigma.” She also 
rejects these terms because:  
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While there might be things that I deal with on a daily basis, they don’t define me. 
And I don’t see them as ruling my life. I like to look at it as something like, ‘okay 
I’m dealing with this,’ basically. So that’s why I would probably choose to go for 
‘psychiatric service consumer.’ 
Likewise, Aaron, quoted above, also saw ‘mad’ and ‘mentally ill’ as pathologizing terms 
that reinforce the mad/sane dichotomy.
10
 He said that he did not identify with ‘mad’ 
“because of the historical connotations.” He elaborated and said:  
It seems like a word to describe violent, angry, uncontrollable people, which is 
really marginalizing. If you have psychological issues to call someone ‘mad’ or 
label them ‘mentally ill’ I feel like it isolates them. And it’s something that they 
need to be quarantined and dealt with for. So I’m not sure if I agree with the use 
of those words.  
Aaron points to the way in which labeling someone based on a binary understanding can 
be dehumanizing and marginalizing. He therefore does not take on any identity-based 
terms regarding mental distress and simply describes his “mental health” as “ambivalent 
at best.” 
Challenging the mad/sane binary, which is characteristic of the biomedical model, 
may cause some concern about sliding in to an unhelpfully relativist position on how to 
understand these concepts. It is important to note that this challenge is not the same as 
claiming that ‘mental illness’ does not exist. The argument is that experiences of mental 
distress exist, but the biomedical model is an unhelpful way of ‘making sense’ of those 
experiences. The next section will further clarify why this is the case. 
                                                 
10
 Allison and Aaron’s comments also indicate that the term ‘mad’ was not always seen by the participants 
as a non-medicalized term and was sometimes interpreted as akin to ‘mentally ill.’ 
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Making sense of mental distress through psychiatric diagnosis 
 
Theorists of social approaches to mental distress have challenged the scientific 
validity of diagnostic categorizations. Many have pointed to the fact that psychiatric 
disorders have no “construct validity,” which means that no underlying biological or 
“causal pathological mechanism” has been identified (Thomas, 2013, para. 3-4). Further, 
psychiatric diagnoses have no “predictive validity,” meaning they do not offer an 
accurate depiction of “a specific course and outcome” (Thomas, 2013, para. 3-4). Some 
have pointed to the ever growing roster of psychiatric diagnoses pathologizing an 
increasingly large list of behaviours, emotions, and experiences of distress, leading to 
questions about whether any one could be deemed mentally healthy (Davis, 1997; 
Mosher & Boyle, n.d.; Rapley, 2012). Even a brief look through the most recent DSM 
may reasonably lead some to conclude that this is indeed the case. Boyle (2007) contends 
that diagnostic categories do not realistically describe real life behaviour and emotions 
and that there is so much overlap between diagnoses that in some cases there may be little 
similarity between people who share a diagnosis (p. 290). Many contend that the 
evidence overwhelmingly points to mental distress as an understandable response to 
adverse life experiences and thus suggest that diagnostic categorization should be 
abolished altogether (Bentall, 2003; Boyle, 2007; Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & 
Bentall, 2013; May, 2007; Tew, 2011; Thomas, 2013).  
However, these debates tend to remain at the theoretical level and do not examine 
how people actually experience the diagnostic process (May, 2007; Tucker, 2009). As 
May (2007) argues, the process of receiving a psychiatric diagnosis transforms distress 
into a medicalized, individualized problem. Being given a diagnosis can have a huge 
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impact on identity and experience. As Tucker (2009) contends, diagnosis is a form of 
social recognition with many negative associations, and has the “power to form identities 
that exist across multiple contexts…and become the prime identifying feature” (p. 4). 
Indeed, as one participant, Michelle, a white, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto said 
about her diagnosis, “I find that it’s a huge part of my identity…. I often feel like that’s a 
bigger part of my identity than my gay identity. I feel like that one, it comes first…. It’s 
kind of my top layer of identity, I guess.” It is therefore important to examine how the 
participants negotiated the diagnostic process, as it reveals much about both the appeal 
of, and the problems with, the biomedical model as it is actually experienced. Psychiatric 
diagnoses are the predominant way of explaining experiences of madness, but the 
participants’ narratives reveal that there are few benefits and many problems with this 
method of making sense of mental distress. 
The literature in social approaches to mental distress suggests that the limited 
value of a psychiatric diagnosis to those who receive one is in finding some kind of 
explanation for their distress (Boyle, 2007; Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 
2013; Tucker, 2009). As Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, and Bentall (2013) put it, “While 
some people find a name or a diagnostic label helpful, our contention is that this 
helpfulness results from a knowledge that their problems are recognized (in both sense of 
the word), understood, validated, explained (and explicable) and have some relief” (pp. 2-
3). The participants’ narratives support this contention. For some participants, being 
given a diagnosis offered some relief in that they finally had a way to interpret 
behaviours, feelings, and thoughts that may have been scary and problematic. As Angela, 
a white, gay, cisgender woman in Winnipeg said about her diagnosis: 
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It helps explain a lot of my behaviours, too. So it’s good to finally know that there 
was something wrong with me when I was [pauses]. Like I can recall having 
episodes when I was young but never identified or anything like that. So it kind of 
gives me comfort knowing that at least it’s a condition that I do have. But 
unfortunately there’s still a lot of people that really don’t understand it. 
Angela was able to take comfort in having an explanation for behaviour that had caused 
her problems throughout her life, even though she struggled with other people’s lack of 
understanding of her experiences. Similarly, Barb, quoted above, told me it was “nice to 
have a definitive knowledge of what’s wrong with you.”  
Ironically, participants often stated that being diagnosed with a mental illness was 
a relief because it meant that they were ‘not crazy.’ This underscores the extent to which 
‘crazy’ has come to signify ‘without reason,’ irrationality, and unintelligibility. For 
example, Margaret, a white, bisexual, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto said, “It’s kind 
of like, oh good, so it’s something real, it’s not just all in my head, it’s not because I’m 
crazy, it’s not just me.” Similarly, Rob, quoted above, said it was “a relief” to be 
diagnosed: 
It had been a while that I was kind of like, ‘what the hell is going on, why do I 
feel this way.’ So it was like, okay, at least I have sort of an answer to what this is 
and I’m not making it up. I’m not, it’s funny [pauses] um, you know I was just 
about to say, ‘I’m not crazy.’ It’s like, ‘Oh I have depression, I’m not crazy’ 
[laughs]. 
Though a psychiatric diagnosis often means that those diagnosed will in fact be perceived 
as ‘crazy’ by many, an explanation sometimes provided relief, even if only temporarily. 
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Essentially, mental health care professionals ‘made sense’ of behaviours, experiences, 
and thoughts that had become troublesome and provided some kind of ‘answer’ to what 
was feeling problematic.  
The participants also expressed other powerful reasons for accepting biomedical 
explanations for their experiences. Many demonstrated that they were often encouraged 
to do so by family members and friends. Barb, quoted above, described this as follows: 
I think I’ve come to accept it now. It’s been a long time. A couple of friends that 
have sat with me as I bawled and fought it and was angry and wanted to move 
past it, they sat there and said, ‘No, this is it. You’re probably going to have to 
take medication the rest of your life.’ You never see that for yourself, but I think 
there’s an acceptance of it now.  
Barb describes an initial resistance to her diagnosis that she came to accept with the help 
of her friends. Barry, a white, gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, described the impact of 
hearing his family members explain how they felt and how this seemed to explain his 
own experiences: 
My mom has depression and so does my brother. They are on medication for it 
and they go see a psychiatrist. I didn’t realize until they were describing how they 
felt and I went, ‘Oh that’s really how I felt for two or three years.’ And I was like, 
‘Oh well, I guess that was why I felt that way.’ 
 Barry’s distress started to make sense to him within the framework used by his mother 
and brother. For many participants, the role of support networks was key in reinforcing 
diagnostic categorization as the best way to understand their experiences. 
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 Participants who accepted their diagnoses as the truth about their experiences did 
not discuss aspects of the diagnoses that did not accurately describe them. Some, 
however, did express ambivalence about fully redefining their sense of self in accordance 
with the biomedical model. When I asked Mary, quoted above, about her relationship to 
her diagnoses, she told me that this was something she was “really trying to understand.” 
She explained this as follows: 
There was kind of a stale point where I was diagnosed with depression until now 
with this new diagnosis and I wasn’t on medication and I thought these 
fluctuations in mood were just my personality. I thought maybe I was just upset, 
like I just had bad coping skills with school or it was just part of the way that I 
was and I almost started to value [pauses], I mean I think I do still value, the days 
that are bad because I feel like they give me my personality. And they’re valuable 
to me because that’s what I have to offer. It’s difficult for me to let go of it, for 
example with medication, because I feel like it’s become so much a part of who I 
am. Now I’m trying to understand how my life can be, how I can be me as a 
person with mental illness versus someone who’s trying to realign myself every 
day. 
Mary was in the midst of grappling with a changing sense of self and hesitating to fully 
accept the medicalization of certain emotions and personality traits. Yet she felt strongly 
that her moods were more than just “a bad day” or “just stress” and that there was 
“something wrong” that the biomedical model of mental illness could explain and 
perhaps fix through psychiatric medication.  
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 The hope that medical explanations could lead to resolving distress was common. 
As Crabitha, quoted above, said, “I can’t fight this problem if I don’t know what the 
problem is so I have to first of all identify what the issue is and then I can go about trying 
to fix it. You know, because I can’t keep going on the way I’m going.” As will be 
discussed more in the following chapter, treatments based on the biomedical model 
worked for some participants, providing another reason to accept their diagnoses as valid. 
As Beresford and Wallcraft (1997) point out, the biomedical model may also be the only 
framework they have ever encountered. As they state, “The idea of ‘mental illness’ is 
internalized. This is as a result of their broader socialization and passage through the 
psychiatric system. It is also likely to be the only analytical framework with which they 
are familiar for understanding their situation, feelings and perceptions” (Beresford & 
Wallcraft, 1997, p.70). Indeed, the dominance of the biomedical model can occlude other 
perspectives. Speed (2011) argues that it does not co-exist well with other ideologies. As 
he states, “If the service user draws from a medical discourse to explain their situation 
(invoking a chemical imbalance in the brain, for example, as the reason they have 
auditory hallucinations) then it becomes very difficult for that same person to blame, for 
example, poverty or abuse they experienced as a child” (p. 125). 
It is also important to note that those who dispute the medicalization of their 
experiences or the veracity of their diagnosis are seen to be lacking ‘insight,’ a term that 
indicates that a person believes they are ‘sick’ and accepts a biomedical explanation for 
their ‘illness’ (Dillon, 2011, p. 153). Showing a lack of insight can be seen as “a cardinal 
feature of psychosis” (Bentall, 2003, p. 496). It can therefore be risky to disagree with 
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one’s diagnosis, as this is itself seen as a sign of illness and can lead to further 
medicalization.  
However, as the first half of this chapter demonstrates, some participants did not 
unequivocally accept medicalized explanations for their distress. Many expressed 
critiques of the diagnostic process and of diagnostic categorization as a way of 
interpreting their experiences. It is therefore important to examine how people who 
experience mental distress come to resist the disciplinary power of diagnosis. This 
discussion will also indicate some of the problems with diagnostic categorization as a 
way of making sense of mental distress.  
 Those who critiqued the biomedical model were less likely than those who did not 
to encounter alternative perspectives from family members and friends. Some discussed 
developing a critical sensibility in university and applying that lens to their understanding 
of diagnosis and biomedical frameworks. Devon, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto 
said he learned to question diagnosis and biomedical ways of thinking about madness 
“through education,” which led him to think of “medical or scientific discourse” as 
“failures”: “So I don’t see that as a solution anymore, as much as I would like to.” Devon 
indicates that he no longer has faith in psychiatry and diagnostic processes in part 
because of what he has learned in school. Likewise, Caleb, quoted above, said that “some 
of the most persuasive things and some of the things that guided me along to becoming 
comfortable with that term [psychiatric survivor] was really just my relationship with the 
things that I was reading in the academy.” Aaron, quoted above, explained that the more 
he learned about the DSM, the more he came to think that it is based on a “process that’s 
rooted in cultural conventions.” The result is that “I don’t trust diagnosis.” Aaron shifted 
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his understanding of diagnosis and madness from a biologically essentialist perspective to 
one that focuses on social and cultural factors through his learning in university: 
It’s been a process for me of learning about it because I always thought of myself 
as fairly, it was either I wasn’t very smart or I wasn’t very able, or I was just not 
good enough in terms of biology or mental make-up because I turned out gay. It 
was a long struggle and then the more I think about things I feel like it’s more 
cultural, so I’m really interested in research into how shame is socially 
constructed and how violent shame and silencing can be.  
Aaron points to how his learning helped him challenge internalized homophobic 
ideologies that position queer people as biologically and mentally deficient, which 
sparked an interest in social factors leading to mental distress.  
 Similarly, Laila, quoted above, said she was predisposed to critique biomedical 
explanations of mental distress because she “became a lot more political and a lot more 
aware of systems and power and oppression” through her experiences of being diagnosed 
with a physical disability. Laila was an undergraduate student in psychology at this time 
and began to look more closely at the studies presented in class: 
What I started seeing was all these stereotypes built into diagnosing and labeling 
in the studies that we were reading about. Not everyone read through them in 
detail but I was the kind of person that would read these things, and methodology 
especially, and I saw how they were drawing diagnoses for certain things based 
on surveys of twenty white college students.  
When Laila critiqued the methodology of these studies in her papers on these grounds, 
she was “met with a lot of resistance” from teaching assistants and professors. This only 
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fed her interest in looking at “what’s really happening in terms of labeling and diagnostic 
process and how much is built on these really ridiculous assumptions and power 
dynamics.” 
As Laila’s comments also indicate, psychiatric diagnoses are heavily gendered, 
sexualized, and racialized, as discussed in detail in chapter one. As Metzl (2009) argues, 
interactions between doctors and patients are in part predetermined by institutional 
racism: 
Race impacts medical communication because racial tensions are structured into 
clinical interactions long before doctors or patients enter examination rooms. To a 
remarkable extent, anxieties about racial difference shape diagnostic criteria, 
health-care policies, medical and popular attitudes about mentally ill persons, the 
structures of treatment facilities, and ultimately, the conversations that take place 
there within” (Metzl, 2009, p. xi).  
While Metzl is referring specifically to race, his arguments also apply to gender and 
sexuality. Like Laila, many of the participants critiqued the diagnostic process based on 
their critical consciousness about power, race, gender, and sexuality. 
For example, Jaime, a racialized, lesbian, trans person in Winnipeg told me that 
she does not trust psychiatric diagnoses because of many disciplinary experiences with 
systemic power throughout her life. She said that her experiences as a youth with the 
police and with Child and Family Services (CFS) convinced her that “any sort of person 
who wore a uniform or had some form of power to be able to control you or apprehend 
you, you know, sucks.” Agents of the state such as police and CFS often act as 
disciplinary forces in racialized communities and Jaime explained that she sees doctors as 
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yet another vector for institutional power “that will tell you what they think is right.” Her 
perspective was also shaped by her experiences in prison, where she was assessed by a 
psychiatrist and a psychologist: 
It was a part of assessing my rehabilitation or whether I can be released. The 
psychologist was like, ‘You’re perfectly fine, and you know a lot, and you’re 
pretty smart.’ And the psychiatrist was like, ‘You’re gonna be a career criminal’ 
[both laugh]. I think that was also because the psychiatrist was working for the 
prosecutors. I just remember that standing out for me as like, ‘Okay, you just 
assigned me the rest of my life.’  
The stark contradiction in these assessments demonstrated for Jaime that diagnostic 
processes are subjective judgments serving the interests of those in power. Though she 
does not overtly name racism as part of this process, as a person of colour her narrative 
can be read with this in mind given the ways that racism operates on a systemic level. 
Some participants drew attention to the gendered character of diagnostic 
categorization. Allison, a Torontonian who identifies as white, queer, and genderqueer, 
described seeing a psychiatrist who diagnosed her with three mental disorders. She was 
critical of one in particular, because of her knowledge about how this diagnosis is 
gendered: 
That makes zero sense to me. I don’t like that label because the label was 
something that has been used against women many times in the past…. In terms 
of my gender identity, sometimes I identify more female and sometimes I’m more 
male. But sometimes I don’t feel like I’m either. But biologically I’m female. So 
this diagnosis is something that a lot of women get slapped with and it kind of 
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made me go, ‘If I was a guy would you be saying this to me right now?’ And I’m 
sitting there and I’m going, ‘This is absurd.’  
Allison resisted the diagnosis because her experience as genderqueer and her knowledge 
about the gendered nature of the diagnosis meant that it did not make sense as a way to 
describe her experiences. Likewise, Devon, quoted above, recognized the gendered, 
racialized, and classed nature of psychiatric diagnoses and therefore resisted the diagnosis 
he was given as a teenager: 
Being white and middle-class and a young teenage girl, for sure. Of course you’re 
depressed. Of course you need to be on anti-depressants [laughs]. Like his [the 
doctor’s] attitude was just that probably most teenage girls should be on anti-
depressants. So that was another factor in thinking that maybe it wasn’t the right 
thing, that it was kind of a blanket prescription and everybody was going to be 
getting it who walked into that office. 
Devon’s critical consciousness about sexism and medical practice allowed him to critique 
the diagnostic process and resist the medicalization of his experiences of distress. 
 Many of the trans participants had an especially fraught relationship to diagnostic 
process and categorization. As previously mentioned, many had been diagnosed with 
gender identity disorder in addition to various other ‘mental disorders.’ Unlike most of 
the diagnoses in the DSM, the gendered nature of GID is blatant and explicit, making it 
easier to critique on these grounds. As discussed in chapter one, the veracity of GID is 
widely questioned within trans scholarship and communities and many do not accept the 
pathologization of gender non-conformance. However, receiving this diagnosis is 
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sometimes required for gaining access to the technologies of medical transition.
11
 
Knowledge circulates within trans communities about what narrative must be performed 
about our experiences, thoughts, and behaviours in order to receive the diagnosis and 
gain access to services. Many trans people, therefore, have a sense of GID as socially 
constructed and feel some level of agency about the diagnostic process in that many 
recognize the necessity of using the psychiatric system and the diagnosis of GID in a 
pragmatic way. As Sol, a white, queer, transgender person in Toronto, said, “I think it’s a 
bit of a crap issue, honestly [both laugh], and I bit the bullet to jump through the hoops to 
get the testosterone, so I didn’t really dispute their terms very much. I tried to frame my 
own experience in my own terms but not deviating super far from what they understand 
as gender identity disorder.”  
While many trans participants expressed an ability to use GID strategically, going 
through the diagnostic process also had an impact on their understanding of themselves. 
For example, Mike, quoted above, discussed the complex effects on his sense of self as a 
result of “re-narrating” his life to fit the diagnostic criteria of GID. Before seeking the 
diagnosis, Mike was “pretty strongly feminist” in that he was “against gender” because 
he believed that “a lot of gender had to do with patriarchy.” Mike found that his feminist 
belief that gender is a “social system about power relations” was incompatible with the 
individualization characteristic of diagnostic criteria. While Mike remains critical of the 
biomedical model, his experiences with the diagnostic process caused shifts in his 
feminist beliefs: 
                                                 
11
 In Canada, the process is different in each province. Generally speaking it is only possible to gain access 
to surgery without a diagnosis of GID if one has the means to pay a private surgeon (and sometimes not 
even then, as some request evidence of having been diagnosed). This is therefore a class stratified situation, 
and it should also be noted that the public procedures for gaining access to surgery is generally much more 
invasive and time consuming. Those seeking hormones usually also require diagnosis. 
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Re-narrating my life, re-narrating everything that I thought was politically and 
socially important into just a sense of who I am as a person and how I fit in the 
world, was difficult because it involved accepting some dominant ideas about 
gender and also recognizing that some things were true, that not everybody, 
actually, was driven by this serious obsession and upset-ness about gender; a lot 
of people are just fine with it. So that was kind of hard for me, because the 
politicized view that I had enabled me to not actually address my own situation. 
So it was a combination of letting go of some of my politics, really, but also 
incorporating myself more into how I see the world and how I am in the world. So 
it was tricky.  
Mike began the diagnostic process with a strong critique of GID and the biomedical 
model, but his experiences with diagnosis caused him to conclude that some parts of 
feminist ideology are also incompatible with the realities of trans experience. This had a 
profound impact on his politics and his sense of self. 
 As the participants’ narratives demonstrate, there are a number of factors 
influencing participants’ perceptions of the biomedical model of mental illness. These 
include the relief of finding a way to explain their experiences, connections with family 
and friends, exposure to alternative frameworks in university and community settings, 
and applying critical understandings of race, gender, and sexuality to the biomedical 
model of mental illness. One of the biggest factors affecting participants’ impressions of 
the biomedical model was their experiences with mental health care providers, as will be 
further explicated in the next chapter.  
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 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the biomedical model of mental 
illness is so prevalent that it was difficult for the participants to make their experiences 
intelligible without using the language of diagnosis, even when they did not fully agree 
with diagnosis as an organizing framework for their experiences. If diagnosis is an 
inadequate way of making sense of experiences of distress, how can these experiences be 
described? As Tew (2005) argues, “having ways of making sense that work for us is a 
crucial foundation for personal recovery and for enabling the recovery of others” (p. 10). 
In other words, in order to address mental distress, it is important to have a way of 
making these experiences intelligible. I turn now to a discussion of some alternatives to 
diagnostic categorizing. 
Alternatives to diagnostic categorizing 
 
Some theorists of social approaches to mental distress argue that it is helpful to 
shift from a language of ‘symptoms’ and diagnoses to that of ‘complaints’ (Bentall, 2003; 
Boyle, 2011; Tew, 2011). Following Bentall (2003), Tew (2011) argues that the language 
of ‘illness’ should be replaced by descriptions of “the specific experience that is troubling 
us,” such as hearing voices or persistent distressing thoughts (Tew, 2011, p. 29). Boyle 
(2011) explains that this kind of descriptive language should also foreground the context 
in which the complaints arise. She gives the following example to illustrate this point: 
“John is a widower with psychotic symptoms,” as opposed to, “The critical voices John 
hears may be part of a painful debate he is having with himself about whether he cared 
enough for his wife when she was dying” (p. 41).  
Some participants who rejected the term ‘mentally ill’ were sometimes at a loss 
for language that felt comfortable and accurately described their experiences. Some found 
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it more helpful to name their specific struggles rather than taking on the pathologizing 
identity ‘mentally ill.’ As Margaret, quoted above, said, 
I don’t know if it’s because of the word illness. I’d rather say that I’ve struggled 
with depression. And I struggled with, you know, suicidal thoughts, tendencies 
too. I mean I could admit that I have an illness with my other recovery programs 
but maybe it’s just like I said, the word ‘illness’ kinda throws me off.  
Similarly, Rob, quoted above, describes himself as someone who experiences feelings of 
depression and who has “dealt with suicidal tendencies.” Bentall (2003) argues that using 
this kind of descriptive language rather than medicalized terminology dispenses with the 
need to create a definitive distinction between madness and sanity or to always assume 
that these kinds of experiences are pathological (p. 141). 
Language is not the only thing that needs to shift in order to move away from 
psychiatric diagnosis. If mental distress is not due to an imbalance in brain chemistry, 
there is still the question of how to determine what factors lead to mental distress 
becoming problematic enough to interfere with someone’s life. Tew (2011) offers a 
useful set of suggestions for understanding when mental distress becomes disruptively 
problematic. He argues that there are generally a number of social factors present: the 
“disruption of personal agency – where some aspects of one’s experience seem ‘out of 
control,’” interference with “a person’s ability to carry on with their daily life (social 
dysfunction),” and becoming a “risk to self or others” (pp. 34-35). He believes that 
assessing these factors are of “more practical value” than psychiatric diagnoses (p. 34). 
Tew contends that expressions and experiences of mental distress can usefully be seen as 
“a way of coping with (or containing) our underlying unease; and a ‘cry for help’ that 
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may also express (often indirectly) what the unease may be about” rather than symptoms 
of a mental condition or disorder (p. 29). The next section will further clarify the kinds of 
experiences that can provide a social context for understanding mental distress. 
Making sense of mental distress: Resisting individualization and acknowledging 
social context 
 
Many participants drew attention to the ways in which their life experiences 
played a role in their mental distress, placing importance on the role of social contexts 
and adverse life experiences. This is in direct contradistinction to the biomedical model, 
which individualizes distress, attributing the cause to biologically-based pathologies such 
as chemical imbalances in the brain, rather than taking into account the social conditions 
and life experiences that may lead to distress and non-normative behaviours that get 
categorized as ‘mental illness.’ As Rapley, Moncrieff, and Dillon (2011) contend, 
ignoring the social context means that “more or less understandable reactions to life’s 
challenges” get turned “into internal individual pathology – whether labeled as 
depression, psychosis or some other diagnosis” (p. 4). It also means that structural 
oppression is minimized or ignored. As Ballou and Brown (2002) argue, the 
individualization characteristic of the biomedical model both silences those deemed mad 
and fails to take in to account “forces, dynamics, and structures” that may lead to 
experiences of madness. As they state, “While individual problems are certainly 
significant, it is also significant and meaningful that individuals are enormously impacted 
by multiple forces and systems” (p. xviii).  
This is particularly relevant to LGBQT people, because of the impact of 
homophobia, transphobia, and other forms of oppression. As Betty, quoted above, said, 
  110   
I think being who I am and having queer people in my life and being queer myself 
and sort of living apart from a larger segment of the population, I see people get 
shit on all the fricking damn time because we’re queer or because we’re poor or 
different. The world doesn’t always change for us or is not set up for the people 
that I care about....  The queer identity that I have and that the people that I care 
about have, that prevents them from being able to get what they need from 
systems that are supposed to support them, informs how I feel crazy sometimes. 
It’s also helplessness a little bit, too. That feeling of helplessness impacts the way 
that I feel crazy. You know, like that crazy feeling of not being able to do 
anything, being completely unable to move anything or switch something so it 
works for people, that gives me anxiety. I think it should give me anxiety. I 
actually think it should give everybody else anxiety, to be honest. Like I don’t 
think I should have to have all that. Some fucker should carry that shit for me. 
Whatever. That’s the way it is.  
Betty directly links her feelings of ‘craziness’ and anxiety to being queer in a 
homophobic and otherwise oppressive society. From a biomedical perspective, Betty’s 
experiences of distress and anxiety would be perceived as symptoms of illness 
characteristic of a disordered mind. Her explanation of her experiences challenges this 
perspective; her anxiety response makes sense within the social context she provides. As 
Boyle (2011) argues, the biomedical model renders experiences of madness unintelligible 
through sidelining the social context in which these experiences arise. This supposed lack 
of intelligibility of behaviours and thoughts deemed mad is often what justifies the use of 
the biomedical model “or any model based on individual deficits” (p. 40). She contends 
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that it is therefore crucial to insist on the intelligibility of mental distress and behaviours 
and thoughts that seem “‘abnormal’” through focusing on “the idea that people’s feelings 
and actions are consonant with their past and present experiences” and recognizing that 
“some ‘normal’ social practices, such as gender role socialization or consumerism,” can 
in fact be deeply injurious (p. 41).  
Indeed, there are quantitative studies linking experiences of homophobic and 
transphobic discrimination with ‘mental health and illness.’ Chamberland and Saewyc 
(2011) identify LGBQT people as a “vulnerable population” in terms of ‘mental health,’ 
surmising that this is connected to experiences of discrimination and social exclusion. 
The Trans PULSE study results indicate a connection between transphobia and 
depression in both trans men and trans women (Rotondi, Bauer, Scanlon, Kaay, Travers 
& Travers, 2011; Rotondi, Bauer, Travers, Travers, Scanlon & Kaay, 2011). Likewise, a 
study that measured the effects of overt forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men found that such experiences can have a negative impact on ‘psychological 
wellbeing’ (Morrison, 2011, p. 87). As McIntyre, Daley, Rutherford, & Ross (2011) 
argue, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a “strong relationship between perceived 
experiences of discrimination and mental health status, not only among LGB people but 
also for other minority populations” (p. 174). Of course, LGB (and queer and trans) 
people are also members of other ‘minority populations’ and can experience many kinds 
of oppression, as the following discussion will demonstrate. 
The participants’ narratives resonate with the results of these studies, in that it is 
clear that experiences of oppression based on gender and sexual dissidence are linked to 
mental distress. For example, David, a white, Jewish, gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, 
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described the oppressive treatment of boys and men who transgress the norms of 
masculinity and the ways in which this can lead to mental distress: 
I was queer from the very get go. What I liked, what I wanted was totally against 
the gender role that I was supposed to have. What was great about it is [that] I was 
bold enough and my family was either ignorant enough or lenient enough that I 
went and did what I wanted to do and avoided those things I wasn’t interested 
in…. The intersection of that with what I would call mental illness is the degree of 
harassment I experienced all the way through my childhood and my teenage years 
and in my twenties from my society.... I believe that the distress that was 
constantly on me, the world’s response to my being, is a powerful wounding 
element. And I think there’s no way of knowing what would have happened had 
my orientation and identity not been responded to in the way that it was, with acts 
of omission of people who did not come to my rescue, or did not come to protect 
me, or change the situation…. I think how they intersect, then, is my identity, the 
world’s response, and then the condition that developed in me because of that 
intersection. 
While David values the experiences created by being able to embrace his queer gender, 
he identifies society’s response to it as part of what led to what he calls his mental illness. 
Similarly, Donovan, a white, queer, gay, cisgender man in Toronto, described the impact 
of being expected to embody hegemonic masculinity: 
This is going back to my experiences with bullying and my own insecurities with 
not wanting to kiss girls in elementary school or be in art club or all of those kinds 
of things that made it possible for youth to pick on me were ways in which I 
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deviated from proper pieces of masculinity. And so because I was feminized in 
the things that I liked…, I think I internalized a lot of that. Especially when it 
came to my body image. And I think body image has a lot to do with how I 
understand myself to be very insecure. But then how that insecurity transposes 
onto an anxiety disorder. So having an anxiety disorder is my own discomfort 
with myself. So being called fat all the time when I was younger. And now seeing 
myself as someone who is fat, even though I’m not a fat person, but I can’t get 
that out of my head. Or never having a partner…until I was in my fourth year of 
university because I was so scared of how people would see my body, understand 
myself as a queer person or a gay person. And I think that has a lot to do with how 
I became a problem to the psychiatrist. But I also think that my own self-worth 
was compromised because of all that bullying and sexual assault that I 
experienced.  
Donovan drew attention to the negative impact of being harassed as a child for not living 
up to the norms of hegemonic masculinity. He explains how this harassment and the 
effects of fatphobia, homophobia, and sexual assault are directly related to his 
experiences of anxiety as well as his psychiatrization.
12
  
 Likewise, A.P., a racialized, queer, cisgender person in Toronto described the 
importance of many social factors in leading to mental distress, including “homophobia 
and transphobia and being the target of it and being stigmatized, being able to find a job, 
being rejected by your family or even milder things can affect your mental health issues 
or cause you to have mental health issues.” Jen, a white, pansexual, cisgender woman in 
                                                 
12
 Fatphobia refers to the pervasive positioning of “thinner bodies as morally, medically, aesthetically, and 
sexually desirable, while heavy bodes are vilified” as well as the “fear and hatred” directed at “visible body 
fat on oneself or others” (Saguy & Ward, 2011). 
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Toronto, told me that she was “concerned that regular behaviours are seen in a 
pathological sense” and the reason for her distress “is because of social factors and 
situational factors.” She went on to say: “I don’t think it’s something that’s wrong with 
my brain. I think it’s something that’s wrong with the context in which I grew up.” 
Referring to “the potential trauma that comes with hiding your sexuality in a repressive, 
potentially conservative environment in which you grow up,” she says, “That can have an 
effect on your mental health and your well-being.”  
 In addition to experiencing discrimination, queer and trans people often 
experience isolation and struggle with finding sources of social support, which can affect 
mental wellbeing (Gapka & Raj, 2003, Mcfarlane, 1998, Rotondi et al, 2011). The 
distress caused by feelings of isolation, especially at a young age, was a common theme 
in participant narratives. Barry, quoted above, described feeling depressed and isolated 
growing up “in a community where there was one gay kid in our entire school” and 
feeling “all alone” with no one to talk to while “starting to figure out who I was.” Aaron, 
quoted above, also described feeling isolated as a teenager: 
Around puberty I felt like I didn’t have very many people to talk to. There weren’t 
very many resources in [the country where I lived], so when I tried to look up 
mental health online, I had a lot of symptoms that corresponded with bipolar 
disorder. In retrospect it was probably just puberty but I don’t know....  There was 
a lot of pressure in terms of still being closeted and being in a very fundamentalist 
Muslim country. And really my own understanding of that place was fairly 
limited because I wasn’t someone that was enmeshed in that community; I was an 
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immigrant even there. So it felt really isolating. And so that led me to think that I 
was depressed.  
Aaron described the impact of isolation in the context of diaspora and homophobia, a 
deeply stressful situation that led to confusion and distress. 
 Some participants also discussed feeling isolated on the basis of race. Marcus, a 
racialized, queer, trans man in Toronto, discussed the impact of racism and isolation as a 
racialized person growing up in a small town: 
I think growing up in [a small town] and not being surrounded by other people of 
colour, I think that affected my mental health in that I didn’t understand what 
racism really was and so I thought it was just me – that people hated me. It was 
apparent because you’re a ‘chink’ or whatever. I didn’t know how to deal with it 
because there were no classes on it and nothing that reflected my culture in school. 
And it was also very religious – a Catholic school upbringing. It was hard for me 
[and my siblings] who were the only East Asians in our grade for the longest time 
until we hit high school and there was maybe three more. 
Marcus described the impact of growing up as a person of colour in a racist society where 
racism is never named and assimilation is covertly enforced through Eurocentric 
curricula. His story draws attention to the kinds of practices that are commonly accepted 
as benign (white-centric curricula) that are in fact harmful and can lead to mental distress. 
 Trans participants often linked feelings of mental distress to not being able to 
transition and being forced to live as the gender they were assigned at birth. For example, 
Josh, an Indigenous, heterosexual, trans man in Winnipeg, described living with extreme 
levels of distress before gaining access to testosterone: 
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I went to see [the doctor] and it was like either I get the sex change or I keep 
doing drugs until I kill myself. Those are the only two options. I’ve never been 
that blunt with a doctor. You know I’m always quiet....  I was like either you help 
with my transition or I just keep on doing drugs till eventually my liver fails or 
something. Because I’m not a lesbian, I’m sick of living like that, I don’t classify 
myself as a lesbian…. So he’s helped me out and everything’s completely 
changed. It’s like flipping a pancake almost [laughs]. Probably about two months 
after starting testosterone and even my roommates, my friends noticed. As a youth 
I’d been in every kind of drug possible, cocaine, heroin, injecting drugs, like I 
amaze myself that I’m actually still alive, you know [laughs], with some of the 
stuff I’ve done….  A lot of people have noticed I’m just a lot happier. A lot 
happier with myself, a lot happier with life and not on a one-way road to 
destruction. 
Josh directly links his mental distress to his social situation. He described feeling anxious 
and depressed for many years until he was able to begin transitioning. At that point his 
levels of mental distress decreased exponentially and he was able to stop taking 
psychiatric medications. Similarly, Rikki, a white, French-Canadian lesbian transgender 
woman in Winnipeg, told me that she had “life-long depression and transitioning is the 
cure.” She described being diagnosed with depression and trying psychiatric drugs in the 
hopes that they would help her feel better. After four years of taking various psychiatric 
medications, she came to the realization that she is trans: 
At that point I started getting worse because it’s like I knew what I needed to do 
to cure myself but I was in a situation where I couldn’t pursue that. So the 
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knowledge and not being able to do anything about it made it worse and so we 
tried to fight that with more medication. What happened was that I attempted 
suicide. When I stopped myself, clarity came to mind and I said that if I’m going 
to beat the depression I have to change my gender. At that point I started feeling 
100% better. It was at that point I stopped taking medication.  
Like Josh, Rikki experienced high levels of mental distress and attempted suicide due to 
the inability to transition. Once she was able to change her situation and begin 
transitioning, she noticed a huge lessening of mental distress and stopped taking 
psychiatric medications. 
 Other participants made mention of the impact of traumatic experiences and 
difficult family relations as something that could lead to mental distress. Raven, a Métis, 
trans, genderqueer person in Winnipeg, described experiencing difficulties connected to 
his mother and her partner overdosing on drugs: 
I was feeling kind of suicidal and self-injured a bit. And I was going through a lot 
of stuff at that time. I was with my mom. She’s a drug user and she O.D.’d when I 
was eight. And also my mom’s partner that she had been with for several years 
O.D.’d when I was about twelve and was in a coma for a little while and came out 
of that with brain damage and so I was with him through that, for about a year 
through that process and seeing him kind of come back to life a bit. Which it’s 
lucky he did. I think it probably brought up a lot of trauma that I had with my 
mom O.D.-ing.  
Raven’s mental distress makes sense when connected with what was going on with his 
family. As he put it, “I think it makes sense that I have panic and anxiety. I just have a lot 
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of shit, I guess.... I’ve had a lot of trauma in my life and I think I’m just dealing with that 
in my body, trying to figure that out.” Similarly, Margaret, quoted above, described 
growing up in an “alcoholic dysfunctional family” and connected her feelings of mental 
distress to these experiences: 
I’d rather say ‘survivor’ than ‘mad’ or ‘mentally ill.’ Like I said, both my parents 
were alcoholic and well my mom did get into twelve step recovery and she did 
stop drinking but I feel like she wasn’t really what they say, ‘working her 
program.’ She didn’t take responsibility. She would act crazy and then act like 
someone else had the problem. 
Margaret does not see herself as ‘mentally ill’ because her distress makes sense to her 
given her family dynamics. Likewise, Jen, quoted above, identified her experiences 
growing up as what led to her mental distress. As she said: “I became homeless at sixteen 
and I was homeless for two months. I had a very tumultuous upbringing. My parents 
were very middle-class but they were abusive and there was all kinds of emotional abuse 
that was going on and sometimes physical abuse.” While Raven’s, Margaret’s, and Jen’s 
experiences do not directly speak to the significance of being LGBQT, it is important to 
note that the existence of systemic discrimination means that even in cases where 
oppression is not overtly obvious, it may in fact play a role. For example, becoming 
homeless may be that much more difficult as a LGBQT person because of the presence of 
homophobia and transphobia in homeless shelter systems. 
 As the participants’ narratives demonstrate, the role of adverse life experiences is 
crucial to consider in understanding mental distress. Such experiences can lead to mental 
distress and social approaches indicate that de-pathologizing mental distress by locating it 
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within social contexts positions mental distress as an understandable response to adverse 
life experiences. As I have shown, this is in direct contradistinction to the biomedical 
model, which frames ‘the mentally ill’ as unreasonable and unintelligible based on 
underlying ‘disorders.’ Social approaches are particularly useful for understanding 
LGBQT experiences because as members of marginalized groups, they often have to 
contend with homophobia, transphobia, and other forms of oppression. This pushes the 
queer critique beyond selective diagnoses to make the broader claim that the biomedical 
model as a whole is problematic and that social approaches to mental distress provide 
another way of making LGBQT experiences of madness intelligible. As I will argue in 
the next chapter, these models have very different implications for treatment. 
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Chapter Three: The Biomedical Model in Practice: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, and 
Trans Encounters with Mental Health Care Practitioners 
 
 In chapter two I contend that the biomedical model of mental illness is an 
unhelpful way of making sense of lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (LGBQT) 
experiences of mental distress. I argue that biomedicalism individualizes mental distress, 
treating social contexts and structural oppression as unimportant or secondary and 
rendering LGBQT experiences of madness senseless and pathological. I present social 
approaches to mental distress as another way of making these experiences intelligible; 
these approaches understand mental distress as a reaction to adverse life events and 
experiences of oppression. 
In this chapter I examine participants’ experiences with mental health care 
practitioners in order to look at the effects of the biomedical model in practice. I explore 
how the ideologies underpinning health care practices govern the relationship between 
practitioners and those seeking care, as well as decisions about how to address or manage 
mental distress. I argue that the power relations embedded in the biomedical model can 
make for inequitable relationships and interactions, a problem compounded by a 
profound lack of knowledge among practitioners about LGBQT cultures, identities, and 
behaviours as well as racialized cultures and processes of racialization. Furthermore, 
participants’ experiences indicate that despite the removal of homosexuality from the 
DSM and increasing resistance to the inclusion of gender identity disorder (now gender 
dysphoria), LGBQT people continue to be pathologized through various means. These 
include discourses that position nonnormative sexual and gendered behaviour, desires, 
and practices as deviant; diagnostic criteria that pathologize ‘promiscuous’ behaviour, 
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and the use of mental health systems and child protective services as tools of 
(neo)colonial regulation.  
The result is that participants struggled to create equitable relationships and 
interactions with practitioners, which in turn affected their access to, and decisions about, 
ways of addressing their distress. My analysis shows that encounters with mental health 
care practitioners whose approaches are informed by biomedicalism are not objective 
assessments of mental health; rather, they are enculturated processes rife with 
problematic subjective judgments and discrimination. This disrupts the notion that all 
those who seek mental health care receive equal treatment and that the mental health 
system is equipped to address the needs of LGBQT people.  
As demonstrated in chapter two, the biomedical approach to understanding 
‘mental illness’ extends well beyond formal healthcare settings such as hospitals and 
doctors' offices into counselling relationships as well as the consciousness of the 
participants, their support networks, and the general public. Participants were therefore 
likely to encounter biomedical perspectives regardless of where they accessed services, 
though there were differences between types of practitioners.  
Participants described interactions with psychiatrists and general practitioners as 
those that were most heavily informed by the biomedical model of mental illness. This is 
unsurprising given that these types of practitioners have medical training. Seventy-six 
percent (28) of participants described consulting a general practitioner about their mental 
health and 70 percent (26) reported having seen a psychiatrist at least once. Only 16 
percent (6) of participants had seen a psychologist, making the nature of these 
experiences more difficult to evaluate. Eighty-four percent (31) of participants had seen a 
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counsellor at least once. Counsellors were less likely to be strictly informed by 
biomedicalism and more likely to make use of critical perspectives; for this reason these 
experiences are not the primary focus of this chapter. Only 5% (2) of participants had 
never seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, or counsellor. 
Availability of services in Winnipeg and Toronto 
 
Participants’ access to services and their choices about what type of practitioner to 
see were shaped by provincial insurance coverage. In Manitoba and Ontario, mental 
health care practitioners who are covered under provincial health insurance include 
general practitioners and other service providers practicing in doctor’s offices such as 
social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. Psychiatrists practicing in hospitals are 
also covered. Other publicly funded services include hospital emergency services, 
hospital in-patient and out-patient programs, and support groups operating within 
hospitals. Some community health centres receive funding to offer free counselling, 
support groups, crisis lines, and in some cases mobile crisis response and short-term 
residence. These services are often limited by catchment area, have extensive waiting 
lists, and are therefore difficult to access. Private practice counsellors are not covered 
under provincial insurance, making them accessible only to participants who could afford 
it and those who had insurance coverage through work. Those who were students had 
access to counselling through their post-secondary institutions.  
As this description suggests, the most readily available provincially-covered 
services are those that are located in institutionalized medical settings like hospitals and 
doctors' offices and are most likely to be informed by the biomedical model of mental 
illness. This means that participants were likely to have their experiences of distress 
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medicalized. Furthermore, services that are not explicitly LGBQT-focused are highly 
likely to be inaccessible or hostile to LGBQT people in a number of ways, regardless of 
whether they are mainly informed by biomedicalism. This made it particularly 
challenging for participants to find adequate mental health services. 
 In terms of mental health care services that are LGBQT-centered or explicitly 
LGBQT-friendly, the context in which the participants sought care was different 
according to whether they lived in Winnipeg or Toronto. Winnipeg, the capital of 
Manitoba, is the largest city in the province with a population of approximately 700,000. 
According to the 2006 census, ten percent of Winnipeg’s total population is Aboriginal, 
the biggest urban population of Aboriginal people in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2006). 
The impact of colonization is highly visible; as Silver (2004) claims, “Winnipeg is a 
deeply segregated and racist city. This is the legacy of a long and still-present process of 
the colonization of Aboriginal peoples” (para. 4). Racial segregation is reflected in 
Winnipeg’s LGBQT community and the health-related services that are available for 
LGBQT people, as will be seen below.  
 In terms of health services available for LGBQT people in Winnipeg, the 
Rainbow Resource Centre offers drop-in counselling and short-term counselling, peer 
support groups, including some that are trans-specific, group counselling, and youth 
programming. There is a Gay Men’s Clinic for gay and bisexual men at Four Rivers 
Medical Clinic. This clinic offers family practice care and a clinic for gay and bisexual 
male youth. It also serves trans men who are gay or bisexual, though this is not explicitly 
stated on their website. Klinic Community Health Centre is known to be LGBQT-
friendly and offers an extensive list of health services, including family practice, 
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counselling, crisis lines, and HIV and STI screening. Likewise, Mount Carmel Clinic is 
known to be LGBQT-friendly and offers many services to those living in the north end of 
Winnipeg, including family practice, counselling, and support services aimed at various 
groups such as immigrants and refugees, young parents, and homeless people with mental 
illness. One program at the clinic, Sage House, offers health and support services to 
street-involved women, explicitly including trans women. Nine Circles Community 
Health Centre is also known to be LGBQT-friendly and provides STI and HIV testing 
and primary care for those living with HIV. 
For trans participants in Manitoba and Ontario, mental health care is more overtly 
entwined with trans identity. Trans people who seek hormone therapy and surgeries must 
acquire the help of medical professionals. This often involves contact with mental health 
care practitioners and receiving a diagnosis of gender identity disorder (now gender 
dysphoria). The vast majority of general practitioners do not prescribe hormones or have 
the necessary knowledge about trans health to support trans patients. This means that 
trans people have to find trans-specific health services, unless they are already in the care 
of a general practitioner who has been educated about trans health or is open to seeking 
such education.  
Prior to the launch of a trans health clinic at Klinic Community Health Centre in 
December 2009, trans people from Manitoba were sent to the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health (CAMH) in Toronto, Ontario. The trans clinic at Klinic runs two evenings 
a week, with a waiting list of eight months. This clinic supports trans clients in their 
transition and provides prescriptions for hormones and referrals to surgeons who perform 
trans-related surgeries, some of which is provincially covered. There is one clinical 
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psychologist, Jules Henderson, who is known to be trans-positive and provides the 
documentation that is necessary for access to hormones and surgeries. This service is 
covered by provincial insurance, if accessed through a referral from Klinic. As of March 
2013, Mount Carmel Clinic has been working on establishing a new weekly trans health 
clinic.  
In Winnipeg, there are no LGBT-centered services that offer mental health care 
services from an Indigenous cultural perspective. There are several Indigenous 
organizations such as Aboriginal Health and Wellness Centre, Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata 
Centre, and Ka Ni Kanichihk that offer a wide range of health and wellness services 
based on Indigenous culture, but do not specifically include two spirited and LGBQT 
people in their mandates. One participant, Travis, a Métis, queer, cisgender man, 
described this problem as twofold. First, “Winnipeg is very divided in terms of race, in 
terms of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.” He explained that in the north end of the city, 
there are services run by and for Aboriginal people, whereas in the south end, social 
services are white dominated in terms of who works there and controls the organizations. 
Second, he described not only “the divide between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal" but 
also the "weird idea" that "if you’re Aboriginal and you’re queer, people don’t know 
what to do with that." He explains, "They either want you to be one or the other. And 
then if you’re in those spaces, it’s typically one or the other.” This leaves Indigenous 
two-spirited and LGBQT people without services that acknowledge their specific needs 
as two-spirited or LGBQT and Indigenous individuals. There is a group called Two-
Spirited People of Manitoba Inc: Aboriginal Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender 
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People, that seeks to address these issues by running trainings and workshops for 
organizations that wish to hire them. 
Toronto, the biggest city in Canada with a population of about 2.79 million and 
5.5 million in the Greater Toronto Area, is often touted as a diverse and multicultural 
city. In terms of LGBQT-specific services, the Sherbourne Health Centre is a community 
health centre that offers a number of services, including primary care and support groups 
for those who are homeless, newcomers to Canada, and LGBT people. The centre also 
offers short and long term counselling to those in its catchment area. The Sherbourne is 
known as the ideal place for LGBT healthcare in Toronto, but there are long waiting lists 
for primary care (up to three years) and counselling (one to two years). The Sherbourne 
also houses Rainbow Health Ontario (RHO), a provincial program aimed at promoting 
LGBT health and increasing access to health services. The RHO website has an extensive 
database of LGBT-friendly healthcare providers across Ontario. RHO offers LGBT 
cultural competency training in the form of a series of workshops for health care 
providers. It also runs the Trans Health Connection Project, which provides training for 
health care providers working with (or intending to work with) trans clients in the form of 
four-day modules on trans care and a weekly telephone helpline for health care 
professionals.  
David Kelley Services, housed at Family Services Toronto, offers short term 
counselling to LGBQT people and people living with HIV/AIDS. The waiting list is 
generally at least one year long, though it was temporarily full and no longer taking 
names when I called to inquire about wait times in January 2013. The 519 Church Street 
Community Centre provides short term counselling (6 sessions only) and referrals to 
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other LGBQT-friendly services. It also has health and wellness- related programs for 
LGBQT people, including some that are trans-specific. Planned Parenthood offers short-
term counselling for youth under 30, with a focus on underserved groups such as 
LGBTQ, homeless, and newcomer youth. Their waiting list is approximately one year 
long. The Griffin Centre offers mental health programs for LGBT youth and adults, 
including those that address depression, discrimination, sexuality, substance use, and 
more. The Lesbian Gay Bi Trans Youth Line is a distress line that provides peer support 
to youth under 26 years of age in Ontario. The Hassle Free Clinic is known to be LGBT-
friendly and specifically includes trans people in their gendered hours of operation (they 
have separate hours for women and trans people and men and trans people). It provides 
STI and HIV/AIDS screening and other sexual health related services. Two-spirited 
People of the First Nations offers counselling and referrals, outreach, research, and 
curriculum development for Indigenous Torontonians. 
Trans people seeking surgeries covered by Ontario provincial insurance must 
undergo psychological assessment and be approved for surgery at CAMH. There is a 
waiting list of at least one year to be seen and the approval process can take one to three 
years. CAMH has a fraught history with trans people and is heavily critiqued within trans 
communities, but it is the only option for trans Ontarians seeking provincially covered 
surgeries. Those who have the means can pay for surgeries privately, though often they 
require at least one letter from a mental health professional indicating readiness for 
surgery. The Sherbourne Health Centre and some endocrinologists and general 
practitioners who have completed training through RHO are willing to prescribe 
hormones, usually after an assessment of readiness.  
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Access to LGBQT-specific health care in Toronto is by no means ideal, but there 
are more options than there are in Winnipeg. For example, the RHO database of LGBT-
friendly health care practitioners, programs, and services across Ontario had a total of 
229 entries when I accessed it in April 2013. The Rainbow Resource Centre in Winnipeg 
purportedly has a list of LGBT-friendly practitioners, but was unable to locate it when I 
called to inquire in April 2013. I also asked the Trans Health Clinic housed at Klinic if it 
has a list of trans-friendly providers and was told that they would love to, but have no one 
to put on such a list. As well-resourced as Toronto is, however, participants located in 
Toronto identified the same difficulties with service provision as those located in 
Winnipeg, with only a few context-specific differences. For this reason, I discuss 
participant experiences as one large group throughout the chapter, mentioning context-
specific differences where relevant. 
Power dynamics in relationships informed by biomedicalism 
 
The nature of the relationship between the practitioner and the person 
experiencing mental distress is crucial, whether the relationship is new or ongoing. Many 
participants emphasized the importance of trust, collaboration, respect, and ally-ship and 
indicated that interactions with these characteristics were exceedingly difficult to find in 
the mental health care system. Indeed, the biomedical model of mental illness can make 
for inequitable relationships between practitioner and patient. As discussed in chapter 
two, the biomedical model positions those experiencing mental distress as deficient and 
in need of correction, as irrational and incapable of making informed decisions, and as 
fundamentally different from those who are considered sane. These problems are 
compounded by homophobia, transphobia, racism, and other forms of oppression. While 
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not all individual practitioners explicitly embrace these beliefs, they are implicit in the 
ideology governing medical practice and informed the way many practitioners interacted 
with the participants.  
 A major theme that emerged from the participants’ stories about their encounters 
with practitioners was the unhealthy power relations that governed these interactions and 
relationships. Many participants indicated that there is an inherent power imbalance in a 
model that sets up practitioners as all-knowing experts with the power to assess and 
diagnose those experiencing distress. As one participant, Raven, a Métis, trans, 
genderqueer person in Winnipeg, said: “I’m generally somebody who can fucking say 
what I mean and stand up and advocate for myself. But when it comes to doctors and 
people in health care, there’s just such a fucking power dynamic, like power imbalance. 
There’s just nothing you can do.” Participants described interactions that felt cold and 
distant, with no collaboration and often no respect. Many felt as if practitioners had 
limited or no regard for their agency. For example, Donovan, a white, queer, gay, 
cisgender man in Toronto, described feeling frustrated that his psychiatrist was unwilling 
to share information with him: 
I met resistance in that counselling work where I really had to ask, ‘Can I 
look at my notes?’ ‘No.’ ‘Well why? I want to know what you’re saying 
about me. I see you frantically writing, I want to know what you’re 
writing. Are you writing, ‘He’s really crazy?’ Are you writing, ‘I’m 
bored?’ Are you drawing a happy face? Like what are you doing?’ But 
they won’t share that with you. 
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Donovan’s attempts to equalize the relationship through information sharing were shut 
down, reducing his trust in his psychiatrist. This lack of transparency was common, with 
some participants experiencing outright deception from practitioners. Andrea, a white, 
queer, cisgender woman in Winnipeg, described being “tricked into using a psychiatrist” 
by her general practitioner after telling him that she believed she has fibromyalgia: 
He said he was sending me to a specialist. When I arrived there he started 
asking me all these questions about my childhood and all that kind of 
thing and I was like, "Why are you asking me these kind of questions? Are 
you a rheumatologist or something?" He’s like, "No, I’m a psychiatrist. 
Didn’t your doctor tell you that?" And I was like, "Ahh, no." 
Andrea needed forms completed by a doctor that would validate her inability to work in 
order to receive disability benefits from Manitoba’s Employment and Income Assistance 
program. She believed the psychiatrist had completed these forms based on a diagnosis of 
fibromyalgia: 
He said he would sign my medical forms…, but instead of putting 
fibromyalgia he put borderline [borderline personality disorder] and 
somatic personality [somatization disorder]. And he hadn’t even shared 
that diagnosis with me. It was shared to me by Employment and Income 
Assistance.  
Andrea was deceived by both her general practitioner and a psychiatrist, who gave her a 
diagnosis that indicated that he did not believe in the veracity of the fibromyalgia 
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diagnosis and her account of her symptoms.
13
 Andrea believes that part of the reason her 
general practitioner sent her to the psychiatrist was that he saw her as an “insane queer 
woman.” She believed she was seen as less credible because her doctor espoused 
homophobic beliefs and positioned her sexuality as a form of mental illness. As she put 
it, “Just like, ‘You’re crazy. Gay.’”  
 The lack of transparency about diagnosis may be of particular concern for trans 
people. Devon, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto, indicated that he was kept in the 
dark about being given a diagnosis of gender identity disorder, discovering this years 
later through a third party:  
I didn’t see the diagnosis until eventually I had a endocrinologist who 
asked me a lot of psychological questions, which I thought was really 
weird because she was asking me more personal questions than the shrink 
actually did. But she eventually gave me all of my health documents when 
I moved…so I could give it to whatever doctor I’d go in to see. In that I 
saw some of the original documents and saw that "this patient has been 
diagnosed with gender identity disorder" on it and realized that I had been 
subjected to some designations and some pretty specific terms that I didn’t 
realize had been applied to me.  
While Devon was initially surprised, he said: “I guess the assumption is that you know 
that that’s why you’re there, so you want to get that designation [both laugh]. I think they 
would be a little, ‘What did you expect? [laughs].’” However, Devon was not alone in his 
unawareness. Other trans participants indicated that they didn’t know a diagnosis of 
                                                 
13
 Somatization Disorder is diagnosed when there is no physical medical condition causing the reported 
symptoms or the reported discomfort exceeds the expectations of the practitioner based on evidence such as 
physical examination (DSM-IV).  
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gender identity disorder was required in order to access publicly funded medical 
technologies of transition. For example, Brayden, a racialized, gay, trans man, told me, “I 
don’t think that’s how it works out here,” despite having already seen the doctor at the 
trans clinic in Winnipeg. This indicates that there is potentially a lack of clarity and 
transparency about sharing diagnoses. Though there is a culture of informal knowledge 
exchange in trans communities, practitioners should not assume that all trans people 
already know they will be officially diagnosed before being allowed access to medical 
transition. The importance of this should not be underestimated. Many trans people 
disagree strongly with the pathologization of trans identities and behaviours and some go 
to great lengths to avoid having their transition psychiatrized.  
Many participants also described condescending and paternalistic practitioners. 
For example, Margaret, a white, bisexual, queer, cisgender woman, told me the following 
about her experience in a hospital in Toronto: 
The questions were just too stupid and we were sitting there for a while 
and I kind of got annoyed. Like they started asking me, “What day is 
this?” “What floor are we on?” and “Where are we?” And by that time I 
felt like saying something smart-ass like “Mars” and, you know, “The 
forty-first of October." Like shut up. What do you think I’m going to say, 
right? 
It sounds like Margaret was assessed using a standard tool of psychiatric assessment, the 
Mental Status Examination. The section she described above is aimed at assessing level 
of cognition but was experienced as insulting and paternalistic. As Margaret’s comments 
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suggest, the application of standard assessment may sometimes be at the expense of being 
attuned and helpful to someone experiencing distress. 
Likewise, Viki, a racialized, queer, gender-fluid woman, felt that psychiatrists 
were not attuned or caring and were instead “formal, not supportive,” as well as 
“offensive, judgmental” and “not really caring about the person.” She attributed this to 
the medical model: 
I think because there’s such a medical model with so many psychs that 
when you’re talking about someone’s emotional and mental well-being, I 
feel like you should pay attention to the emotions they’re talking about 
and the mental state that they’re in. A lot of the times that doesn’t happen. 
I’ve had doctors pass comments about the way I look. I recently had a 
psych tell me that I was defiant. I find it really offensive that the supposed 
objective is someone’s mental health, but there are insensitive, rude things 
that are passed that don’t even consider where they’re at or who they are. 
Things like my gender and my sexual orientation can often be targeted. 
As Viki’s story also indicates, the power imbalance between practitioners and those 
experiencing mental distress is compounded by oppressive beliefs and lack of knowledge 
about LGBQT cultures, experiences, and identities. 
“Going back to gender and sexuality 101”: Practitioner ignorance 
 
Participants often came into contact with mental health care practitioners who had 
little to no knowledge of LGBQT cultures, identities, and experiences. While this 
problem is not limited to approaches informed by the biomedical model, medical training 
generally does little to acknowledge or address this problem (McIntyre, Daley, 
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Rutherford & Ross, 2011; Rutherford, McIntyre, Daley, & Ross, 2012). A recent survey 
of 150 medical schools across Canada and the United States shows that the median 
amount of time spent on LGBT issues in the curriculum is five hours (Obedin-Maliver et 
al, 2011, p. 971). Due to its large, diverse population, Toronto may be assumed to be a 
well-resourced city for LGBQT people. However, participants in both Toronto and 
Winnipeg indicated that unless they were receiving services at an LGBQT organization, 
they encountered practitioners who demonstrated a profound lack of knowledge. This 
serves as a major barrier to providing adequate care to LGBQT people. 
For example, Jen, a white, pansexual, cisgender woman, described seeing a 
psychologist in Toronto who could not understand her partnership with a trans woman: “I 
was like, ‘We’ve spent half these sessions just trying to clarify stuff about transsexuality 
to you. That’s not my job. It’s not my job to teach you. You’re supposed to be the 
professional.’" Jen experienced the same problem with a psychotherapist in Toronto:  
She didn’t seem to know anything about queer issues or trans issues and 
any time I talked to her about that stuff it just seemed kind of foreign to 
her. I don’t expect everybody to know everything, but I do expect a degree 
of something, you know [both laugh]. So that was difficult. I don’t want to 
have to feel like I have to explain the basics, like going back to Gender 
and Sexuality 101 to set up enough context for my life to make sense to a 
service provider.  
Like Jen, many participants felt like they had to educate service providers about 
sexuality and gender, making it difficult to focus on the distress they came to address and 
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in some cases making it worse. Margaret, who was assessed at a psychiatric hospital in 
Toronto, encountered stereotypical thinking about bisexuality:  
When I tried to be honest and open, telling them that I was bisexual, then 
of course they’re like, “Well which do you like better?” And I’m just like, 
making a puking face [both laugh]. You know, “Shut up, who cares, 
what’s it matter, why do I have to choose?” I mean I hate it when people 
ask me that anyway, but I just felt that was especially insensitive for 
people in the mental health field.  
Margaret was frustrated with the obvious lack of knowledge about bisexuality and the 
stereotypes expressed by her practitioners, further reducing her trust in the care provided. 
 Practitioners who were trans-positive and trans-knowledgeable were particularly 
hard to come by. Mike, a white, omnisexual trans man, indicated that this is especially 
difficult to find after transition in Toronto: 
After transition, almost impossible to get anybody who has any kind of 
understanding of trans issues that are not transition related or that are not 
gender dysphoria related. So that part I found really hard, because any 
kind of counselling or any services that I get now, people literally cannot 
wrap their mind around my history with gender. 
For many participants, like Mike, this meant that they limited access to health 
care services. As he went on to say: “I basically can’t get services anymore. And 
that’s true for health care, too. In general I’m so far off the map of what’s regular 
that doctors and clinicians are not trained to deal with it.... I’m articulate enough 
that I can say things but they still don’t get it.” 
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Though many practitioners had no LGBQT-specific knowledge, many still 
behaved like ‘experts’ in this regard. Caleb, a white, bisexual, trans male Torontonian, 
described being seen by a general practitioner:  
I get in to the room with the doctor…and he says, "Look, is it possible that 
you think you’re trans but really you’re actually bisexual?" And I was like, 
"Well, I think I’ve already considered that possibility, and I think that 
those things don’t have anything to do with each other. So no, I think I’m 
trans and bisexual, actually. Uh, you’re a jackass." I think that is a really 
good example of those doctors truly having no fucking clue whatsoever 
about queer people in general and trans people specifically. 
Practitioners like the one seen by Caleb continued to act as if they knew best, despite 
their glaring lack of awareness. Unsurprisingly, Caleb did not feel as if he could get his 
health care needs met by this practitioner. 
Participants in Winnipeg also reported a widespread lack of knowledge amongst 
mental health care practitioners. Rikki told me she felt like she wasted time seeing a 
psychiatrist in Winnipeg who was “a hack” and did not have the knowledge necessary to 
help her: “I think my psychiatrist has never been trained in GLBT, so I think she didn’t 
have the knowledge and so she was just trying to do whatever she could to make you feel 
better. But I don’t think she knew what she could do to get me through this.” Another 
Winnipegger, Lisa, had the veracity of her lesbian identity questioned by her psychiatrist: 
I’ve talked to her about having sex with guys. And she’s like "Are you 
sure you’re a lesbian?"…. Nobody had ever questioned that. I was mid-
twenties at that point. I think to question that after I’d been out for how 
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many years, it was like, "Yeah I’m a lesbian. I very much don’t like sex 
with guys, although I do it."  
Lisa’s psychiatrist had a rigid understanding of sexual identity categories and was unable 
to understand that the links between sexual behaviours and identity categories are not 
always straightforward. This became a sticking point in their sessions and Lisa believed 
that the psychiatrist continued to see her as someone who was confused and undecided 
about her sexuality, even though this did not reflect Lisa’s sense of self. 
Encountering practitioners with such ignorance of LGBQT identities, practices, 
and cultures when participants were in a vulnerable position was difficult for many. 
LGBQT-specific services have long waiting lists in both Toronto and Winnipeg, making 
it hard to use these services as an alternative. The result for some, like Derek, a 
racialized, queer, genderqueer person in Toronto, was to avoid health care services if at 
all possible: “Within the past few years, as a very queer unusual person, I’ve just barred, 
kept to like the walk-in clinics or just deal with it myself, or [my] grandma.” As this 
discussion demonstrates, lack of knowledge about LGBQT identities, experiences, and 
cultures was a significant barrier to quality mental health services. 
Practitioner lack of awareness about processes of racialization and racism  
 
  Many racialized participants also reported experiencing racism from 
practitioners, as well as a lack of awareness about racialized cultures. For example, many 
mental health care practitioners are uninformed about how Indigenous cultural 
understandings of mental health differ from mainstream perspectives as well as about 
“culturally appropriate methods of assessment and counselling with Indigenous youth and 
adults” (Stewart, 2008, p. 49). As Travis told me about Winnipeg, there is a lack of 
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access to holistic practice. In his case, he saw a social worker who discussed “holistic 
stuff” because she had some work experience in Indigenous communities, but was not 
very knowledgeable. Travis found that the onus was on him to bring this perspective to 
the sessions. Furthermore, he states that the community in Winnipeg is small, bringing up 
confidentiality issues: “If you want to do spirituality stuff, the Aboriginal community is 
very small, right, so if you’re gonna go, who’s going to be talking to who?” Travis also 
encountered misinformed practitioners, like one who assumed that all Indigenous people 
have their medications paid for and refused to provide him with samples on this basis, 
making him feel “really uncomfortable with her.”  
Racialized participants also experienced heterosexism from practitioners who 
assumed they were heterosexual, indicating a complex interplay of race-based 
assumptions and heterosexism. For example, Aaron, a racialized, gay, cisgender man, 
told me the following about his encounter with a doctor in Toronto: 
The doctor asked, “So you have sex with women, right?” and marked off 
on the paper that I have sex with women and literally asked me three 
times. He’s like, “You have sex with women, right?” I was like “No.” And 
he’s like, “No, I mean, do you have sex with women?” And I said, “No.” 
And then it almost sunk in at that point and he was gonna' etch out his 
mark but before he did that he thought it would be best to say, “No I mean, 
are you gay?” [both laugh]. I was like, “Yeah.” And finally he changed it. 
For me, that was not so much just homophobic as much as racist or 
classist. It’s not like I had on my Lady Gaga t-shirt or something. I was 
wearing what I consider regular clothes, jeans or whatever.  
  139   
Aaron draws attention to the ways in which heterosexism intertwines with racism 
and classism to create wealth and whiteness as an integral part of being gay and 
male in the social imaginary. As a black, low income, immigrant man he is not 
read as gay without overtly signifying queerness through white North American 
norms (i.e. a Lady Gaga t-shirt) and has to actively work against disbelief that he 
is gay. 
Many racialized participants also indicated that it was difficult to find service 
providers who could understand the ways in which race and racism informed their 
experiences. As Marcus, a racialized, queer, trans man in Toronto, said, there is a “lack of 
awareness” about race and racism amongst mental health counsellors, including those 
located in LGBQT organizations. Marcus saw a counsellor at the 519 Church Street 
Community Centre who “didn’t really talk about race that much,” though Marcus would 
have liked to. As he put it, “It helps to have that sort of knowledge or people talking 
about race and understanding like race in general and intersectionalities.” When Marcus 
joined an LGBQT support group about mental distress, he found that when he discussed 
his experiences of racism, others tried to neutralize the experience as simply bullying. 
When Marcus challenged this, he was made to feel as if he had to “prove that it actually 
happened.”  
Likewise, Jaime, a racialized, lesbian, trans person, saw a counsellor at an 
LGBQT-friendly organization in Winnipeg who was unable to relate to her experiences 
as a genderqueer person of colour. Following her unsuccessful experience there, Jaime 
never sought out services again. In fact, when Jaime experienced what she called “a 
mental breakdown” with “suicidal ideation” in which a mobile crisis unit and the police 
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were involved, she had no support from counsellors. Her cumulative experiences with the 
mental health care system made her “skeptical and fearful of the whole institution of 
health care” and she said that she would never be able to “get the services I need.” As 
these stories indicate, even LGBQT organizations may not be well equipped to address 
the needs of racialized LGBQT people, an issue that is further explored in the next 
chapter. 
Individualizing distress through pathologizing sexualities 
 
 Participants also discussed their experiences with practitioners who pathologized 
their sexualities. Despite the removal of homosexuality from the DSM and increasing 
resistance to the inclusion of gender identity disorder (now gender dysphoria), 
practitioners often individualized distress by positioning participants’ sexualities and 
genders as the cause of their mental distress, rather than recognizing that living in the 
context of discrimination can lead to distress. In some cases this was blatant. For 
example, Sonja, a Métis, bi-queer, cisgender woman, described being assessed by a 
Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre psychiatry resident who “pathologized queerness and 
made it into this cause of disease kind of thing.” During the assessment, she did not feel 
safe enough to disclose her sexuality. However, once he had completed the assessment 
she decided to come out to him. The following ensued: 
He got really upset. Not over the fact that I hadn’t told him everything, but 
just about what it meant to be queer and what I could expect to happen in 
my mental health if I continued to be queer. And I was like, "Why isn’t 
anybody…?" I literally looked at the mirror because there was a mirrored 
window or whatever, and I was like, "Why isn’t anybody coming in here 
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and removing this guy?" [both laugh] "I’m sorry I didn’t come out, but 
[laughs], you know, I don’t need to hear this." And no one came. And he 
just kinda' wrapped it up and sputtered and was like, "K thanks, bye." 
In Sonja’s case, the pathologization of her sexuality was direct and blatant. Other 
participants described more nuanced scenarios in which they felt like their sexuality was 
pathologized. Discussing health care practitioners and their perspectives on sexuality, 
Andrea, quoted above, observed, “Some of them just don’t have a clue. They think that 
it’s part of your mental health problem instead of just who you are.” Andrea experienced 
this firsthand with a psychiatrist in Winnipeg, who she said pathologized her 
relationships with women and seemed more eager to diagnose her after she disclosed her 
sexuality. 
 Likewise, Lisa, whose psychiatrist in Winnipeg questioned her sexuality, also 
questioned her appearance. Lisa was asked, “What are you trying to say?” in regards to 
her blue Mohawk hairstyle, her piercings, and her tattoos. Her psychiatrist believed that 
Lisa’s aesthetic choices were partially at fault for her struggles, placing the blame on 
Lisa’s queer appearance rather than on the oppressive behaviours of those who 
discriminated against her.  
 Similarly, when I asked Viki, quoted above, to elaborate on the ways in which her 
gender and sexuality were targeted, she told me about an appointment with a psychiatrist 
in Toronto. Viki, who identifies as Korean, had chosen a Korean psychiatrist in hopes of 
creating “some sort of bridge” between herself and her parents. She found that he 
pathologized her appearance and behaviour for not living up to Korean cultural norms, 
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which consider children “property” and a reflection of bad “parenting skills” if a child “is 
an embarrassment.” Viki described the ways in which the psychiatrist positioned her: 
He was pointing out my physical presentation as someone who wasn’t 
gender conformist, as someone who was queer, as someone who had 
piercings and tattoos. That I was an embarrassment. Which was a little 
hard for me to hear. And then further talked about aspects of what success 
meant to my family. And I said education. And I was struggling and I was 
trying to say that I was successful in my own way and then he said that I 
was not. Basically that I was a failure because I didn’t have a full-time job, 
I wasn’t married, I didn’t have a home. So my entire identity to this 
psychiatrist was defiant.  
Viki’s psychiatrist used heteronormative and classist norms of appearance and success, 
thus deeming her a failure. As Halberstam (2011) states, “Success in a heteronormative, 
capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined 
with wealth accumulation” (p. 2). As Viki points out, these norms are also racialized; she 
was pathologized for not living up to the expectations placed on her as a Korean woman. 
 As these stories show, many practitioners pathologized non-normative sexual 
behaviours, identities, and experiences instead of looking at the impact of oppression. As 
Betty, a white, cisgender, queer woman in Winnipeg, put it: “They’d be like, ‘The fact 
that you are on the fringe and you have this queer identity is why you are feeling crazy.’ 
Instead of being like, ‘The context that you live in where people are homophobic douche 
bags is actually the supporting factor in your mental illness.’” As the next section 
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illustrates, this was not the only way practitioners pathologized sexuality. Some overtly 
problematized participants’ sexual behavior by labeling it ‘promiscuous.’ 
Pathologizing sexuality: Diagnosing promiscuity 
 
 Diagnostic criteria for many ‘mental illnesses’ include promiscuity, heightened or 
aggressive sexual drive, and ‘indiscriminate’ sexual behaviour. Examples include 
dissociative identity disorder, borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality 
disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and bipolar disorder (Diamond, 2011). These 
critera are judgmental and moralistic, heavily laden with assumptions about appropriate 
levels of desire, numbers of sexual partners, and types of relationship within which sex 
should take place. Arguably, these criteria are based on heteronormative values about 
how much sex should be had and with whom. As Warner (1999) argues, queer culture 
fosters an “alternative ethical culture” that challenges sexual shame and heteronormative 
ways of organizing intimacy, relationships, and sexual practices (vii). As he claims, queer 
sex “is not required to be tidy, normal, uniform, or authorized by the government” (p. 
35). However, some mental health care practitioners saw queer forms of organizing 
sexual relations as a sign of ‘mental illness.’ 
 Indeed, some participants reported being deemed ‘promiscuous’ by their mental 
health care practitioners. Donovan, quoted above, described his sense of the beliefs of 
mental health care practitioners about having many sexual encounters with multiple 
partners: “It’s this idea of morality, that they are not taking care of themselves because 
they’re not truly good people, and because of that they’re having lots of sex. So it’s this 
idea of you’re a bad person, you don’t care about yourself, so you’re going to have lots of 
sex.” In this view, engaging in sex outside the bounds of a heteronormative, monogamous 
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relationship is perceived as a sign of moral weakness and disrespect of self. Donovan 
explained how his sexual history could therefore be pathologized by mental health care 
practitioners. However, he had his own interpretation of his behaviour: 
I’ve went and had lots and lots of sex with lots and lots of guys and felt pleasure 
and hurt that way, which is interesting. But I never physically made myself bleed 
because I was unhappy with who I was. So I got fucked instead. And that, to me, 
I’ve created to be normal in some interesting and weird way.  
Donovan reflects a similar view to the one he attributes to practitioners in that he 
compares having sex with many men to self-harm. He went on to say that in the past, he 
did not see himself as someone who was “mentally ill” because he never tried to commit 
suicide, only thought about it. At the time of the interview, he was reconsidering this and 
reflecting on how having lots of sex could be seen as self harm: 
Because I have these images and understandings of mentally ill, I didn’t at that 
time think that having lots of sex was an attribute of someone who was mentally 
ill. But if I was to hurt myself I would think that would be someone who was 
mentally ill. But I guess now thinking of it…, it’s understood that if someone has 
lots of sex, there’s more chance to get HIV or to get an STI and therefore they 
need to take care of themselves and if they don’t take care of themselves by not 
having lots of sex then therefore they have a problem. 
In many ways, this view is aligned with the earlier perspective, linking high rates of 
sexual activity with ‘mental illness’ and an inability to care for oneself. At the same time, 
Donovan resists this in describing his sexual behaviour as normal, a perspective perhaps 
aided by critical queer norms that resist heteronormative sexual relations. Donovan 
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expressed some resistance to the pathologization of his sexual practices while at the same 
time naming cutting as ‘abnormal’ and perhaps as indicative of mental ill health, a 
hierarchy that he was in the midst of questioning at the time of the interview (naming it 
‘interesting and weird’). 
 Similarly, Brock, a white, gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, found that his general 
practitioner positioned his sexual behaviours as unhealthy and attributed them to his 
‘mental illness’: 
We’ve talked about using it [sex] as a coping mechanism of borderline 
[personality disorder]. An aggressive sexual drive, seeking it out, sexual 
relationships that aren’t necessarily healthy, be it through masturbation or through 
promiscuous sex. And it’s been talked about like, yes, I acknowledge that I put 
myself in very dangerous situations. And my doctor has known this is something 
that you have to deal with. But we’ve approached it very justly, even-handedly.  
Unlike Donovan, Brock did not express any conflict with his practitioner’s views, stating 
that he needs to be “more careful” about his sexual behaviour because the “long term 
negative side effects can be disastrous.” Having many sexual encounters also felt 
unhealthy to Brock because he was often hurt by “gay men’s culture” in which many men 
were able to “let go quickly” and not get emotionally involved. Brock went on to say that 
his own inability to do the same was due to having borderline personality disorder, 
thereby classifying both his ‘promiscuity’ and his lack of being able to feel good about it 
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as indicative of mental ill health. In this way he supports the links between mental ill 
health and high rates of sexual activity with multiple partners.
14
 
 Service providers sometimes also conflated ‘promiscuity’ with non-monogamy, 
with the assumption being that those who have open relationships engage in lots of sex 
with multiple partners. As A.P., a racialized, queer, cisgender person in Toronto, told me: 
When I say that I’m non-monogamous and then they [mental health care 
practitioners] go into detective mode because I think that promiscuity is supposed 
to be a sign of things. I’m not promiscuous at all, but non-monogamous 
automatically equals [trails off]. Also it’s the kind of thing where doctors assume 
that if you identify as such that you must be some kind of deviant. There must be 
something wrong with you. It’s fine if you just want to meet a nice person of the 
same gender and settle down and adopt kids or have a puppy or something, but if 
you don’t subscribe to that model, then automatically it’s like maybe it’s a sign of 
more mental illness [both laugh]. 
While A.P. does not critique the concept of ‘promiscuity,’ she challenges the assumption 
that those who are non-monogamous engage in a lot of sexual encounters as well as the 
pathologization of open relationships. She draws attention to the way that homonormative 
relationships have attained a certain level of respectability with some practitioners, while 
other practices continue to be pathologized and linked to ‘mental illness.’ 
 Smith, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto, described the difficulties of finding a 
mental health care practitioner who does not pathologize BDSM and non-monogamy. As 
he put it: “I would want to be able to find somebody who I know isn’t going to be like, 
                                                 
14
 This is not to say that the ways in which Donovan and Brock interpret their experiences are ‘wrong’ or 
‘inaccurate.’ Rather, I am suggesting that their perspectives are, in part, aligned with their health care 
practitioners’ views about the links between ‘mental illness’ and ‘promiscuity.’ 
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‘Well, all of your problems are related to the fact that you’re non-monogamous or that 
you’re engaged in BDSM.’ I have heard so many stories about that being the case.” For 
Smith, who also self-identifies as “sex-positive,” the sexually conservative values 
embedded in biomedical ideology were unacceptable and make it difficult for him to find 
an adequate service provider. As this discussion shows, queer sexual practices and queer 
ways of organizing sexual relations were often pathologized by mental health care 
practitioners and treated as part of participants’ ‘mental illness.’ As this discussion also 
indicates, some participants grappled with the internalization of sex shaming and the 
pathologization of queer sexual relations while others resisted such pathologization.  
Pathologizing gender identity 
 
 The pathologizing of nonnormative gender identity was even more overt, partly 
because of the continuing inclusion of trans-related diagnoses in the DSM. For some, 
whether trans-identified or not, the inclusion of gender identity disorder (now Gender 
Dysphoria) in the DSM meant that trans-positivity and psychiatry are completely 
mutually exclusive. As Bettie, a cisgender participant from Winnipeg, said: “Who is a 
trans positive psychiatrist? Who the fuck is that? Who’s a trans positive psychiatrist? 
Does that exist in the world? Because we’re fucking still stuck with the DSM diagnosis 
for that, so what the hell?” Indeed, the inclusion of diagnoses that pathologize non-
normative genders had a resounding impact on trans participants, both within and apart 
from processes of gaining access to the technologies of medical transition.  
 Trans participants from Winnipeg who had navigated the mental health care 
system for gender identity-related needs had all done so after 2009, when Manitoba 
stopped referring trans people to CAMH. Since setting up its own process for granting 
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access to medical transition, the experience has become less pathologizing for 
Manitobans, as it does not take place in a psychiatric institution. The gate-keeping 
process through Klinic is less medicalizing, and participants who had been through the 
process spoke positively about their experiences with the clinical psychologist who 
assessed their readiness for transition. Despite this, there were still concerns about having 
to be diagnosed in order to gain access to services. As Rikki said: 
I know that it’s a requirement for us to get our surgery that we need the diagnosis. 
That’s where it’s ludicrous. I can’t just say I’m trans; I have to get someone else 
to say that I’m trans. So if I make an appointment to see a psychologist to say, 
“Can you write a note to say I’m trans?” “Are you?” “Yes I am.” “Okay.” “I just 
told you I was.”  
As Rikki indicates, the requirement to have one’s trans identity validated by being given 
a diagnosis of GID (now GD) is still problematic, though preferable to the process at 
CAMH. 
By contrast, Torontonians using provincially-covered services are seen in a 
psychiatric institution by a psychologist and a psychiatrist and asked invasive, irrelevant 
questions about their sexual practices and desires. None of the participants in this study 
had accessed care through CAMH, either because they had paid for services privately, 
had not used medical technology to transition, were not interested in the concept of 
transitioning, or had accessed services in another province prior to moving to Toronto. 
However, the experiences of trans people at CAMH is discussed and critiqued within 
trans communities and is known to be pathologizing and harmful in some cases. For 
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example, Derek, a racialized, queer, genderqueer person, told me that he is “afraid of 
them, intensely.” He went on to say: 
I attend Trans Youth Toronto, I’ve heard enough horror stories through the 
grapevine to be like, "I don’t want to touch CAMH unless I was paid." And 
knowing my own ways of identifying I would fail [names a scientist at CAMH] 
test in a heartbeat. The idea of conforming to a gender role makes me incredibly 
uncomfortable and conforming to a gender performance as well. 
Derek is referring to a scientist at CAMH, whose beliefs and practices concerning trans 
children and adolescents are contested by trans activists. The test Derek refers to is the 
expectation that those seeking medical transition conform to a binary sense of gender and 
provide ‘proof’ of having performed it over a ‘long enough’ period of time. Those who 
identify as genderqueer or otherwise challenge binary genders have a difficult time 
gaining access to medical transition through CAMH. 
The “horror stories” Derek refers to can also affect the way that practitioners 
outside of CAMH are viewed. For example, Caleb, quoted above, told me that he “took 
the whole conversation of transness off the table” with his therapist because he feared he 
would be pathologized for being trans. This was partially due to what he knew about 
CAMH’s practices:  
A lot of trans people, especially here in Toronto, those folks who go to CAMH, 
have had to deal with psychiatrists and psychologists presuming that their mental 
illnesses that they may have in addition to transitioning are either because of 
being trans or vice versa, that being trans is because of mental illness. And both of 
those things just cause me so much rage, for obvious reasons.  
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Caleb knew that the pathologizing of trans people is still rampant and wanted to avoid the 
possibility of hearing these views espoused by his therapist. Similarly, Devon, another 
Torontonian, believed that he would always be perceived as mentally ill by any mental 
health care practitioner, regardless of his mental state, by virtue of being trans: 
I imagine that because transsexuality has a history of pathologization that I’m 
already seen as having that pathology. So I’m already being viewed as mentally ill 
right off the get go. And it may be in my case that my anti-depressants are 
injectable, but that’s how I feel that I’m being viewed in that moment and I don’t 
like it. 
Devon is referring to his testosterone shots as anti-depressants, suggesting that while the 
technologies of medical transition may prevent him from being depressed (“my anti-
depressants are injectable”), he should not be positioned as mentally ill for being trans. 
 As this discussion shows, mental health care practitioners are often viewed with 
suspicion and fear by many trans people, because of the ongoing pathologizing of non- 
normative genders, and are often far from being helpful resources for trans people 
experiencing mental distress. 
Pathologizing Indigenous LGBQT people 
 
 Similarly, many Indigenous LGBQT people have reason to view mental health 
care practitioners with distrust. The mental healthcare system can be seen as a tool of 
colonization, rather than providing a way to heal from it. For example, the system often 
works in tandem with child protective services in displacing and controlling Indigenous 
people. As outlined in chapter one, Indigenous people have long been deemed ‘mentally 
ill’ and institutionalized for resisting white domination (Menzies & Palys, 2006; Kanani, 
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2011; Yellow Bird, 2004; Vermette, 1988). Moreover, the child protection system in 
Canada is governed by federal and provincial legislation that does not recognize tribal 
authority and fails to meet the needs of Indigenous youth, who continue to be over- 
represented in the system. (Baskin, 2007; Bennett, Blackstock, & De La Ronde, 2005). 
As de Leeuw, Greenwood, and Cameron (2010) argue, the Canadian child welfare system 
takes up where the residential schooling system left off, based as it is on the same 
“colonial discourses of Indigenous deviance and governmental trusteeship” (p. 289). 
They contend that the Canadian government ignores its own role in creating the social 
determinants of poor health conditions for Indigenous people, while continuing to 
reproduce narratives about Indigenous deficiency in terms of addictions and mental 
illness to justify violent interventions (de Leeuw, Greenwood, & Cameron, 2010). 
 The ill effects of these systems on Indigenous people were described by one 
participant, Travis, a Métis, queer, cisgender man who was employed in social services in 
Winnipeg. He indicated that the impact of colonization and the ongoing negative effects 
of the ways in which child welfare agencies interact with Indigenous families result in a 
no-win situation for Indigenous youth: 
There’s just such a long history of colonization and the impact that has on 
folks…. I worked with primarily young people involved in the child welfare 
system. That system isn’t able to meet their needs in terms of anything actually. 
The kids would have access to doctors and psychologists, but I’ve heard from a 
lot of youths whose social workers just send them to the psychologist and they 
don’t like that, so there’s a big disconnect there.... It’s hard for some inner-city 
Aboriginal street-involved young people to be sent to a doctor to help them when 
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they’ve been bounced around the child welfare system, haven’t seen their family 
in years, bounced from the streets to shelters to the streets and they’re fifteen 
years old. 
It is helpful to read Travis’s comments alongside those of another participant, Josh, who 
discusses his experiences as an Indigenous trans youth in Winnipeg, to demonstrate the 
damage that can be inflicted by these systems:  
Through Health Science Centre and it was called Manitoba Adolescent Treatment 
Centre. They [Child and Family Services] had put me in there because they had a 
shortage of group homes when I was thirteen years old. Their way of interacting 
with the people that didn’t want to talk to a psychiatrist was by locking us in a 
rubber room which was the size of a bathroom. Had a camera, a hole in it, they’d 
leave you in there. They’d put us in these little rooms and if we don’t want to talk 
to a counsellor about our problems, that was the ultimatum. Being put in this 
damn rubber room. And you know, coming from a small town and being abused 
by all these people and then being thrown in a psych ward and being forced to talk 
or we’ll put you in a rubber room. ‘Well I don’t care, I’ll sit here all night if you 
want, you know.’ I was pig-headed; everybody knew I was pig-headed. I’d sit 
there for hours and hours on end…. After three months I got a new psychiatrist 
and he took me out of there. He’s like, ‘She doesn’t belong in there,’ and placed 
me in another group home finally. That was a pretty horrible experience. 
Josh’s experiences show how the mental health system and child protective services play 
a part in ongoing violence against and displacement of Indigenous people. Josh’s 
experiences were also imbued with transphobia. After telling another psychiatrist at 
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Health Sciences Centre that he was a boy, Josh was told he was crazy and heavily 
medicated. His experiences with these systems was deeply traumatizing; Josh told me 
they led to “a lot of self-mutilation, like cutting and slashing my wrists and deep cutting 
and stuff like that.” This in turn led to further medicalization and intense racism from 
health care providers: 
One doctor’s pissed off ‘cause one time had to put seventy-two stitches to put my 
arm back together and he’s pissed off. ‘I see you here every week at the Health 
Sciences [Centre], I see you here every week, every second day, you know what’s 
your problem? If you want somebody to hurt you, come here and I’ll punch you in 
the eye.’ 
Josh’s story reveals the deeply racist character of health care provision and the ways in 
which Indigenous bodies are seen as worthless and disposable. This is in keeping with 
incidents like the 2008 death of Brian Sinclair, a homeless, disabled Indigenous man who 
waited 34 hours in the emergency waiting room of the same Winnipeg hospital before he 
died from a treatable bladder infection because he was ignored and assumed by staff to be 
intoxicated (Puxley, 2013). The impact of colonization, oppression and marginalization 
in the context of a racist health care system can literally mean death. 
 As I have been arguing throughout this chapter, the biomedical model 
underpinning health care and social welfare practice can make for unhealthy or 
destructive power dynamics and this is compounded by lack of knowledge about and the 
pathologizing of non-normative genders, sexualities, and racialized people. As will be 
discussed next, biomedicalism also informs assumptions about the best way to treat 
mental distress and the relationship between practitioners and those seeking care. 
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Biomedical methods of managing mental distress: Medication as ‘corrective’  
 
The biomedical model’s foundational assumption that mental illness is caused by 
a chemical imbalance or physical dysfunction in the brain leads to medication as the 
means of ‘correction.’ Most participants who came in contact with medical professionals 
regarding their experiences of mental distress were met with practitioners who believed 
in psychiatric medication as the first line of defense, often at the expense of addressing 
the social context of their distress. Sixty-two percent (23) of participants reported having 
taken psychiatric medication at some point, prescribed by a general practitioner or a 
psychiatrist. While some psychologists and counsellors also suggested medication as a 
means of treatment, they were unable to prescribe drugs and were more likely to also 
acknowledge and address the social contexts of participants’ experiences. 
The chemical imbalance theory provides a widely held rationale for the 
prescription of psychiatric medication as a form of treatment. However, oppressive 
beliefs about marginalized groups can also play a role in practitioners’ decisions about 
who requires treatment and of what sort. A study of American clinicians found that they 
were more likely to believe that lesbians and gay men were in need of psychiatric 
medication based on their evaluation of fabricated case descriptions of lesbian, gay, and 
heterosexual patients (Biaggio, Roades, Staffelback, Cardinalli, & Duffy, 2000). The 
fictional patients in this study were all white, giving no indication of the role of racism in 
the clinicians’ evaluations. However, as Fernando (2010) argues, decisions about type of 
treatment are rife with subtle forms of discrimination based on race. For example, anger 
or depression due to the effects of racism is often not appreciated by mental health care 
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practitioners, who may therefore perceive racialized patients as out of control and in need 
of sedation or seclusion (Fernando, 2010, p.112). As he states: 
If the anger is recognized as emanating from psychological or social problems, 
psychotherapy or ‘sociotherapy’ (ways of influencing behaviour by manipulating 
the environment) may be seen as the patient’s need. If the cause of a person’s 
depression is appreciated by the psychiatrist, psychological treatment may be 
used, while if it is not, ECT or antidepressant medication may be considered 
(Fernando, 2010, p. 112).  
The many ways in which homophobia, racism, and other forms of oppression influence 
treatment recommendations are difficult to document. As one participant, Laila, a 
racialized, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto, said: 
I had one doctor tell me that because I was South Asian I have low pain tolerance. 
That was really blatant racism. I think that mostly it’s in the way that you get 
treated though. The assumptions that people make about you. Or the fact that they 
don’t think that you need treatment or that you’re exaggerating about something. 
And that’s harder to pinpoint. 
While the reasons for it are not clear, many participants were confronted with a relentless 
focus on medication as a way to manage their mental distress and practitioners who were 
highly unlikely to appreciate the importance (or even the existence) of oppression in their 
experiences of distress. In addition, inequitable relationships between participants and 
practitioners made it difficult to acquire the necessary support in making decisions about 
medication. 
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 Psychiatrists in particular were guilty of providing medication as the only 
response. Participants who had seen psychiatrists frequently described brief encounters 
that ended with prescriptions for psychiatric medications, whether or not they were 
interested in taking them. The social contexts in which participants experienced distress 
were rarely considered important. For example, Donovan, quoted above, described his 
appointments with a psychiatrist in Toronto as follows: 
I felt labelled. I felt constrained. I felt he [the psychiatrist] was more interested in 
how the medication was regulating my body and less about what I was 
experiencing. So “How are you sleeping?” versus, “How was you telling your 
parents about you coming out?” That to me is more important. I didn’t really want 
to be on that medication in the first place. “I’m here to talk to you and that’s why 
I’m here, but you don’t want to do that.” So sometimes he would end the 
conversations early. Sometimes I would quickly try to say, “What do you mean 
by that?” And he was not happy about those kinds of conversations.  
Donovan found that there was a consistent power struggle with his psychiatrist and his 
efforts at addressing his difficulties with homophobia were rebuffed in favour of 
psychiatric medication as a means of treatment.  
 Likewise, Rikki sought the help of a psychiatrist in Winnipeg who focused solely 
on the prescription of medication as the answer to her feelings of depression:  
Sometimes I’d be talking to him and he’d have his eyes closed like he was 
sleeping. Sometimes my meetings were 10 minutes long. I would go in and it’d 
be, “How are you feeling?” “Not better.” He’d amend the prescription and say, 
“We’ll try this.” I’d go back in the next week or two weeks. “How are you 
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feeling?” “Still not better.” “Let’s try this.” So it was just constantly throwing 
different types of drugs on me and it got to the point that I was really loopy. I 
stopped seeing him after a year. 
Rikki eventually discovered that a major cause of her depression was her inability to 
transition, a reason not appreciated by this psychiatrist, nor resolved through medication. 
Furthermore, her psychiatrist’s demeanor made her feel like he was not fully present and 
unable to really support her.  
 Similarly, Raven, quoted above, was prescribed increasing amounts and types of 
psychiatric medications over the course of four years. Regarding his appointments with a 
psychiatrist in Winnipeg, he said: “That person was only there to give me medication. My 
appointments were maybe five, ten minutes long. He would check in, “How are you 
doing?,” summed it up quickly, and if there was something new going on he would 
prescribe something else for that and that was about it.” For every type of distress Raven 
experienced, he was offered another type of psychiatric medication: 
It was just ridiculous. They had me on an anti-anxiety and then because I’ve never 
really been able to sleep properly they had me on sleeping pills and they also 
prescribed me Atavan which I was eating like fucking candy and then I was 
feeling really fucking obsessive and crazy about things so they’re like, ‘Oh, here’s 
some Seroquel’ and I had a fucking cocktail of stuff.  
Raven eventually decided to stop taking medication because it was not addressing the 
social context of his distress. As he said, “I feel like if there’s not anything with that, if 
there’s no support, if there’s no therapy, if I’m not doing any work around it then it’s just 
like what are they doing? It’s just such a temporary solution.” Raven received no support 
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in quitting these medications from the psychiatrist who was prescribing them, indicating 
that there is little support available for those who want to stop taking medication. 
Respect for agency in decision-making about psychiatric medication  
 
As Raven’s comments indicate, participants were not simply passive victims 
regarding treatment. However, their agency was often compromised in decision-making 
regarding psychiatric medication. Many described having contact with the mental health 
system when they were in crisis and feeling desperate for help. As Morrow and Weisser 
(2012) argue, the Canadian mental health system is “oriented towards crisis rather than 
prevention, leaving those to fall through the cracks who are more stable but sill need 
help” (p. 36). This means that by the time people get to the point of experiencing a crisis, 
their choices are constrained, as it is more difficult to advocate for oneself or evaluate a 
course of treatment that is presented as the best or only option. For example, Raven, 
quoted above, was a teenager when he first came in contact with the psychiatric system. 
He described feeling “really out of control,” “really paranoid,” and unable to leave his 
house:  
It had gone really fucking far, by the time I went in to talk to them. I was wanting 
to fucking kill myself and I was just completely at my wit's end. So I was just 
like, “Whatever you have to offer me, I’ll do anything. Just make this go away.” 
And so as soon as they offered me medication I was like, “Sure let’s do it.” 
Many participants described a similar sense of desperation. As Barb, a white, lesbian, 
woman in Winnipeg, said, “When you’re that low down and your whole world is kind of 
scooped from you, you’re pretty much willing to go with anything that anybody could do 
if they tell you it will make it better.” Similarly Angela, a white, gay, cisgender woman in 
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Winnipeg, stated, “When you’re that sick and you end up in the hospital, you kind of just 
go with the flow. You’re not really open to debate and you’re not really thinking about 
that kind of stuff. You just go, ‘Okay, take this or okay, take that.’ My attitude was ‘I’ll 
try anything.’”  
Additionally, the behaviour people may exhibit during a crisis is often interpreted 
in a sanist way; people are seen as irrational and incapable of making decisions. While it 
is indeed the case that support in decision-making about treatment is often needed, this 
kind of behavior can instead be used as justification for involuntary or forced treatment. 
Angela, quoted above, told me the following about her experiences in the hospital: 
I didn’t want to get injected with a certain type of drug they wanted to try and 
they started threatening me and saying that they’re going to get a form done or 
something like that. They didn’t realize how sensitive I was to medications, so 
one of them actually made my blood pressure go down really fast. 
While this kind of involuntary treatment is often characterized as for the patient’s own 
good, it can have long lasting negative consequences. As Tew (2011) argues, for most 
people on the receiving end of involuntary treatment, it can “undermine an already fragile 
sense of self,” create the impression that someone is dangerous, alienate them from key 
supports, and decrease trust in healthcare professionals (p.152-153). 
Much of the biomedical approach to psychiatric medication is predicated on the 
assumption not only that medication is the best way to manage distress, but that 
medicating those in distress is for their own good. This ideology is reflected in medical 
concepts like ‘patient compliance,’ a term used to describe whether people take their 
medication as prescribed. The language of ‘compliance,’ which implies submission and 
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obedience, denies that people are capable of making responsible decisions about whether 
or not psychiatric medication works for them. Indeed, there is a field of study devoted to 
how to increase compliance and reduce attrition rates, with the assumption being that 
patients who stop taking their medication will worsen their condition (Llorca, 2008; 
Vlasnik, Aliotta, & DeLor, 2005). Perhaps one of the more egregious examples of this 
kind of thinking is the development of microchip compliance packaging, which monitors 
whether medication has been removed from packaging and sends a wireless report to 
prescribing physicians (Taylor, 2008). Another example is the development of pills 
containing microchips activated through interaction with stomach acid, serving the same 
monitoring purpose (Halley, 2010). The concept of ‘compliance’ becomes even more 
disturbing when connected with evidence about who is seen as ‘defiant,’ as described 
above. 
This kind of approach to psychiatric medication ignores the fact that psychiatric 
medication can in some cases actually worsen mental distress. As Breggin (2008) argues, 
psychiatric medication can cause people to “become desperately depressed and suicidal, 
violently aggressive, or wildly out of control, without realizing that their medication is 
causing them to think, to feel, and to act in unusual and otherwise abhorrent ways” (p. 1). 
Indeed, the prescription of medication and the sidelining of the social context affecting 
the wellbeing of the participants often had adverse effects.  
Some participants were prescribed medication in situations that felt unsafe. As 
Lisa, quoted above, said, “You go in with a [suicide] attempt, you could go home. So you 
have sutures with more meds. With more medicine to pop.” She described leaving the 
hospital on more than one occasion after attempting suicide to go home “to myself…or to 
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pills again or to nothing.”  Similarly, Betty, quoted above, described her first experience 
with the mental health system as a teenager experiencing a panic attack. She went to an 
urgent care centre and was seen by a psychiatrist: 
The psychiatrist talked to me for two minutes and prescribed me hundreds of 
tranquilizers. Like pretty much enough to kill, well, enough to kill myself for 
sure…. What did I do after that? I took a lot of tranquilizers [both laugh]. I did 
[laughs]. I was a teenager. He gave me a lot of drugs. What are you supposed to 
do? [both laugh] 
Some participants described feeling much worse on medication. Mary, a 
racialized, queer, cisgender woman in Toronto, was prescribed two anti-depressants by 
her general practitioner as a young adult, immediately preceding her departure for 
university in another city, which was distant from her support network. She was 
instructed to increase her dose on her own if she felt her depression was getting worse. 
She said: “That’s what I did. I had to see a doctor I didn’t know on campus and she 
increased the dosage even more and I ended up in the hospital and they turned me away 
with a prescription for tranquilizers.” Mary felt like the medication was making her feel 
worse, but could not obtain any helpful guidance from medical practitioners. She said, 
“At that point I went to a naturopath because I just had no direction in terms of 
medication and I had to get off of it…. Obviously it [the medication] was making things 
worse and they just wanted to give me more.” Mary, like other participants, experienced 
adverse effects and did not have adequate support in making decisions about 
continuation, cessation, or alternatives. 
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In many cases, the symptoms caused by psychiatric medication were unbearable. 
Bettie described her struggle to find a medication that worked for her: “One of them I 
couldn’t even ‘get off’ when I was on it. What the hell? So that was a no-go. The other 
one I was super rage-y. Like anger, craziness. So that was also a no-go. Like screaming 
crazy, screaming on Portage [Avenue], like totally fucking out of control.” Similarly, 
Donovan, quoted above, described insufferable symptoms: “Taking the medication again, 
being on it, hating it, having sexual side effects, not being able to have sex or jerk off, 
being able to but not being able to enjoy it, feeling numb, feeling like a drone. I could 
concentrate in school, but at what cost?” For Angela, quoted above, psychiatric 
medication created a physical disability: “The Lithium that I was taking destroyed my 
thyroid. So now I have hypothyroidism forever because of that one drug. I’ve been toxic 
[liver toxicity from psychiatric medication] numerous times where I’ve had to go to 
emergency.”  
Despite the undesirable symptoms created by medication, some participants 
eventually decided to begin taking medication again, even when they did not want to, 
because practitioners portrayed medication as the only alternative. Those who refuse are 
sometimes told they are responsible for their ill health. Donovan described feeling strong-
armed into taking medication again after several years of not doing so: 
Recently I actually sat in that psychiatrist’s office and said, “I don’t want to take 
pills, I’ve been on them, Ritalin, Paxil, I don’t want to take them.” After three or 
four conversations later, I was finally guilted. After [being] pushed and pushed 
and pushed to take pills, I gave in. I’m the type of person that is very much 
against medication. But I myself wanted to stop that conversation. And stop, I 
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guess, the feeling of being blamed or ‘this can help you’ or somehow believing 
that [laughs]. 
Though Donovan did eventually decide to stop taking medication once again, his story 
shows that the biomedical model is pervasive and persuasive. Even those who oppose 
medication and had negative experiences with it were sometimes convinced by 
practitioners to try again. Mary, quoted above, eventually moved back home in order to 
be closer to her support networks and she then chose to resume psychiatric medication. 
However, she felt ambivalent about this decision: 
It’s a scary thing for me because I don’t really believe in it. I don’t eat anything 
weird, I barely drink pop, so to take something like that is difficult for me. But 
I’ve gotten to a point that I’m not sure when I decide that this is something that is 
livable and something that is an actual illness that I need to treat. It just worries 
me in terms of any future relationships or work. Hopefully on a minimal dose it 
will help me maintain a normal life. 
Mary demonstrates some confusion and hesitation, seemingly somewhat invested in the 
biomedical model but not entirely committed to it. Her story indicates that there is a lack 
of support for people who want to explore options aside from medication. Likewise, 
Angela, who experienced serious ramifications from psychiatric medication, felt like she 
had no other options: 
I became convinced that I need them and if I go off them I’m a high-risk. I don’t 
like them, I don’t want to be on them, there’s medications that I’m on right now 
that I want to get off of. I’m at the point where I can’t wait to see my doctor; I just 
want to stop. But you can’t do that, I think…. I guess they do what they do, but I 
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don’t really trust what they’re doing to me. I just want to know what I’m like off 
them, period. I want to know if I’m the same person. 
As this discussion demonstrates, many participants did not have enough support from 
their practitioners to make decisions that felt right to them and were instead confronted 
with medication as the only way to mange distress. When medication failed to be helpful 
or was in fact destructive, many participants were left with no support or helpful direction 
from practitioners and no alternative ways of addressing their distress. 
All of this is not to say that psychiatric medication is destructive for everyone. For 
a few participants, psychiatric medication had positive effects. Barb, quoted above, found 
psychiatric medication helpful because “it really takes some of the onus of life away from 
you.” She found that this gave her time to achieve “internal healing.” She believes that in 
some cases psychiatric medication is “for life” because “you don’t go back to work for 
six months and have the same thing happen again.” Likewise, David, a white, Jewish, 
gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, found that medication was helpful for him. He told me 
that his brother identified as “brain damaged” from psychiatric medication and that he 
had “a really good reason to be afraid of medication” because pharmaceutical companies 
“don’t give a shit” and “just need to find what they can sell.” Having seen his brother’s 
negative experiences with medication, he knew that “medications can make people sicker 
in the long run.” Despite these views, David tried psychiatric medications and found that 
they had positive effects: 
That was my experience, getting my life back. I can work full time… And I still 
work full time. Never would have been able. I can’t even begin to really articulate 
what that was like. You go out for a walk and you could smell flowers or you can 
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feel the sun, you can feel the breeze and you’re there. You’re there. There’s no 
static, you’re not in a box, you’re there. 
As David indicates, psychiatric medication improved his quality of life. And because of 
these types of positive results, I am not arguing that psychiatric medication should be 
banned. Rather, I am compelled by Moncrieff, Cohen, and Mason’s (2013) framework 
for understanding such matters (see also Moncrieff, 2008). They challenge what they call 
the “disease-centered approach” pertaining to psychotropic medications. This approach is 
the most common way of understanding psychotropic medication, which posits that they 
work by “correcting an underlying disease of the brain” such as a chemical imbalance 
(Moncrieff, Cohen, & Mason, 2013, p. 214). In contrast, they propose a “drug-centered 
approach,” which posits that psychotropic drugs “produce altered mental states” which 
can be helpful and/or detrimental (p. 215). They compare this to the useful effect that 
alcohol has on “very shy” people in that it lowers social inhibitions, as opposed to 
correcting a chemical imbalance or an “alcohol deficiency in the brain” (p. 215). They 
call for more analyses based on the perspectives of those who use such drugs to 
determine the various effects they have and how they could best be used, arguing that 
‘users’ must be accorded far more choice in the matter (p. 230).  
As Boyle (2013) notes, the drug-centered approach makes room for both “positive 
and negative effects of psychotropic drugs” without linking them to disease and is 
amenable to non-medicalized perspectives regarding mental distress (p. 9). This approach 
makes sense in terms of what the participants shared about positive and negative effects 
of drugs and supports the need for increased agency regarding the exploration of various 
options for the management of distress. Indeed, the drug-centred approach is more 
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conducive to respecting choice regarding medication use. This is because it is the person 
taking medication who evaluates the efficacy of the drug rather than medical experts who 
believe that such drugs are curing an underlying disease (Moncrieff, Cohen, & Mason, 
2013, p. 229). 
 As discussed in chapter two, experiences of oppression can lead to mental 
distress. This chapter shows, however, that LGBQT people experience oppression within 
the very system that is supposed to aid with lessening distress. Mental health care 
informed by biomedicalism can make for inequitable interactions governed by unhealthy 
power dynamics and oppressive beliefs about sexuality, gender, and race. This means that 
many participants avoided the health care system when possible and struggled to find 
adequate care. Unequal relationships between practitioners and those seeking care, 
combined with biomedical assumptions about psychiatric medication as the most 
effective way to correct ‘mental illness,’ left participants with inadequate choices and 
support about how to address distress. There is a strong need for more equitable 
relationships between practitioners and LGBQT people seeking care, which can only be 
achieved when practitioners develop a critical awareness and change their pathologizing 
beliefs about non-normative genders, sexualities, and racialized people. This suggests 
that ‘recovery’ from mental distress may be particularly difficult for LGBQT people, who 
often cannot rely on the mental health system for help in this regard and who are, in many 
cases, ill-served by the system. 
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Chapter Four: Changing Directions or Staying the Course? Race, Gender, Sexuality, and 
Recovery in Canada’s Mental Health Strategy 
 
As demonstrated in chapter three, many LGBQT people experience oppression 
and discrimination within the mental health care system and are sometimes ill served by 
biomedical methods of managing mental distress. This indicates that recovery may be 
especially challenging for LGBQT people, who cannot always rely on the mental health 
system for support. The concept of mental health recovery is currently of critical 
significance in Canada, where ideologies about mental health and illness are arguably 
undergoing a paradigm shift due to the recent work of the national Mental Health 
Commission of Canada (MHCC), established in 2007 (White 2009, White & Pike, 2013, 
Morrow, 2013, Morrow & Weisser, 2012). Canada’s first national mental health strategy, 
Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada mobilizes 
recovery as a key concept in ‘changing directions’ in the mental health system.  
In this chapter I draw on Changing Directions as well as interview data to 
examine the concept of recovery for LGBQT people who experience mental distress. I 
argue that there is a disjuncture between state-produced interpretations of the ways in 
which gender, sexuality, and race inform mental health needs and the knowledge of 
LGBQT people with lived experience of mental distress and mental health service use. 
Most notably, despite the use of social understandings of mental health, the strategy fails 
to advance a strong structural analysis of homophobia, transphobia, racism and other 
forms of oppression in shaping experiences of mental distress, access to services, and 
recovery. Participant narratives indicate that there is a clear need for profound change in 
the mental health system in order to facilitate meaningful options for managing mental 
distress and recovery for LGBQT people. However, Changing Directions indicates that 
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this need continues to be misunderstood by the state, which does not bode well for the 
implementation of anti-oppressive changes to the system.  
What is mental health recovery? 
The concept of recovery originated within the psychiatric survivor movement in 
the 1980s as a way of challenging biomedical prognoses of life-long ‘illness’ and reduced 
capacity for self-determination (Poole, 2011). Psychiatric survivors developed an 
understanding of recovery that is “conceptually distinct” from the biomedical view of 
recovery as the “remission of symptoms” (Tew et al, 2012, p. 444). In this view, recovery 
refers to (re)creating a meaningful life with or without experiences of mental distress and 
recovering from the effects of psychiatrization (Davidson & Roe, 2007; Tew et al, 2012). 
This could involve addressing various social factors such as “poverty, substandard 
housing, unemployment, loss of valued social roles and identity, isolation, loss of sense 
of self and purpose in life, and the iatrogenic effects of involuntary treatment and 
hospitalization” (Davidson & Roe, 2007, p. 463). Howell and Voronka (2012) argue that 
recovery was used by psychiatric survivors as an organizing framework for those who 
had been psychiatrized to “avert the medical system through alternate means (including 
peer knowledge and support)” (p. 2). As this discussion shows, the initial 
conceptualization of recovery focused on psychiatric survivor agency, addressing the 
social factors that can cause or exacerbate mental distress and exploring means of 
addressing distress outside of medical systems. 
Recovery has since been taken up as a concept informing policy change and 
mental health service provision in the global north, most recently in Canada (White & 
Pike, 2013). Howell and Voronka (2012) refer to recovery as one of the “central 
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frameworks for organizing mental health care in the Western world” (p. 1) and Morrow 
and Weisser (2012) name recovery as the “cornerstone” of Changing Directions, 
Changing Lives (p. 30). However, the use of recovery in such contexts has changed its 
meaning and some argue that it has been reconfigured in the service of neoliberal state 
agendas (Harper & Speed, 2012; Howell & Voronka, 2012; Morrow, 2013; White & 
Pike, 2013). Howell and Voronka (2012) contend that recovery has been “incorporated 
into, and some would say co-opted by, medical reason and mental health policy” and is 
now used to “incorporate psychiatric survivors into medical systems” and reinforce 
“medical authority,” as mental health professionals become ‘experts’ in recovery (p. 4).  
Biomedical understandings of recovery, which position mental distress as a 
biological deficit which can be addressed through psychiatric medications, are especially 
compatible with neoliberalism, which individualizes social problems and downloads 
responsibility from the state to the individual (Morrow, 2013). Yet even social 
approaches can be used in the service of neoliberalism, if ‘the social’ is narrowly defined. 
As Harper and Speed (2012) point out, ‘social context’ can be construed as understanding 
a person experiencing mental distress as part of a larger network of family and friends, 
thus reducing the social context to the interpersonal and ignoring structural factors 
(Harper & Speed, 2012, p. 15). They argue that even recovery models that acknowledge 
inequality do so by placing “the onus on the service user to rearticulate the effects of 
social inequality in terms of their individualized, responsiblized self” (p. 15). For 
example, ‘empowerment’ is positioned as “psychologized and individualized” rather than 
as a “redistribution of power” (p. 15). As they state: “these manifestations of responsible 
individuals speak directly to neoliberal models of the service user” (p. 16). Likewise, 
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Weisser, Morrow, and Jamer (2011) found in their review of the mental health recovery 
literature, “very few models of recovery explicitly address social and structural 
inequities,” whether the approach to recovery is biomedical or social (p.4). There is a 
critical need for such models, given the current political significance placed on the 
concept (Morrow & Weisser, 2012). Morrow and Weisser (2012) contend that a social 
justice framework would understand recovery as “both personal and social” and shaped 
by “social and structural barriers” (p.28). Given these various definitions, the following 
will examine how the MHCC positions recovery. 
‘Recovery’ in Changing directions, changing lives 
Changing Directions, Changing Lives is the work of the Mental Health 
Commission of Canada (MHCC), which was established by the Conservative-led federal 
government in 2007 with a ten year mandate to create a mental health strategy, a national 
anti-stigma campaign, and a knowledge exchange centre regarding mental health. The 
need for such a commission was established by a Standing Senate Committee that 
produced the 2006 report Out of the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, 
Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada, which listed 118 recommendations for 
improving mental health and addiction services, including the creation of a national 
mental health strategy. The first phase of the strategy creation was completed in 2009, 
with the release of Toward Recovery and Well-Being: A Framework for a Mental Health 
Strategy for Canada, which outlined a framework to inform the strategy. As indicated by 
the name of the document, the concept of recovery plays a crucial role in defining the 
framework and thus the strategy. 
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 Changing Directions, Changing Lives is a 113 page document outlining six 
strategic directions for implementing change in the system. These are named in the 
executive summary as follows: (1) Promotion and prevention, (2) Recovery and rights, 
(3) Access to services, (4) Disparities and diversity, (5) First Nations, Inuit, and Métis, 
and (6) Leadership and collaboration. Each strategic direction is further broken down into 
four or five priorities, with recommendations for action based on each priority.  
In general, Changing Directions reflects a departure from a strictly biomedical 
approach to mental health in that it includes a mixture of both biomedical and social 
approaches. In fact, early drafts garnered harsh criticism in the Canadian press for being 
too heavily grounded in social science, illustrating the dominance of the biomedical 
model in popular understandings of mental distress (White & Pike, 2013). A mixture of 
the biomedical and the social is also evident in the strategy’s definition of recovery: “The 
concept of recovery refers to living a satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life, even when 
there are on-going limitations caused by mental health problems and illnesses” (MHCC, 
2012, p. 12). This definition sounds similar to the way the psychiatric survivor movement 
defined recovery, in that it does not require the elimination of ‘symptoms.’ However, it 
differs in that there is no acknowledgement of the fact that people may need to recover 
from the effects of psychiatrization. The definition also suggests that both mental distress 
and the resulting ‘limitations’ placed on those experiencing it are caused by ‘problems’ 
and ‘illnesses,’ leaving no room for those who do not see mental distress as a deficit or as 
a social issue rather than a medical one.
15
 In this way, the MHCC takes the positive 
                                                 
15The MHCC leaves the distinction between ‘problems’ and ‘illnesses’ intentionally vague, stating that it 
does not “attempt to draw a firm line between ‘problems’ and ‘illnesses,’ or to resolve all of the 
controversies surrounding the choice of terminology” (p. 11). The use of ‘problems’ in addition to 
‘illnesses’ cannot therefore be characterized as a clear departure from the medical term ‘illnesses.’ 
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sounding message of ‘hope’ while jettisoning the critical repositioning of the origins of 
mental distress and the resulting limitations as social and structural, thereby side-stepping 
state responsibility for structuring and addressing those conditions. This fundamentally 
neoliberal approach turns recovery into an individualized “personal journey” (Morrow & 
Weisser, 2012).  
As others have argued, state interest in recovery is not necessarily primarily 
humanitarian and has much to do with economics (Poole, 2011, White, 2009). White 
(2009) outlines the ways in which the MHCC has positioned ‘mental illness’ as an 
‘economic burden’ and potential crisis with profound economic repercussions for Canada 
(pp 232-234). This suggests that the motivation for pursuing recovery as defined by the 
MHCC is, at least in part, financial. State produced conceptualizations of recovery as 
being able to ‘contribute’ are telling; if one can ‘contribute’ one is not a ‘burden’ on the 
state or society. The initial use of ‘recovery’ by psychiatric survivors has thus been 
“appropriated and reconfigured” by the MHCC and “the political significance of recovery 
as a form of empowerment or resistance is changed” (White & Pike, 2013, p. 244), 
instead serving the interests of the neoliberal state. 
  This positioning of ‘recovery’ as an individualized process ideally resulting in the 
ability to ‘contribute’ puts the focus on making personal change, rather than social and 
structural change. The following will look more closely at sections of the strategy to 
examine the implications of this for how the MHCC envisions facilitating recovery for 
marginalized groups. 
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Recovery in the context of ‘diversity’ and ‘disparity’: Strategic direction four  
In this section I focus on Strategic Direction Four, for which the full in-text name 
is: “Reduce disparities in risk factors and access to mental health services, and strengthen 
response to the needs of diverse communities and Northerners.” This strategic direction 
describes five priorities, which are named in the executive summary as: 4.1. Social 
determinants, 4.2 Immigrants, refugees, ethno-cultural, racialized, 4.3 Northern and 
remote, 4.4 Minority official language, and 4.5 Gender, sexuality. My analysis focuses on 
the introduction to strategic direction four as well as priorities 4.1, 4.2, and 4.5. 
I concentrate on these three priorities because they include a discussion of the 
social determinants of mental health and the role of race, gender, and sexual orientation 
in shaping mental health needs. It is the only section of the document (aside from the 
executive summary) to make mention of the specific concerns of “lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
two-spirited, trans-gendered, and trans-sexual” (though notably not queer) people. As is 
evident even from this brief description, the strategy does acknowledge some of the 
social factors that influence mental distress, access to services, and recovery and is 
therefore not strictly biomedical in its approach. However, the strategy does not advance 
a strong structural analysis of the role of discrimination and oppression in shaping 
experiences of mental distress, access to services, and recovery and does little to 
acknowledge the role of the state in perpetuating or alleviating this oppression. 
The introduction to strategic direction four acknowledges that there is inequality 
in terms of “the opportunity to achieve the best possible mental health and well-being” in 
Canada (MHCC, 2012, p. 57). The MHCC explains that those with “better incomes, more 
education, and stronger social networks” are often healthier (MHCC, 2012, p. 57). It 
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states that Canada recognizes these “disparities” and is committed to changing them, 
“where they can be changed” (MHCC, 2012, p.57). The focus of strategic direction four 
is on those who “are at greater risk” and who “experience disparities in access” to 
services, due to the following: “socio-economic status; ethno-cultural background, 
experience of racism and other forms of discrimination, and reasons for emigrating; 
living in a northern or remote community; being part of an official language 
(Francophone or Anglophone) minority community; and gender and sexual orientation” 
(MHCC, 2012, p. 57). The introduction concludes with an acknowledgment that while 
there is commonality within groups of people, the “intersecting dimensions” of people’s 
lives mean that everyone is affected differently (MHCC, 2012, p. 57). 
This introduction sets the stage for the strategy’s approach to analyzing 
‘disparities’ in mental health. The MHCC uses the language of the social determinants of 
health to explain how certain groups are both ‘at risk’ of developing ‘mental health 
problems and illnesses’ and have differential access to services. This seems like a clear 
departure from the medical model of mental illness. However, Boyle (2013) argues that 
the medical model has become adept at “assimilating and neutralizing” alternative 
frameworks (p. 14). She contends that one of the key ways in which this takes place is in 
making sure that social factors are always positioned as contributing factors rather than as 
“primary causes of mental distress and therefore primary targets of intervention” (Boyle, 
2013, p. 14). Perhaps because the MHCC does not clearly set forth a strong theoretical 
framework, it is not entirely clear what it sees as the primary cause of distress, though as 
I show above, its definition of recovery suggests biomedical origins. What is clear, 
however, is that the ways in which social determinants are theorized is problematic. It is 
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already apparent from the introduction that the strategy is lacking in terms of an anti-
oppressive structural analysis. With the exception of “experiences of racism 
and…discrimination,” the ‘risk factors’ listed focus on characteristics of the individual 
rather than the environment (e.g. ‘socio-economic status’ as opposed to ‘class 
oppression’, ‘living in a remote/Northern community’ as opposed to ‘lack of services in 
northern/remote communities’). The list does include racism, but this is the only place in 
strategic direction four where this word appears, and as will be seen, opportunities to 
include structural analyses of racism are ignored. 
Theorizing the ‘risk factors’ as individual characteristics rather than 
environmental ones has consequences for perceived responsibility and intervention. If the 
‘risk’ is gender or sexuality rather than transphobia, sexism, and homophobia, then there 
is no reason to look for external conditions that create these ‘risks’ and the state cannot be 
held responsible for perpetuating or alleviating these conditions. Any intervention is less 
likely to target structural causes and can also be framed as ‘charitable’ and 
‘humanitarian’ efforts to ‘help’ marginalized groups rather than a necessary responsibility 
of the state. For the most part, strategic direction four stays focused on this individualistic 
level, though at times it does make mention of structural conditions. As will be seen, even 
when structural conditions are described, the MHCC does not follow through with a 
strong anti-oppressive structural analysis that holds the state responsible for creating, 
promoting, enabling, and accepting these conditions. 
Priority 4.1: “Make improving mental health a goal when working to enhance 
overall living conditions and health outcomes” 
 
 As is the case with the introduction, Priority 4.1 draws on the language of the 
social determinants of health to explain the existence of disparities in mental health and 
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access to mental health services in Canada. The emphasis is on the role of poverty in 
creating these disparities and putting people at “greater risk” for “mental health problems 
and illnesses.” It is argued that Canada must “continue” to address poverty in order to 
reduce these disparities while employing a “health equity lens” to ensure that this is 
effective. The ‘health equity lens’, though not defined, is said to be important because 
policies have a differential impact on and within broad categories of people. The example 
given to illustrate this is that “women with lower incomes may be less likely that those 
with higher incomes to respond to an initiative to improve women’s mental health” 
(MHCC, 2012, p. 58).  
The strategy places the responsibility for the inequitable result on the response of 
the women with lower incomes (they are “less likely to respond”), rather than on the 
policy itself, which may well have been designed to benefit the more privileged group, 
whether intentionally or not. Morrow (2013) argues that this is typical within “more 
medically oriented mental health literature” wherein the “language of epidemiology (‘at-
risk populations’) is imported as a way of individualizing the social problems underlying 
the experience of distress” (p.327). As she contends, this literature often fails to recognize 
that “the ways in which services are designed, and the assumption that they operate 
under, may reproduce the very inequities they purport to ameliorate” (p.327). 
Unfortunately, this lack of attention to the ways in which services perpetuate inequities is 
evident throughout strategic direction four.  
Priority 4.1 ends with three recommendations for action, the first of which is to: 
“encourage government leaders to spearhead collaborative action to reduce disparities in 
living conditions, while also improving mental health outcomes” (MHCC, 2012, p. 59). 
  177   
This is an important recommendation that recognizes that social factors such as living 
conditions can have an effect on mental health. It is, however a bit vague, “encouraging 
government leaders” rather than, for example, ‘funding anti-poverty initiatives’ or 
‘building more subsidized housing.’ The use of the passive voice also makes it unclear as 
to who will be doing the work of this ‘encouragement’ and what shape it will take. 
The second recommendation is to “use ‘health equity lenses’ to ensure that new 
mental health policies and programs reduce disparities while improving mental health for 
the population as a whole.” The problems with this have been outlined above, not the 
least of which is that there is no definition of “health equity lenses.”  
The third recommendation is as follows: “Strengthen data and research to develop 
a better understanding of the mental health needs and strengths of diverse population 
groups.” This is a positive recommendation, as there is no doubt that there is a need for 
more research that focuses on marginalized groups. However, the recommendations as a 
whole do not follow through on suggesting changes that significantly address the 
structural conditions of poverty outlined at the beginning of priority 4.1. This is achieved 
in part through the use of epidemiological conceptions of ‘at-risk’ groups that minimize 
structural conditions and thus state responsibility. As will be seen, this is a recurring 
theme throughout strategic direction four. 
Priority 4.2: “Improve mental health services and supports by and for immigrants, 
refugees, ethno-cultural and racialized groups” 
 
 Priority 4.2 continues to use the epidemiological language of ‘at risk’ groups to 
describe the links between mental illness and immigrants, refugees, and ethno-cultural 
and racialized groups. According to the MHCC, many members of these groups have 
trouble finding employment, making an adequate income, and finding housing. The 
  178   
examples used to illustrate this are newcomers to Canada who are “finding it increasingly 
difficult to obtain employment, particularly employment that matches their level of skills 
and education” (MHCC, 2012, p. 60). Structural racism is not named as a force shaping 
these conditions. As noted above, the MHCC includes “experience of racism” in the list 
of factors that cause disparities in mental health and access to services in the introduction 
to strategic direction four. However, there is no analysis of what this actually means or 
how it shapes living conditions that can lead to distress. The reasons for struggles in 
finding employment and housing are left open to speculation, rather than being explained 
as a result of racist state regulations, such as the ones governing foreign accreditation, 
which make it exceedingly difficult for highly educated newcomers to have their 
credentials recognized in Canada. 
 The MHCC goes on to discuss the barriers faced by these populations in 
accessing mental health services. It is explained that many do not have access to services 
“that feel safe and are effective because they are attuned to that group’s culture, 
experience and understanding” (MHCC, 2012, p. 60). The MHCC provides the reasons 
for this as follows: “People from diverse backgrounds can have different values and 
traditions that inform their approach to health. They sometimes experience and describe 
mental health problems and illnesses differently, which can be challenging for service 
providers” (MHCC, 2012, p. 57). This language implicitly identifies white, Canadian-
born people as the  ‘normal’ group against which others are deemed ‘diverse’ and 
‘different.’ The MHCC frames the problem as the ‘different values and traditions’ that 
are ‘challenging’ for service providers, who in this formulation are presumptively white 
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and Canadian-born, rather than understanding the problem as Eurocentric and racist 
service provision.  
Next, it is stated that services should be “modified” to be “more welcoming and 
effective.” The strategy names this framework as “cultural competence or cultural 
safety,” an approach that will allow providers to recognize “the influence that social 
disparities and imbalances of power can have on relationships” (MHCC, 2012, p. 60). 
While the recognition of power imbalances is important, the suggestion to remedy this 
with cultural competency is contentious. This approach has been critiqued for failing to 
advance an analysis of racism (Kumagai & Lypson, 2009) or of power and oppression 
(Pon, 2009). Similar to the approach taken elsewhere by the MHCC, the notion of 
cultural competency is said to use whiteness as the “standard by which cultures are 
differentiated” (Pon, 2009, p. 60). Pon (2009) argues that cultural competence is founded 
on whiteness, which operates as a system of power that confers privilege on those who 
are perceived as white, while marginalizing and othering racialized people
16
. Cultural 
competence also reifies and homogenizes cultural and racial categories and presents 
competence as a “static requirement” rather than a “critical consciousness” (Kumagai & 
Lypson, 2009, p. 782-783). Furthermore, in the Canadian context, cultural competency 
can serve as a way of suppressing and ignoring colonialism and racism by pandering to 
the idea that Canada is mainly a “fair and tolerant society” (Pon, 2009, p. 66).  
The MHCC presents cultural competence and cultural safety as if they are 
interchangeable, but in actuality these approaches are quite different. The notion of 
                                                 
16
 Whiteness informs more than just specific practices like cultural competence. It shapes workplace 
environments resulting in “white-normed” environments that create barriers to advancement for racialized 
workers, and can make it difficult for racialized workers to challenge white-centric policies and practices 
(Gosine and Pon, 2011). 
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cultural safety was developed in New Zealand by Maori nurses as a way of addressing 
the ways in which neocolonialism shapes health care, oppressing the Maori people and 
privileging White settlers (Smye & Brown, 2002). This approach uses a postcolonial 
understanding of culture as a complex system of representation rather than a static set of 
beliefs and practices and demands that practitioners be self-reflexive and aware of their 
own subject positions. There has been some examination of cultural safety’s applicability 
to Canada in addressing the neocolonial context in which Indigenous people access 
healthcare (Anderson, Browne, Khan & Lynam, 2003, Smye & Brown, 2002). 
In contrast, for the reasons discussed above the cultural competency approach is 
unlikely to address inequity and the lack of critical awareness in the mental health 
system. Cultural safety looks more promising, but has so far been developed as an 
approach that applies specifically to the relationship between Indigenous people and 
White settlers. While this is necessary and useful, there is a need for additional 
approaches that address power, discrimination, and oppression as they pertain to other 
racialized groups.  
The MHCC goes on to further promote cultural competence and cultural safety as 
the way to address disparities in its recommendations for action in this section. The first 
of five recommendations for Priority 4.2 is: “Expand use of standards for cultural 
competency and cultural safety, including through accreditation bodies and professional 
associations.” While the use of the cultural safety approach may be positive, 
institutionalizing the cultural competence approach may make it appear as if the mental 
health system is making a commitment to addressing ‘diversity’ and disparities, which 
may make it more difficult to make a case for anti-oppressive, anti-racist approaches. If 
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cultural competence is institutionalized as the way to address inequity, it may be more 
challenging to raise awareness and create space for approaches that address racism and 
white-centric practices.    
The second recommendation is as follows: “Increase access to information and 
mental health services, treatments and supports in diverse languages.” This is an 
important recommendation, as evidenced by a recent Toronto report that found that many 
mental health services are inaccessible to newcomers because service providers are 
unable to understand many newcomers’ cultures and languages (Jacobsen, Farah, & 
Toronto Cultural Diversity Community of Practice, 2010, p. 16). 
The third recommendation is to “Better evaluate the potential of traditional 
knowledge, customs and practices to address mental health problems and illnesses, and 
improve access to those that work.” This is an important acknowledgement of the 
necessity of expanding beyond the bounds of Western approaches. There is the potential 
for the implementation of this recommendation to improve mental health services. It 
does, however, raise questions regarding what standards of evaluation will be used and 
how effectiveness will be determined. If biomedical standards are used, they are unlikely 
to find value in non-biomedical approaches, which can be incompatible with positivist 
methods of measurement and evaluation. 
Recommendation four is to “support immigrant, refugee, ethno-cultural and 
racialized community organizations in assessing local mental health needs and strengths 
and in taking action on local priorities, in collaboration with mental health and other 
service systems.” Recommendation five is to “develop and implement mental health 
plans in all jurisdictions to address the mental health needs of immigrants, refugees, 
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ethno-cultural and racialized groups, with their full involvement.” These 
recommendations are to be commended for emphasizing that the communities in question 
should be fully involved in implementing these suggestions. However, there is danger in 
medicalizing, pathologizing, and individualizing the experiences of immigrants, refugees, 
and racialized people. As discussed in chapter one, there is a long history of 
psychiatrizing racialized people as a tool of social control. In the contemporary context, 
for example, being diagnosed with ‘mental illness’ can put applications for status in 
Canada at risk, as the government can reject applicants who are thought to “pose 
excessive demands on health or social services” (Kanani, 2012). In addition, developing a 
“mental health plan” and increasing the reach of mental health systems in racialized 
communities runs the risk of further imposing the medical model of mental illness on 
racialized people. While the recommendations are not worded in such a way that 
necessarily means that this will be the case, they are vague enough to leave the door open 
to this possibility and there are sections of the report that suggest that this could occur. 
Moreover, increasing access without addressing racism and oppression within the system 
is not helpful, as oppressive services may in some case be more damaging than useful.  
The recommendations in this section make no mention of ways to address the 
social conditions related to employment, poverty, and housing discussed in Priority 4.2, 
focusing instead on making the mental health system more accessible through increasing 
access to information, assessing mental health needs, and creating mental health plans. 
There is no discussion of the multiple ways in which the state creates conditions that lead 
to distress through, for example, immigration policies that mean that many have 
precarious status in Canada and work in exploitative labour conditions. Cultural 
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competence is offered as one of the ways to address ‘power imbalances,’ which ignores 
the structural context and neutralizing the oppression that takes place within the mental 
health system. In sum, the recommendations do not address the racism within the system, 
nor do they address the state’s role in the social conditions that may lead many 
“immigrants, refugees, ethno-cultural and racialized groups” to experience distress. As is 
also evident from this discussion, race is discussed in isolation from gender and sexuality, 
despite the MHCC’s nod to intersectionality in the introduction to strategic direction four.  
As is discussed below, Priority 4.5, which focuses first on gender and then on sexuality, 
similarly fails to adopt an intersectional approach. 
Priority 4.5: “Address the specific mental health needs related to gender and sexual 
orientation” 
 
Priority 4.5 lists several ways in which gender makes a difference in “mental 
health problems and illnesses.” These include the following:  
Women are more likely than men to experience anxiety and depression, including 
depression following the birth of a child. Men are more likely to develop 
schizophrenia at a younger age. Girls and women attempt suicide at higher rates, 
but men and boys…die by suicide more often (MHCC, 2012, p. 68).  
It is clear from this quotation that the MHCC espouses a binary, cisnormative 
understanding of gender, referencing studies using cisgender participants only and 
making no mention of trans and intersex people in its discussion of gender. This is further 
evidenced by cissexist assumptions such as the one that only women give birth to 
children. Furthermore, the MHCC reinforces a biomedical view of mental distress by 
presenting these differential rates of various ‘illnesses’ as medical facts. For example, the 
document states that women are more likely to experience anxiety and depression, rather 
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than stating that women are more likely than men to be diagnosed with depression and 
anxiety and have their experiences medicalized. Moreover, the role of race and racism 
goes unexamined in the discussion concerning gender. For example, Fernando (2010) 
argues that there is a “racist tendency to designate black people as schizophrenic” due to 
the ascription of “violence, suspiciousness and dangerousness to black clients” (p. 110). 
The MHCC ignores the racialized character of this diagnosis, stating only that men 
‘develop’ (as opposed to saying they are diagnosed with) schizophrenia at a younger age. 
Indeed, the MHCC uses ‘women’ and ‘men’ as universal categories, without 
acknowledging differences based on any form of social difference. 
 The MHCC then goes on to state that “gender makes a person vulnerable to 
mental health problems and illnesses” and this means that “the impact of gender needs to 
be considered in prevention and early intervention efforts” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). Despite 
the fact that this declaration is followed by lists of “risk factors” for cisgender women 
and men that are clearly created by inequity, sexism, and patriarchy, it is ‘gender’ that is 
blamed for this ‘vulnerability,’ rather than structural inequity and expectations associated 
with hegemonic gender norms. 
For example, the “risk factors” listed for women are: “caregiving responsibilities, 
higher rates of poverty,” “domestic violence and abuse,” and higher likelihood of 
experiencing “childhood sexual abuse.” It is positive that the MHCC acknowledges the 
existence of such experiences in the lives of many women. However, the expectation that 
women will perform the majority of caregiving, the feminization of poverty, and violence 
against women and girls can be seen as effects of sexism and patriarchy. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that poverty and violence affect racialized women in even higher 
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numbers, indicating the interlocking effects of racism and sexism (Jiwani, 2006). If these 
facts can be ignored and the blame placed on gender, the state can sidestep responsibility 
for addressing these conditions through, for example, funding or creating social services 
for low-income racialized women. 
 Likewise, the “risk factors” for men are listed as those that “threaten their sense of 
success and achievement, such as job loss,” men’s inability to recognize having an 
“emotional problem” and their desire to “handle it alone,” and the fact that men “do not 
always present signs and symptoms in ways that are easily recognized by service 
providers” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). It is positive that the MHCC recognizes that men also 
experience mental distress. However, the MHCC presents these risk factors as facts about 
men, as opposed to contextualizing them as part of hegemonic masculinity. The 
expectation that men will be ‘breadwinners,’ non-emotional, independent, and ‘strong’ is 
part and parcel of the same problematic belief system that positions women as dependent, 
emotional, and weak (Connell, 2002; Scott-Samuel, Stanistreet & Crawshaw, 2009). By 
presenting this neutrally as ‘gender difference’ as opposed to the result of social 
processes that (re)enforce and discipline gendered behaviour, the MHCC arguably 
becomes part of the social processes that recreate this worldview and naturalize 
hegemonic gender ideals and behaviours.  
This approach also individualizes the problem and thus also the potential 
solutions. For example, if the problem is the way men “present signs and symptoms,” one 
logical solution would be to educate men on recognizing the signs of ‘mental illness.’ 
This strategy treats men as a homogenous, monolithic group, which runs the risk of 
perpetuating binary, cisnormative, heterosexist (and likely white-centric) gender 
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expectations. It also encourages men to pathologize any evidence of distress as ‘mental 
illness.’ Another logical solution would be to train providers in recognizing the ways that 
men apparently present symptoms, thus homogenizing and essentializing men’s 
behaviour based on hegemonic gender ideals.
17
 Again, this also keeps the biomedical 
model intact, placing the problem on the inability to recognize symptoms of an 
underlying illness, rather than examining how diagnostic criterion and the way they are 
applied are enculturated and subjective. An alternative would be to explore how men’s 
experiences are less likely to be medicalized because the diagnostic criterion for many 
‘mental illnesses’ have been feminized and used as tools of social control of women. 
Does it follow that men who are perceived as ‘feminine’ are more likely to be diagnosed 
as ‘mentally ill’? Another alternative would be to examine how race and racism inform 
gendered expectations and diagnostic processes. For example, does the racist cultural 
association linking black men with violence and danger inform how they are perceived 
and diagnosed with ‘mental illness’ (Fernando, 2010, Metzl, 2009)? 
 While it is encouraging to see the MHCC consider gender at all, the way in which 
it is considered is limited. The sum total of the strategy’s gender analysis is 217 words. 
The words ‘sexism’ and ‘transphobia’ are nowhere to be found; nor are a whole set of 
related words and concepts. While it is not essential to use these specific terms, the 
strategy does not in any way discuss discrimination based on gender within the mental 
health care system, whether against trans people, those who are perceived as non-
normatively gendered, or cisgender women. The strategy is based on a normative 
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 There is a difference between arguing that hegemonic masculinity affects how men are perceived by self 
and others  in relation to ‘mental illness’ and arguing that men present signs of mental illness differently 
than women. One acknowledges the socially real effects of constructs such as gender, while the other 
presents men as a universal group with essential characteristics.  
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understanding of gender that does not allow for female masculinities and male 
femininities. It also does not consider how race, sexuality, class, disability or any other 
factors may inform experience. It is refreshing to see the recognition of ‘social 
determinants’ of mental health such as poverty and violence, rather than a rigid 
biomedical explanation based solely on brain chemicals and genetic factors. However, 
without a structural analysis of oppression both within and outside of the mental health 
care system, the strategy falls short of addressing the salience of gender in mental health 
needs and recovery.  
 The next 240 words address LGBT people, which the MHCC lists as “lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, two-spirited, trans-gendered, and trans-sexual people” (MHCC, 2012, p. 
68). This use of terminology to describe trans people is problematic. The use of “two-
spirited, trans-gendered, and trans-sexual” suggests that the MHCC either disregards or is 
unaware that the latter two terms are not generally spelled with a hyphen and the use of 
‘ed’ at the end of ‘transgender’ is contested (GLAAD, 2010, p. 10). Even more 
problematic is the fact that this section includes trans people in name only. The section 
discusses ‘sexual orientation’ and there is no mention of gender identity, gender 
expression, transphobia, anti-trans discrimination, or any of the issues facing trans 
people, indicating that the MHCC conflates ‘sexual orientation’ with gender identity and 
gender expression, a problem that is also widespread in health care education and 
protocols (Bauer, et al, 2009, p. 353). Despite the use of the term ‘two-spirited,’ the 
MHCC makes no mention of this group either, whether in this section or in Strategic 
Direction 5, which is devoted to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people. Notably, despite 
its increased popularity and use, the term ‘queer’ is also not included, indicating that it is 
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perhaps viewed as too radical or controversial and it possibly is seen as equivalent to 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual, which is a notion that many reject (Jagose, 1996). This 
approach erases a large group of people who identify as queer, rather than as lesbian, gay, 
or bisexual. 
The MHCC then goes on to state that “stigma and discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation have an impact on the mental health of…LGBT people” (MHCC, 
2012, p. 68).  This is an important acknowledgement. Similar to the paragraph about 
gender, the risk factors affecting mental health are then listed, which are “sexual and 
physical assault” and “bullying for youth” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). According to the 
MHCC, these risks can be mitigated by “accepting family" and "connection with other 
LGBT youth” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). Furthermore, the MHCC states that “older people 
may be particularly reluctant to access mental health services because of past negative 
experiences with the service system, including prejudice, discrimination and lack of 
knowledge” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). 
The acknowledgement of the impact of assault and bullying is crucial. The 
suggested method of addressing these problems, however, is limited. While “accepting 
family” and peer support are important, these are both suggestions that download the 
responsibility onto the individual, the family, and the community and sidesteps state 
responsibility for addressing very serious issues of abuse, assault, discrimination, 
homelessness, poverty, and violence. Framing these problems as primarily affecting 
youth does not acknowledge that abuse, assault, discrimination, and violence against 
LGBQT people is widespread and affects those of all age groups. Likewise, suggesting 
that “older people” are the ones affected by “past negative experiences” minimizes the 
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issue by erasing the fact that this affects all LGBQT people, regardless of age. Moreover, 
framing the experiences as being in the past suggests that discrimination within the 
system is largely historical, which is inaccurate.
18
  
The MHCC then goes on to explain that “stereotypes of all kinds” affect the 
treatment of LGBT people “within the mental health system and within the LGBT 
community” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). The report states that:  
On the one hand, mental health service providers must be mindful not to 
stereotype or discriminate against LGBT people because of their sexual 
orientation, and also to recognize the impact that discrimination and stigma can 
have on an LGBT person’s mental health…. On the other hand, LGBT 
organizations should seek to strengthen their understanding of stigma and other 
issues related to mental health and mental illness, and be ready to provide support 
(MHCC, 2012, p. 68).  
This acknowledgement of discrimination is positive and stands out in comparison to the 
section concerning gender, which does not mention discrimination. However, by 
suggesting that stereotyping can be addressed by being ‘mindful’ not to discriminate 
suggests that it is a simple matter of reminding service providers as opposed to an issue 
that requires more systematic and structural forms of intervention. It also reduces the 
issue to a problem with individual service providers, as opposed to acknowledging that 
homophobia and transphobia are structural and deeply embedded in the mental health 
system in myriad ways. For example, simply being ‘mindful’ does not address 
administrative systems that classify people according to name and gender given at birth, 
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 Discrimination against LGBT people within the mental health system and society is also referred to as a 
historical phenomenon in Toward recovery and well-being, the document that outlines the framework for 
Changing directions, changing lives (MHCC, 2009, p. 44). 
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causing problems for trans people who have not changed their identification, and often 
even for those who have, as these systems and those operating them are often not 
amenable to such changes. This kind of institutional erasure of trans people is endemic 
(Bauer et al, 2009). 
Further, the contrast between mental health service providers being mindful and 
LGBT organizations learning more about stigma is problematic. The phraseology that 
begins the sentence about LGBT organizations, ‘On the other hand,’ suggests that it is a 
commensurate problem to the one regarding mental health service providers. Presenting 
the shortcomings of LGBT organizations as commensurate with those of the mental 
health system is inappropriate and unfair, given that LGBQT organizations do not even 
exist in many areas of the country, and where they do, are often underfunded by the 
government. Furthermore, the citation given at the end of this claim is to an article 
written about the public mental health system in the United States, based on data 
collected in 1998 and published in 2004 (though incorrectly cited as being published in 
2008). This 17-page article devotes 6 sentences to the lack of attention paid to “LGBT 
people with serious mental illness” by LGBT community organizations. This seems like a 
dubious basis on which to make claims about Canadian LGBT organizations. In addition, 
this critique of LGBT organizations stands alone; there are no similar critiques of 
organizations that serve newcomers, racialized groups, and women. 
 The MHCC also states that “people who provide mental health services…to the 
LGBT community need to have a positive attitude and to be knowledgeable about the 
needs of people from these communities, while at the same time not making global 
assumptions that can obscure differences among…individual[s]” (MHCC, 2012, p. 68). 
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Like the recommendation to be ‘mindful,’ the recommendation to have a “positive 
attitude” makes it a matter of service providers’ disposition rather than a process of 
challenging deeply held homophobic and transphobic beliefs about LGBQT people. 
Given the widespread and structural nature of homophobia and transphobia in the mental 
health system, the emphasis should be on changing this. Instead, the section includes only 
one sentence about how providers need to be knowledgeable while resisting “global 
assumptions.” Yet the MHCC does not say how providers will become more 
knowledgeable or explain the state’s role in making this happen.  
Priority 4.5 ends with four “recommendations for action,” the first being to 
“increase professional and public understanding of differences in mental health related to 
gender and sexual orientation” (MHCC, 2012, p. 69). Given that the ‘differences’ 
described are mostly about the inequitable environments and circumstances that increase 
or create mental distress, it seems like a misnomer to call this ‘differences in mental 
health,’ as opposed to ‘differences in privilege’ for example, or even the more neutral 
‘differences in mental health needs.’ Characterizing this as ‘differences in mental health’ 
falls back on the biomedical model and essentializes the problem by locating it within the 
body, thereby contradictorily ignoring the social factors outlined in the strategy. 
The second recommendation, which is to “provide mental health services that are 
gender and LGBT sensitive,” turns the focus back to environmental factors. It is positive 
to see acknowledged that there is work to do in the system in terms of making it 
accessible to ‘LGBT’ people. As demonstrated by the participants’ narratives presented 
in chapter three, there is a need for training to increase practitioner knowledge about 
LGBQT cultures and racialized cultures from anti-essentializing, anti-homophobic, anti-
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transphobic, and anti-racist perspectives. Unfortunately, the MHCC does not give any 
indication about how and where this training will take place, whether in medical schools, 
hospitals, or doctors’ offices, and who will do the training.  
The third recommendation is to “take action to reduce the serious risk factors for 
women’s mental health, including poverty, the burden of caregiving, and family 
violence.” This is important because it is one of few places in strategic direction four 
where the MHCC makes mention of the social factors external to the mental health 
system. However, there is no indication of how this reduction in risk will be achieved. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the MHCC took pains to outline ‘risk factors’ for both 
women and men, it seems remiss that there is no mention of men in this recommendation. 
Recommendation four is to “improve the capacity of LGBT organizations to 
address the stigma of mental illness and to work with local mental health services to 
support their community.” This recommendation is vague, in that it does not specify what 
“improve the capacity” means. As discussed in chapter three, LGBQT mental health 
organizations have excessively long waiting lists for counsellors. This indicates that they 
are in dire need of more government funding to provide services, not only to address 
stigma.  
With a few exceptions, strategic direction four focuses on increasing access to 
services, making existing services more ‘welcoming’ to marginalized groups, and 
challenging stigma associated with ‘mental illness.’ In addition to the erasure of state 
accountability regarding the creation of conditions that can lead to distress, there is a lack 
of examination of power relations embedded within the biomedical model such as the 
ones discussed in chapter three. There is no questioning of who is considered in need of 
  193   
psychiatric services and why, as well as the ways in which oppressive beliefs are 
entrenched in diagnostic processes and interactions between service providers and those 
experiencing mental distress. There is, therefore, no examination of the ways in which 
recovery may in some cases be hindered by the dominance of the biomedical model. For 
these reasons, Changing Directions does not adequately address what needs to change 
within the existing system as it stands as well as the possibility of alternative ways of 
understanding and addressing mental distress and recovery. As a guiding strategy for 
changing Canadian mental health policy and practice, it runs the risk of further 
entrenching individualist approaches that leave intact or perpetuate the structural 
conditions that create distress and hinder recovery. In the next section I seek different 
answers to these questions in participants’ accounts of their good experiences with 
service providers, their thoughts about what needs to change in the mental health system, 
and their experiences of community involvement.  
Shifting the paradigm in mental health service provision 
 For the most part, the participants in my study did not make use of the word 
‘recovery’; nor did I use this word in talking with them. Instead, they discussed the ways 
in which they handled their distress, whether through medical strategies or otherwise. 
While some participants felt that the distress they had experienced was in the past and 
unlikely to recur, others characterized their distress as something that was ongoing and 
changed over time, according to life circumstances. Many discussed their individual 
strategies for addressing distress, but it became evident that this concerned more than 
what they could do as individuals and was structured by what took place inside and 
outside the mental health care system. As evidenced in chapter 3, the mental health 
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system often contributed to or increased participants’ distress. At the same time, some 
found supportive and respectful services, often (though not exclusively) within 
community health care services. These accounts of good experiences as well as 
participants' thoughts about what needs to change in the system contrasts sharply with the 
MHCC’s conceptualization of conditions that facilitate recovery. 
One of the recurring themes in participants’ narratives about their positive 
experiences with service providers was the importance of active listening skills, respect 
for participants’ choices, and supportive counsel. Allison, a Torontonian who identifies as 
white, queer, and genderqueer, said about her good experiences with counsellors in 
Toronto: “They listen to you. They sit there and they listen to you and they don’t really 
judge you, at least I don’t think they do. If they do, they shut up [both laugh]. They do it 
privately.” Similarly, Viki, a racialized, queer, gender-fluid woman, described her 
experiences with counsellors in Toronto as positive and very different from her 
experiences with psychiatrists: “I’ve been fortunate to have really great counsellors who 
I’ve connected with and have challenged me, helped me unlearn things, and also really 
validated, which is the opposite of what I feel when I go see a psych. It’s the opposite of 
validation. It’s feeling like shit.”  
Displaying skills such as listening, respecting agency, and being supportive may 
seem like simple requirements, but it indicates a paradigm shift in the way that many 
practitioners are currently operating. One participant from Winnipeg, Bettie, a white, 
queer, cisgender woman, described this as follows: 
I think that mental health providers are super paternalistic and think that they 
know the right answer and the best thing for people and don’t acknowledge 
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context as much as they should be acknowledging context. I think they should be 
seeing their patients as allies and not as patients. I think that is a new kind of 
concept in healthcare where you don’t have clients or patients. You have an ally 
and somebody that you work with to support. 
A shift from envisioning people as patients to allies would mark a paradigm shift because 
of the implications about power relations. As Bettie suggests, equitable power relations 
between practitioners and those experiencing mental distress would alter problematic 
paternalistic dynamics, as discussed in more detail in chapter three.  
Another theme that arose from the participant interviews was the importance of 
having service providers who addressed their social contexts. For example, Jen, a white, 
pansexual, cisgender woman, told me about a social worker in Toronto: “The social 
worker was very crisis management. She was looking a lot at the social factors that were 
impacting me at the time. And she was great. I really appreciated her. She really 
understood youth and she really got where I was coming from [at] sixteen.” 
Likewise, Raven, a Métis, trans, genderqueer person, was connected with a 
lesbian mental health worker and a gay youth and family development worker in 
Winnipeg as a teenager. These two workers helped him access social assistance and 
living arrangements. They also served as advocates for him within the mental health 
system. Raven shared what happened with one of the workers after a particularly 
oppressive experience with a doctor: 
I told her about it and she was like, ‘That asshole.’ She’s like, ‘I’m going down 
there right now.’ She opens her purse, applies her lipstick and takes off, went over 
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to the clinic and fucking reamed them out. Like the doctor, the manager, she filed 
a formal complaint for me. It was amazing. 
After this experience, Raven never had trouble with that doctor again. This kind of 
advocacy is incredibly important. As an Indigenous genderqueer youth navigating the 
child welfare system and the mental health system, Raven experienced a lot of 
oppression. He felt that because these two workers were queer, they were motivated to 
help him and they were the ones he “talked to and connected with the most.” He was still 
in touch with one of them as an adult and named her as “a really, really strong queer 
person in my life.” This kind of advocacy is very different from medicating someone and 
sending them on their way and was far more helpful in aiding Raven with addressing 
some of the conditions in his life that were creating distress. The needs identified by the 
participants for service provision that treats people as allies, is supportive, and provides 
advocacy that addresses social contexts stands in contrast with the needs identified by the 
MHCC, which concentrates on ‘risk factors’ associated with being a member of 
marginalized groups. 
Participants also emphasized that there is only so much individual workers within 
the system can do. If social factors are to be taken seriously as causes of mental distress 
and therefore an important site of intervention in recovery efforts, structural changes are 
necessary. This requires shifting the focus from individuals to structures. As Jacobsen et 
al (2010) state, “recovery should focus more on addressing social inequities and changing 
systems of mental health services and supports and less on changing the individuals who 
use these services and supports” (Jacobson et al, 2010, p.13). This structural focus must 
reconfigure recovery using a broad lens. As Weisser, Morrow, and Jamer (2011) argue, 
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“mental health recovery services” should “include social supports such as housing, 
income security, employment options, accessible transit systems, paid parental leave, 
language classes, and educational opportunities” (p. 26). Likewise, Harper and Speed 
(2012) contend that more attention should be paid to identifying the “structural 
facilitators of recovery” such as “stable income, good housing, [and] employment” (p. 
22). As this suggests, mental health recovery needs to be perceived in very broad 
structural terms in order to adequately address the social causes of mental distress. As 
outlined above, the MHCC minimizes structural factors, particularly those involving state 
responsibility. 
Another recurring theme from participant interviews is the importance of having a 
social justice approach to mental health service provision. This requires having 
knowledge of the ways in which power relations structure social inequities, processes of 
marginalization, and impacts of colonization, abuse, trauma, oppression, and violence. 
This goes beyond having a static understanding of ‘diverse cultures’ and populations as is 
proposed by the MHCC’s suggestion of cultural competence training. As described in 
chapter three, many practitioners continue to pathologize LGBTQ sexualities and gender 
identities. In order to combat these issues, some participants believed that practitioners 
need to be aware of the history and ongoing practice of pathologizing LGBQT cultures 
and identities and how this may impact LGBQT people who experience mental distress. 
As one Winnipeg participant, Rob, a white, French-Canadian, queer, gay, cisgender man, 
told me, “gender and sexual identity that doesn’t fit into the norms of society” have been 
considered mental illness and in some cases continue to be seen as such. He stated 
emphatically: “We can’t operate in that way anymore and so I think there are definitely 
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specific sensitivities required for a community that has for a long time been associated 
with mental illness in a really non-helpful way.” Rob believed that service providers 
becoming educated about this might make the mental health system more accessible to 
LGBQT people.  
Many participants discussed the importance of service providers learning to place 
the focus on the effects of discrimination, rather than on sexuality, gender identity, and 
race as suggested by the MHCC recommendations. Barry, a white, gay, cisgender man in 
Winnipeg, believed that service providers need to be knowledgeable about the health 
impacts of any kind of discrimination. He discussed how service providers need to take 
the effects of experiencing this kind of “hate” seriously. As he said: “I would say not just 
LGBTQ, I would also say anyone who’s experiencing widespread hate I think would 
really be detrimental to your health to be told just for existing you’re wrong and you’re a 
terrible human being.” Likewise, Aaron, a racialized, gay, cisgender man in Toronto, 
emphasized that service providers need to understand how “isolation and the shaming and 
the way people are conditioned to feel really uncomfortable in their own bodies requires 
more work to accept on the part of LGBTQ people.” Aaron stated that it was very 
important to accentuate that LGBTQ people don’t “need more mental health resources 
because they’re LGBTQ but because of the way they’re made to be ashamed of 
themselves.” Similarly, A.P., a racialized, queer, cisgender person in Toronto, stated that 
regarding gender identity in particular, service providers need to understand that “being 
transgender is not a mental illness and then in turn, there’s nothing wrong with having a 
mental illness.” This is in sharp contrast with the MHCC’s approach, which reminds 
service providers to be ‘mindful’ and have a ‘positive attitude.’ 
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Many attributed the ability to use a critical approach to LGBQT mental distress to 
having experiential knowledge of marginalization. As one participant, Devon, a white, 
queer, trans man in Toronto, said, there is “very limited breadth of knowledge or 
experience” about race, class, sexuality, and gender amongst practitioners. He believes 
that this problem is not easily solved. As he said: “I don’t know if you could read an extra 
chapter on queer stuff and then suddenly be the greatest doctor ever.” For Devon, 
understanding was achieved through experience: “I think it’s experiential in a lot of ways. 
Unless you are queer or have a queer family member, been in proximity to it over a great 
length of time, then you can’t really relate.”  
 Likewise, Mike, a white, omnisexual, trans man in Toronto, found that a lack of 
“commonalities” between himself and the practitioners he had seen made the interactions 
“cold and distant” because practitioners are not “personally relating to the person, or if 
they do it seems really fake because there’s no real commonality that they necessarily 
share.” Mike found that service provider efforts to relate to him were not only fake but 
sometimes “offensive” because “the examples that they’re drawing on are so radically 
simplistic compared to what I’m talking about.” Mike had never encountered a service 
provider who shared key commonalities with him and believed that this would have made 
a positive difference in the interaction.  
 Likewise, some racialized participants discussed the importance of seeing 
racialized service providers. Marcus, a racialized, queer, trans man in Toronto, said that 
he was helped by seeing a racialized counsellor who was “really good with the race 
issue.” He found that when he discussed race and racism with white counsellors, he did 
not feel understood and stopped sharing these experiences. Similarly, Laila, a racialized, 
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queer, cisgender woman in Toronto, told me that “the biggest thing” was race, because 
“that’s the thing they see.” She also considered disability an important factor and 
believed that seeing a racialized, disabled counsellor may have made a positive difference 
in her counselling experience because “possibly people [counsellors] wouldn’t be so 
quick to make assumptions based on that.” She acknowledged that this was “not 
necessarily true” but hoped this would be the case. 
 This desire for service providers who share commonalities in terms of social 
location can be seen as essentialist. Social difference is defined across a number of 
intersecting fronts, including but not limited to age, sexuality, gender, race, class, and 
disability, and none of these are static, fixed categories that share essential commonalities 
(Valentine, 2002). There is no guarantee that LGBTQ practitioners will have anti-racist, 
anti-oppressive perspectives or share commonalities with LGBTQ people seeking 
services. While lived experience is often the catalyst that leads people to learn social 
justice perspectives, it is possible to develop a critical consciousness through education 
without life experience of marginalization. 
 However, it is important to understand some participants’ preference for 
practitioners who are perceived to be similarly socially located in some way within the 
larger context of oppression in the health care system. As discussed in detail in chapter 
three, many service providers do not have a critical consciousness and continue to 
pathologize people on the basis of gender, sexuality, and race. In this context it is 
understandable that participants would hope that practitioners with lived experience of 
marginalization may be better informed than those who do not. Additionally, perceived 
social location affects relationships between providers and those seeking services in that 
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it often has impact on trust level. One of the cumulative impacts of experiencing 
oppression at the hands of health care practitioners is that some participants were less 
likely to trust practitioners they perceived as having privilege based on their social 
locations. For example, A.P., quoted above, said that it “means a lot” for her to be able to 
discuss her “problems” to “someone who isn’t straight” because if she is unsure of their 
sexuality she does not feel comfortable sharing her experiences. When I asked her to 
elaborate on the reasons for this, she told me that heterosexual practitioners are likely to 
make heterosexist assumptions and be unable to “relate” and to “get it.” Likewise, Lisa, a 
white, Portuguese, French-Canadian, lesbian, queer person, did not feel comfortable with 
her male counsellor: “I just didn’t feel that he could connect with me. The lesbian issues 
are not the same as straight man issues.” 
 As the participants’ comments indicate, there is a need for more access to LGBQT 
practitioners and practitioners with a critical consciousness, along with practitioners who 
have experiential knowledge of oppression and marginalization and who have social 
justice approaches to service provision. While such practitioners can also be found in 
private practice, many people cannot afford their services. For this reason, it is necessary 
that provincial health insurance be expanded to include those who are currently 
considered private practitioners. As indicated by chapter three, there is also a need to 
better train service providers within the mainstream mental healthcare system. As the 
participants’ comments demonstrate, this training must go beyond the cultural 
competence approach suggested by the MHCC and should be considered essential to 
providing mental health services. 
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 Participant accounts suggest that there are significant changes that need to take 
place in the mental health system that are not accounted for by the MHCC strategy 
document. Furthermore, the shortcomings described by the participants are in many ways 
characteristic of the biomedical model of ‘mental illness’, as detailed in chapter three. 
This suggests that biomedicalism does not always facilitate ‘recovery,’ something that is 
not considered in Changing Directions. This also indicates that there is value in exploring 
options outside of medical methods of dealing with distress. The following section 
discusses community building and participation in an effort to indicate the existence of 
alternative sources of support and non-medicalized forms of ‘recovery’ for participants. 
This is not to suggest that the responsibility for ‘recovery’ and support should be placed 
on LGBQT communities; nor do I argue that such communities are utopian spaces free of 
problems. Rather, this discussion aims to broaden the narrow vision of ‘recovery’ offered 
in Changing Directions and to explore the perspectives of LGBQT people with lived 
experience regarding alternative means of support in Toronto and Winnipeg. 
Recovery as a “collective journey” 
 Weisser, Morrow, and Jamer (2011) argue that recovery should be seen as a 
“collective journey” rather than a personal one and should include “building a sense of 
community, using preexisting support networks, fostering family and cultural 
connections where desired, and overcoming social isolation” (p. 26). Their examples of 
collective recovery are “political activism” and “connection with one’s culture” (Weisser, 
Morrow, & Jamer, 2011). Following this reconfiguration of recovery as collective, 
connections to LGBQT and other social, cultural, and political communities could be 
viewed as part of a collective journey of recovery. Indeed, many participants named 
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communities as places of support and as part of addressing mental distress. For example, 
Brock, a white, gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, stated that the idea that “everyone’s 
responsible for their own mental health is too much along the same lines of the rugged 
individual surviving in the wilderness.” Brock believed that this is not an accurate 
depiction of “how people function, as social creatures.” For Brock this meant that “there 
really needs to be less of an institutionalization of mental health and more of a grassroots 
community focus.” 
 Many participants identified isolation as a factor that created and exacerbated 
mental distress, while they saw connection with community as an antidote. For example, 
David, a white, Jewish, gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, said: “I think when people are 
isolated, that’s the worst possible thing. If we’re gonna talk mental health, isolation is one 
of the key issues. Whether you’re isolated socially, medically, whatever, when you’re on 
your own and you don’t feel connected up, you’re gonna get sick.” Connecting with 
community may be especially salient for LGBQT people, who often experience 
discrimination within family settings, reducing the amount of available support. As 
Smith, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto, said: “I think it’s still pretty common as 
queer and trans people that we don’t have the support from our families of origin that we 
need. And so creating those things is a pretty big part of what I want my community to 
be.”  
 Participants in both Toronto and Winnipeg were involved in community building 
and community engagement as part of addressing mental distress, though this took 
different forms in each city. Toronto’s large size and diverse population offered more 
opportunities for creating various kinds of communities. Toronto is perhaps unique in this 
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respect amongst Canadian cities; even large cities like Vancouver do not quite compare. 
For example, one participant, Devon, quoted above, moved to Toronto from Vancouver 
and found that the social landscape was quite different: 
When I first moved here I started hanging out with a lot of trans guys, because 
that was also new. I didn’t hang out with as many trans guys before because there 
just wasn’t as many; there was three or four of us. But now here [in Toronto] it’s 
like you can meet ten right away and then there’s ten other guys who hate those 
ten guys [laughs]. Like there’s just so many more people. 
As Devon’s comments indicate, the sheer number of people in Toronto makes it more 
possible to have community based on identities, behaviours and experiences (such as 
being trans) that are often marginalized within gay and lesbian communities. For many, 
this was a crucial part of addressing mental distress. For example, Viki, quoted above, 
discussed connections to Toronto communities that “are more open to certain 
differences,” such as the “BDSM kink community” and the “poly community,” as an 
important part of dealing with mental distress. As she said: “I can talk freely about my 
mental health stuff. And I use that as part of addressing some mental health things I’m 
going through.” Likewise, Mike, quoted above, named the Toronto “BDSM leather 
community” as a place where people can deal with “deep problems”:  
People will have problems, like deep problems that they need to work out and live 
through and they have tactics for dealing with them that are definitely not within 
how you’re supposed to deal with your issues. So I think that community is most 
aware of the diversity of people. So they don’t expect everybody to be the same. 
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Mike also named the Toronto “HIV/AIDS community” as a supportive place to deal with 
mental distress: “Similar to BDSM and leather, people are more real and deep when 
they’re in a safe environment. In the sense that if you’re in a room with people that all 
know that they can trust each other, people will go a lot further. Those rooms are very 
valuable.” 
Some participants, like Aaron, quoted above, found community through LGBQT 
organizations or groups. His involvement in a LGBQT student group at a university 
offered “validation” and “a space where I could not constantly be questioned and made to 
feel like I’m strange or fucked up.” Likewise, Derek, a racialized, queer, genderqueer 
person, found that participating in Trans Youth Toronto, run by the 519 Community 
Centre, fostered a connection with one of the facilitators, who “checks up” on him 
regarding “mental health” and “disability.”  
Other participants, like Allison, quoted above, had friends who served as a source 
of community and support: 
I have friends who are consumers of the psychiatric system and we do create a 
small community for ourselves where we can talk about this stuff, we can be open 
about it and it’s not stigmatizing. And we do support each other. There’s maybe 
three or four of us, but it’s one way that we can feel like we’re supporting each 
other and we get it, because most of us are queer. 
Shared experience of both mental distress and being queer allowed for a valuable form of 
support for Allison and her friends. Similarly, Marcus, quoted above, was part of a group 
of queer and trans people who met regularly to discuss community accountability. This 
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group was interested in figuring out a way to do “collective care” regarding mental 
health, which he described as follows: 
I feel like mental health is not really talked about as much, but in the community 
accountability group we are talking about it a lot. We’re talking about disability, 
collective care, which is kind of new to me but I think it’s an amazing concept, 
and a lot of people talk about things that they need to do for themselves, plus what 
they do if they need to outreach the community with collective care. Some people 
feel like they need collective care and some people need to self-isolate – we’re 
just getting into the whole discussion about that. 
Marcus was excited to encounter the concept of collective care as a way of addressing 
mental distress on a community level. Similarly, Smith, quoted above, discussed being 
part of a “care collective” for “people with depression or who are going through grief” 
and noted that this was a “community that’s created around being support systems for 
people.” As Marcus's and Smith’s stories show, there are subgroups within Toronto 
LGBQT communities that are interested in radically reconfiguring support for mental 
distress as a community effort. 
 As these participant narratives demonstrate, creating and participating in 
community plays a crucial role in addressing mental distress. However, the creation of 
such communities seemed hard-won and the communities remained marginalized. Many 
participants referred to ‘mainstream’ queer communities where various kinds of 
oppression ran rampant, leaving them feeling isolated. For example, Aaron, quoted 
above, described staying quiet about his attraction to “chubby men” because the existence 
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of fatphobia made people more “freaked out” by his attraction to fat bodies than by his 
attraction to men.  
 In addition to fatphobia, many named the prevalence of racism, ableism, and 
classism as exclusionary forces within LGBQT communities. A.P., a racialized, queer, 
cisgender person, described this as follows: 
The mainstream queer spaces tend to be super, super white. And it’s the kind of 
thing that I used to be more comfortable with but not anymore. So it’s like, okay I 
could go but none of the other queer people I know would feel welcome. With 
disability stuff once again, like, why is everyone white? Or there’s an awful lot of 
straight people, and so on. So it’s hard to find people that I have a lot of stuff in 
common with, identity wise.  
A.P. also described a lack of interest within mainstream queer communities in making 
events accessible and a lack of acknowledgment that “disability intersects with poverty.” 
Similarly, Laila, quoted above, described an event that was advertised as being created by 
and for disabled queer people, but was “really exclusionary” because it was “such a 
mainstream kind of queer,” not physically accessible, and featured an MC who made 
ableist and racist jokes, such as making fun of a performer with a “non-Anglo name.” For 
Laila, experiencing this kind of event meant that she felt isolated and no longer sought 
out community: 
The worst part was that I was hoping and looking forward to some kind of 
community space, and it was just such a huge disappointment. Another reason 
why I avoid getting into these kinds of spaces, because of shit like this. It’s just 
such a huge, crushing disappointment. 
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Laila’s story highlights the importance of supportive, anti-oppressive community by 
illuminating the impact of experiencing the opposite. Likewise, Viki described being 
asked to stop attending meetings of a community of women of colour based on her 
physical and mental health. She was unable to attend some meetings due to her physical 
health and was sometimes “checked out” when she was present due to her mental health. 
Viki was deeply hurt by the ableist and sanist request to leave the community: “I’m still 
really, really struggling, like not a day goes by that it’s not painful.” As these stories 
show, creating community that was inclusive and anti-oppressive in every respect was an 
ongoing struggle in Toronto.  
 This was also a challenge in Winnipeg. Winnipeg is the largest city in Manitoba 
and is larger than the second largest city, Brandon, by approximately 68, 000 people. This 
makes Winnipeg, at 700,000 people, a ‘big city,’ but on a much smaller scale than 
Toronto. The small size of the Winnipeg LGBQT community meant that there were 
fewer anti-oppressive community spaces and events. There were fewer opportunities for 
what one participant, Raven, quoted above, called “radical queer community.” As he also 
pointed out, much of the Winnipeg LGBTQ community is a bar-based culture:  
The main queer community is really the bar scene, especially in Winnipeg. In 
bigger cities you definitely have more options, but in Winnipeg it’s pretty small. 
There’s not like a radical queer community. It’s mostly just the bar scene and then 
friends. So I have friends. But I’ve never really felt a part of any queer kind of 
scene or whatever.  
Bars are generally inaccessible spaces for many reasons, including the centrality of 
alcohol, physical inaccessibility, and conditions (like crowds of people and loud music) 
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that can be difficult to navigate for some who experience mental distress. As Raven 
points out, bar culture is not particularly amenable to ‘radical queer community’ where 
alternative forms of support can be organized, such as the collective care arrangements 
described by Toronto participants. 
  Racism also made some Winnipeg LGBQT community spaces hostile places for 
racialized participants. At the time of interviewing, there were two queer bars in 
Winnipeg, Gio’s and Club 200. As Travis, quoted above, told me, these bars had “very, 
very different clientele”: 
I don’t think a lot of the clientele [from Club 200] would feel comfortable or even 
be allowed to get into Gio’s, because a lot of the clientele from Club 200 is 
primarily Aboriginal, two-spirited, some trans folks. Whereas Gio’s is much more 
non-Aboriginal. I’ve heard people talk about it in the community, right. I’ve heard 
people be like, ‘I’m not going to Club 200. There’s too many Indians there.’  
As Travis points out, racism towards Indigenous people created exclusionary social 
spaces. Another participant, Sonja, a Métis, bi-queer, cisgender woman, told me that 
“community celebrations” that take place at Gio’s are often avoided by people of colour, 
because they are “very centred around white privilege.” Sonja gave an example of a drag 
event that she described as “Pocahontas, John Smith fucking pow wow party shit.” The 
organizers defended this racist, colonialist event on the basis of having included an 
Indigenous drag performer who was apparently “fine with it.” Sonja was angry that the 
organizers used this tokenistic defense. She said that many people in the community were 
oblivious to how racist these kinds of events were and that “the only people who are 
aware of how weird it is to have that kind of celebration are the people of colour who 
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avoid it.” As Travis and Sonja suggest, Indigenous LGBQT people experience racism 
within LGBQT communities, making some community spaces sources of exclusion 
rather than support. However, their comments also suggest that Club 200 provided a 
more supportive place for Indigenous LGBQT people, though this was not addressed 
directly by any of the participants. 
 In addition to LGBQT bars, LGBQT organizations and mental health 
organizations were mentioned as problematic sources of community. Some felt that 
LGBQT organizations were not particularly inclusive of those who experience mental 
distress and that mental health organizations were not inclusive of those who are 
LGBQT. As Andrea, a white, queer, cisgender woman, said: “There’s not really any 
support systems as far as I’ve noticed. They’ll either support your crazy or they’ll support 
your queer.” Likewise, Barb, a white, lesbian, woman, told me that the LGBQT 
community and the “mental illness” community “run parallel to each other” and are not 
“necessarily integrated.” This meant that those who sought support from mental health 
organizations such as through the support groups run by the Canadian Mental Health 
Association found that there was a singular focus on mental health. For example, Angela, 
a white, gay, cisgender woman, found support by attending support groups for people 
who shared her diagnosis: “It made me feel more okay in my skin, hearing other people’s 
stories that, you know, they have grandiose episodes too. That they think they’re Jesus 
[laughs]. It’s good to identify with.” This support was incredibly important for Angela, 
but she found that there were no groups “specifically for the gay population.” Likewise, 
Lisa, quoted above, attended support groups for those who shared her diagnosis and 
found them to be helpful, but was told that it was not “appropriate” to discuss anything 
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pertaining to her sexuality. This left her feeling like she could not be her full self and that 
there was no place where she could “let both out” and “be safe to do that, and feel safe.” 
As in Toronto, participants struggled with oppression within community spaces and with 
finding and creating space that was fully inclusive and anti-oppressive. 
 However, the small size of Winnipeg LGBQT communities had some positive 
effects in terms of making connections and creating support. Many felt that the small size 
made it more conducive to finding community through friends. Crabitha, a Métis, lesbian, 
cisgender woman, told me that the Winnipeg community is “so small that it’s more like 
one on one.” For her, this provided the opportunity to connect with other LGBQT people 
who experience mental distress. She said: “You know who has mental health issues. 
Maybe not everybody, but you start to know some people who have [pauses] like the 
person who you’re interviewing tomorrow. I know her and we talked about this thing 
over the weekend.” For some, like Crabitha, the smallness allowed for making 
connections. Likewise, Stacey, a white, queer, person, found that seeing the same people 
over the course of many years in the queer community meant that she eventually came to 
know others who experienced mental distress through talking more “deeply” with people 
in the community. This allowed her to create a supportive community of queer friends 
who also experience distress and reject medical methods of addressing it: 
It provides a basis of support for people. I’m also a manic depressive, up and 
down all over the board. And for the group of people that were having the same 
types of things going on, there’s certainly a support in that because you can 
recognize what’s going on and you can recognize what’s happening in your drug 
cycle. It’s an odd community support system but it works. Because your friend 
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would see what was going on, and instead of taking you to the doctor or to 
wherever you’d get a shot, you’d do some drugs and you’d be fine. 
For Stacey and her friends, taking drugs that are often deemed ‘recreational’ instead of 
psychiatric drugs was part of addressing mental distress. Doing this within a group of 
friends offered a way of monitoring her moods and considering how the drugs were 
affecting her. 
 For some, like Stacey and Crabitha, the small size of the community had positive 
effects, like making it easier to find and connect with LGBQT people who experience 
mental distress. However, the small size of the community also created challenges, like 
harmful gossip and lack of privacy. Lisa told me that the Winnipeg community was “too 
small” for her to seek out mad queer community. She believed that having people know 
about her mental distress would lead to gossip and isolation rather than connection: 
It’s bad enough that being in the gay community, you sleep with someone and it’s 
told that you slept with the world. I cannot begin to imagine the words that would 
come out of certain individuals’ mouths about Lisa being crazy or having 
borderline personality disorder. ‘Personality what?’ I just, I can’t even. So it’s 
because of not wanting other people to know, not wanting to have to deal with a 
small community, I’ve limited myself because I don’t want to go through people 
talking about me and it getting back to me. I can’t deal with that.  
Lisa had already experienced negative judgments in the LGBQT community regarding 
her sex life and believed this lack of understanding and gossip would extend to a 
discussion about her mental health. She therefore felt isolated from the LGBQT 
community.  
  213   
 As this discussion shows, many participants in both Toronto and Winnipeg 
believed in the importance of community participation as a crucial component of 
addressing mental distress. Community building and participation in both cities was 
complicated and often fraught with tensions regarding various kinds of oppression. 
However, it was clear that connection with others and support from people who have 
similar experiences was key in dealing with mental distress.  
 This is not to say that community participation should take the place of 
government-funded initiatives to address mental distress and promote ‘recovery.’ This is 
important to note because the reconfiguration of recovery as collective could be just as 
compatible with neoliberal agendas that sidestep state responsibility as is the case with 
the currently popular ‘personal journey’ of recovery, which downloads responsibility 
onto individuals and communities. Rather, I am suggesting that it is possible to learn 
from those with lived experience about what ‘recovery needs’ are met by community 
building and participation with an eye for what might be lacking within biomedical 
ideology and practice, and therefore what could be changed in order to meet those needs. 
For example, from the participant stories quoted above, it seems like community building 
and community engagement offered validation, understanding, support, respect, and 
alternatives to medical methods of dealing with distress. In many ways this echoes what 
was identified as lacking in the mental health system. This is not meant to provide 
definitive answers or alternatives, rather to offer some preliminary thoughts based on the 
participants’ perspectives and experiences with community building. 
 In this chapter I critiqued Canada’s mental health strategy for failing to advance a 
strong structural analysis of the social conditions that can lead to mental distress. I argued 
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that this is accomplished through positioning such conditions as ‘risk factors’ associated 
with marginalization, rather than at least partially created and perpetuated by the state. In 
addition, participant narratives show that there is much to consider in terms of the failures 
of biomedical approaches to recovery, which are not examined in Changing Directions. 
Participants’ stories about community involvement offer one way to begin an exploration 
of other ways to think about recovery. This raises important questions for further 
consideration as to how to foster the positive effects of community building and 
participation as part of ‘recovery’ as well as implementing structural changes that would 
meet these needs within the mental health care system and beyond. This would require 
resisting the MHCC’s neoliberal appropriation of ‘recovery’ as a ‘personal journey’ and 
encouraging state accountability for creating conditions conducive to addressing mental 
distress (Morrow & Weisser, 2012). It also requires further exploration of non-medical 
approaches to recovery in order to truly ‘change directions’ in Canadian mental health 
care.   
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Chapter Five: (In)visibility in the Workplace: Navigating Disclosure and Intersectional 
Oppression at Work 
 
In the last chapter I examined Canada’s mental health strategy document, 
Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada. I argued 
that this document puts forth a limited analysis of the relevance of race, gender, and 
sexuality in terms of recovery, and minimizes the state’s role in producing the structural 
conditions that can exacerbate or create mental distress. The rise of recovery as a 
foundational concept in mental health policy has created new interest in the possibility of 
employment for those who experience mental distress. Indeed, employment can 
contribute to recovery through providing opportunities for social inclusion, friendship, 
financial gain, and self-esteem. Conversely, the workplace can be exclusionary and 
oppressive and create or intensify mental distress. The workplace is therefore an 
important arena to examine. 
In this chapter I draw on my interview data about employment as well as 
scholarly work regarding ‘invisible identities’ to analyze the participants’ workplace 
experiences. I position mental distress, sexuality, and gender identity as aspects of the 
participants’ lives that are sometimes invisible and as such require decisions about 
‘coming out’ in the workplace. I show that even those who are visible or who have 
disclosed information about experiences of mental distress, sexuality, and gender identity 
face ongoing decisions about disclosure. I argue that such decisions are particularly 
pressing and high risk at work, given the economic stakes, the effects on health and well-
being, and the prevalence of oppressive beliefs and practices in the workforce. I 
challenge the positioning of mental distress, sexuality, gender identity, and race as 
personal, private, and neutral social differences by examining the role of sanism, 
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homophobia, transphobia, and racism in structuring the participants’ work lives, 
including obtaining and retaining work, evaluations of job performance, and access to 
workplace accommodations. I conclude with some recommendations regarding the 
improvement of workplace conditions for LGBQT people who experience mental 
distress. As in other chapters, I did not find significant differences between the 
participants located in Winnipeg and Toronto and they are therefore discussed as a group. 
The importance of employment 
The psychiatric survivor movement has long claimed that employment can play 
an important role in well-being, as captured by the adage “a home, a job, a friend” made 
popular by Canadian psychiatric survivor activist David Reville in the 1990s as a simple 
way to describe commonly unmet needs of those who experience mental distress (Reville 
& Church, 2012, p. 192). Indeed, Beckman and Davies (2013) contend that “next to 
homelessness, unemployment and the specter of poverty are the biggest practical 
problems facing people with psychiatric labels” (Beckman & Davies, 2013, p. 54). 
Psychiatric survivor activists have challenged biomedical deficit model narratives that 
position ‘mentally ill’ people as incapable of meaningful employment and have argued 
that many who experience mental distress are capable of and can benefit from 
employment (Repper & Perkins, 2003). Activists and scholars have drawn attention to the 
ways in which employment can help with increasing self-esteem, recuperation of a sense 
of self outside of being labeled ‘mentally ill’, as well as the obvious financial benefits 
(Boardman, Grove, Perkins, & Shepherd, 2003; Church, 2001; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Davidson & Strauss, 1992; Dunn, Wewiorski & Rogers, 2008; Provencher, Gregg, Mead, 
& Mueser, 2002). Indeed, some preliminary research indicates that participation in the 
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workforce may reduce the amount and frequency of hospitalization and the need for 
mental health services (Cohen et al 2008, p. 7). It is important to acknowledge, however, 
that employment is a social factor that can exacerbate and cause mental distress; most 
jobs are not structured to ‘accommodate’ those who experience mental distress; in fact 
able-bodied expectations are the norm (Honey, 2004). 
The mainstreaming of recovery as a key concept in mental health policy and 
service provision has resulted in an increased interest in the role of employment in 
successful recovery from mental distress (see for example, MHCC 2012). While the 
psychiatric survivor movement has focused on the aspects of employment that can be 
beneficial to those who experience mental distress, mainstream perspectives tend to focus 
on the impact on the economy. Media stories, government publications, and some 
scholarly work often positions ‘mental illness’ as a ‘drain’ and a ‘burden’ on the 
economy (Bradley, 2014; Hilton, Scuffham, and Vecchio, 2010; Kirky, 2012; Koerner, et 
al, 2004; Lim, Jacobs, and Ohinmaa, 2008, MHCC, 2011; MHCC, 2013). Increasing 
employment rates amongst those deemed ‘mentally ill’ is thus framed as an important 
measure to reduce the amount of money that is ‘lost’ due to lack of productivity. As 
Poole (2013) points out, in this formulation “the reason sickness is undesirable is not that 
it causes distress or discomfort but that it results in what is often called ‘lost 
productivity.’ This is a sinister and absurd notion, predicated on the greedy fallacy of 
counting chickens before they have hatched” (Poole, 2013). Poole goes on to argue that 
“the idea seems to be that business already has that money even though it hasn’t earned it 
yet and employees who fail to maintain “productivity” as a result of sickness or other 
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reasons are, in effect, stealing this as yet entirely notional sum from their employers” 
(Poole, 2013).  
Further, the economic burden narrative is based on ableist ideology that places the 
blame on those who are excluded from the workforce rather than analyzing the structural 
conditions that make it difficult or impossible for everyone to participate in paid work, as 
well as employment conditions that can create or contribute to ill health. This chapter 
examines one such factor, intersectional oppression, but it is important to note that there 
are many other structural factors that affect employment conditions that are beyond the 
scope of this study. These include the effects of minimum wage regulations, immigration 
law, precarious employment conditions, disability and social assistance regulations, and 
the continued existence of sheltered workshops or ‘work programs,’ where workers 
deemed ‘mentally ill’ are paid well below minimum wage. 
Employment and LGBTQ people who experience mental distress: An overview 
Disabled people have long experienced discrimination in the Canadian workforce. 
Schier, Graham & Jones (2009) argue that full inclusion of those with disabilities in the 
Canadian labour market would require major change in both “corporate and societal 
attitudes” (p. 70). Mad people in particular have a long history of exclusion from the paid 
workforce as well as exploitation of their labour (Reaume, 1997; Reaume, 2006). Many 
mad people in Canada continue to live in poverty (Wilton, 2003) and, according to the 
Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA), the percentage of those with “serious 
mental illness” who are unemployed is between 70 and 90 (CMHA, 2012). Yet 80% of 
people with “serious mental illness” want to be employed (Canadian Mood Disorder 
Society, 2009).  
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These statistics suggest that there are significant obstacles preventing people who 
experience mental distress from obtaining and maintaining work. The CMHA identifies 
some of the obstacles facing those with “psychiatric disabilities” as “gaps in work 
history, limited employment experience, lack of confidence, fear and anxiety, workplace 
discrimination and inflexibility, social stigma and the rigidity of existing income 
support/benefit programs” (CMHA, 2012). The Canadian Mood Disorders Society 
reports that 64% of Canadian organizations “have no structured process for supervisors to 
support employees’ return to work after any illness or disability” and only 20% of 
organizations see addressing “stigma associated with mental illness as a priority” 
(Canadian Mood Disorder Society, 2009). Despite these dire statistics, there are few 
Canadian studies regarding workplace equity and disability, including mental health 
(Peters & Brown, 2009; Shier, Graham & Jones, 2009).  
In terms of sexuality, Hunt and Eaton (2007) claim that Canada is a “queer-
positive nation” with “one of the most progressive records on sexual diversity issues in 
the world” due to anti-discrimination law and the legalization of ‘same-sex’ marriage (pp 
130-131). The Canadian labour movement has been instrumental in creating social 
change for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in the workplace, including the extension of 
benefits to ‘same-sex’ partners and non-discrimination provisions (Hunt & Eaton, 2007). 
Hunt and Eaton (2007) argue that the changes made by unions influenced non-unionized 
organizations to do the same and “made the idea of expanding coverage into human 
rights codes less alien to…some legislators (p. 138). In terms of trans rights, labour has 
been slower to respond and implement anti-discrimination provisions in collective 
agreements, “nor has there been much indication…of social acceptance at the grass roots 
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of the union movement,” though the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) has 
made inroads (Hunt & Eaton, 2007 p. 153). Further, the Canadian labour movement still 
has much work to do in terms of addressing racism both within the movement and the 
workforce (Das Gupta, 2007; Galabuzi, 2006; Rayside, 2007). This is also the case 
concerning disability rights (Rayside, 2007. p. 214). However, as Rayside (2007) notes, 
there is much to be learned about how effectively anti-discrimination policies have been 
put into action and “with what impact at the local level” (p. 153). 
Indeed, the efficacy of anti-discrimination policy is an important consideration. 
Writing in an American context, Spade (2011) argues that anti-discrimination law 
individualizes discrimination and fails to address structural oppression. As he states,  
Anti-discrimination law seeks out aberrant individuals with overtly biased 
intentions. Meanwhile all the daily disparities in life chances that shape our world 
along lines of race, class, indigeneity, disability, national origin, sex, and gender 
remain untouchable and affirmed as non-discriminatory or even as fair” (p.85).  
Spade (2011) cites the continued existence of “wage gaps, illegal terminations, 
hostile work environments, hiring/firing disparities, and bias-motivated violence” 
towards marginalized groups as evidence of the inefficacy of anti-discrimination law (p. 
82). Further, he contends that such laws protect “the least marginalized of the 
marginalized” (usually white people with professional jobs and immigration status), 
while failing to protect those who “face the worst economic vulnerability” such as 
racialized, disabled, trans people without legal immigration status (Spade, 2011, p. 87). 
Though Spade is referring to anti-discrimination law in the United States, his arguments 
provide insight into the way such laws operate in Canada. 
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One way to approach the question of how effective anti-discrimination policies 
have been is to look at income differentials. Is there a “financial penalty for being gay” in 
Canada as there is in the United States? (Badgett, 2003, p.10). While income differentials 
between heterosexuals and gays and lesbian (though not bisexual, queer, and trans 
people) have been documented in the United States, Canadian studies are limited in 
number. In a report commissioned by the Canadian Aids Society, Ryan (2003) speculates 
that Canadian income differentials for gays and lesbians are similar to those in the United 
States, where gay men make less than heterosexual men and lesbian women make 
slightly more than heterosexual women, but less than gay men (p.14). He also surmises 
that lesbian, gay, and bisexual refugees, newcomers to Canada, and two-spirit Aboriginal 
people are especially likely to be low income but due to a lack of research in this area, 
does not have evidence. (Ryan, 2003, p. 15). Carpenter (2008) provides the first, and to 
date the only, Canadian study examining the links between “sexual orientation” and 
“economic outcomes” (p. 1). Based on the 2003 and 2005 Canadian Community Health 
Surveys and the 2001 Canadian Census, he concludes that gay men do indeed have lower 
incomes than heterosexual men, while lesbian women make more money than 
heterosexual women because they work more (whether this is still less than gay men is 
not mentioned) (Carpenter, 2008). 
Income disparities are not the only means through which lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and queer people experience discrimination. A Canadian poll conducted by Angus Reid 
in collaboration with the Canadian Gay and Lesbian Chamber of Commerce showed that 
“one in 10 LGBT workers still find coworkers and employers intolerant of their sexual 
orientation, and between one third to half of respondents had experienced some form of 
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discrimination throughout their professional lives” (Angus-Reid, 2011). More 
specifically, Bowring and Brewis’ (2009) qualitative study about lesbian and gay 
workplace experiences in Ottawa, Vancouver, and Montreal suggest that gays and 
lesbians who are also gender non-normative may have a more difficult time navigating 
the workplace and that those in long-term relationships were seen as more acceptable to 
their heterosexual colleagues (Bowring & Brewis, 2009). They conclude that “lesbians 
and gay men who perform in ways closest to prevailing social expectations around sex, 
gender and sexuality, who rock the heteronormative boat the least, are also perhaps less 
organizationally vulnerable” (Bowring & Brewis, 2009, p. 373, emphasis in original). 
They note that their study stands alone in the Canadian literature regarding “how lesbians 
and gay men experience and negotiate organizations” (p. 361). As they also note, their 
sample of 16 participants is limited in size and in its inclusion of only white, able-bodied 
gay men and lesbian women in ‘professional’ jobs (Bowring & Brewis, 2009, p. 363). 
Canadian studies about trans people and employment are equally hard to come by. 
Some studies that claim to be about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) people fail 
to include any trans people or attend to trans-specific experiences, which are often 
different (though sometimes overlapping) from those of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people. The Angus Reid survey quoted above is an example of this kind of 
misrepresentation. The executive summary of the survey refers to “members of the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered community” throughout the document, but only 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual Canadians were surveyed
19
 (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 
2011). While it is possible that some of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual people surveyed are 
                                                 
19
Notably, the detailed results refer only to gays and lesbians and do not specifically mention bisexuals. 
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also trans, there is no mention of whether or not this is the case and no mention of any 
trans-specific issues. 
The community-based research project Trans PULSE is the only Canadian study 
to document the conditions contributing to the social exclusion of trans people pertaining 
to employment (amongst other issues). Trans PULSE surveyed 433 trans people living, 
working, or receiving healthcare in Ontario in 2009 and 2010. This study found that 71% 
of trans people have some postsecondary education, but “about half make $15,000 a year 
or less” (Bauer et al., 2011, p. 1). Trans people face “unhealthy and unsafe working 
conditions” due to “the lack of trans-positive attitudes as well as trans-inclusive policies 
within workplaces” (Bauer et al., 2011, p. 2). Specific challenges include providing 
references and credentials with current name and gender, coworker and employer 
acceptance, obtaining and maintaining employment, and decisions about disclosure of 
trans identity (Bauer et al., p. 2). This is comparable to data from the American National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey which reports that transgender people are twice as 
likely to be unemployed than the general population, “with rates for people of color up 
to four times the national unemployment rate” and that 90% experienced 
discrimination at work or avoided disclosing trans identity in an effort to avoid 
harassment (Grant et al., 2011, p. 3). Further, 47% reported an “adverse job outcome” 
which included “being fired, not hired, or denied a promotion because of being 
transgender or gender non-conforming” (Grant et al., 2011, p. 3).  
As the National Transgender Discrimination Survey shows, race and racism are 
highly relevant to issues of employment. However, none of the Canadian studies 
reviewed thus far specifically account for race and racism in the Canadian labour force. 
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For example, what would analyses of income disparities and other forms of homophobic 
and transphobic discrimination look like if race was included as a variable? As Galabuzi 
(2006) argues, 
From early European attempts to take control of the land, resources, and trade 
from the First Nations, which involved restricting their economic participation, to 
the selective importation of African American, Asian, and Caribbean labour, and 
the more recent casualization of immigrant labour, race has been and continues to 
be a major factor in determining access to economic opportunity in Canada (p. 7).   
Further, neoliberal restructuring has resulted in the intensification of the 
racialization of poverty (Galabuzi, 2006, p. 12). More specifically, systemic racism in the 
labour force is evidenced by the “income gap, the gap in employment levels, 
overrepresentation in low-paid occupations, under-representation in high-income 
occupations and sectors, and disproportionate exposure to precarious work” experienced 
by racialized groups (Galabuzi, 2006, p. 18). Racialized income disparities and 
differential poverty rates have also been documented by other Canadian scholars (Das 
Gupta, 2007; Jackson 2002; Khosla, 2008; Ornstein, 2000).  
Das Gupta (2007) argues that systemic racism in Canadian workplaces is 
evidenced through “word-of-mouth hiring, differential treatment at the screening or pre-
screening stages, biased interview processes, and the use of vague and subjective criteria 
in hiring, performance appraisals, and promotions” (Das Gupta, 2007, p. 181). Likewise, 
another study of racist discrimination in the Canadian workforce shows that racialized 
people experience racism through various means, such as “a chilly or hostile climate, by 
limiting access to information or participation in work-related social interaction, or by 
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introducing bias into decision-making regarding performance appraisal, promotion, 
developmental activities, job assignment, compensation or other areas” (Agocs & Jain, 
2001, p. 5). 
There is also evidence that these phenomena are gendered, in that racialized 
women are relegated to certain low paying sectors such as the “lower ranks of healthcare 
sector, the textile and garment industry, the service sector and clerical ghettos” (Galabuzi, 
2006, p. 8). Likewise, Das Gupta (2007) notes that people of colour generally and women 
of colour especially are segregated in “low-end jobs in processing and manufacturing, 
sales and service, and in industries such as clothing and textiles” (p. 181). Similarly, 
Khosla’s (2008) study regarding racialized women in Toronto found that this group is 
disproportionately in “manual or non-manual low-skill occupations” (p. 224).  
At best, this summary provides a fragmented outline of the bigger picture in terms 
of employment and the workplace for LGBQT people who experience mental distress. 
Clearly, more research is needed in this area, particularly those that consider the 
intersectional impact of racism, homophobia, transphobia, and sanism. However, this 
limited information does suggest that LGBQT people who experience mental distress 
face significant obstacles obtaining and maintaining employment as well as 
marginalization and oppression in the workplace, despite the existence of anti-
discrimination policies. The interviewees discussed several of these barriers, and 
provided accounts of some of their workplace experiences, both positive and negative. It 
is important to note that most of the participants in my study were employed (30 of 37) 
and as such are not representative of those most affected by oppressive forces that 
exclude many people who experience mental distress from the workforce. Many also 
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reported that they had jobs that worked for them or were able to manage workplace 
dynamics without too much trouble. However, when asked to elaborate about their work 
lives, the interviewees’ stories about past and present workplace experiences revealed 
various struggles associated with oppression in the workforce, resonating with what is 
suggested by the scant statistics presented above. 
The overarching theme that emerged from the employment related data centered 
on the processes of disclosure about mental health-related information, sexuality, and 
gender identity at work and the effects and consequences of such disclosures. As 
identities, behaviours, and experiences that sometimes require disclosure as opposed to 
being self-evident, mental distress and some non-normative sexualities and gender 
identities can raise issues specific to ‘invisible’ identities. Perhaps for these reasons, the 
concept of invisibility is taken up in both disability studies and the literature regarding 
‘sexual orientation’ in the workplace. Indeed, analogies are often made between invisible 
disabilities and sexuality, likening them to one another on the basis of their supposed 
invisibility. I will problematize these comparisons, while attempting to make use of 
insights from both bodies of literature. The scholarly work in these areas tends to be 
singularly focused on either disability or ‘sexual orientation’ there are few that consider 
the intersectional character of identity and experience. Additionally, Morrow and Weisser 
(2012) indicate that there is a lack of intersectional and anti-oppressive “analytic work” 
that examines “the varied ways in which sanism systematically oppresses people” (p. 31). 
I analyze the specific experiences created by the intersections of homophobia, 
transphobia, racism, and sanism.  
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Mental distress: An invisible disability? 
Within the last decade, there have been calls for disability studies to become more 
inclusive of ‘invisible,’ ‘nonvisible,’ or ‘hidden’ disabilities. Scholars have pointed to the 
relentless focus on the ways in which identity is constructed through the interpretation of 
visible bodily markers and the gaze that ‘others’ and marginalizes. Samuels (2003) 
argues that this focus on visibility has restricted our very understanding of what disability 
is, marginalizing invisible disabilities and perpetuating visibility as a central organizing 
tenet for understanding identity, experience, and social recognition (p. 248).  
Invisibility is thus becoming an important concept for theorizing identity and 
experience in disability studies, expanding the boundaries of disability discourse. 
Disability studies scholars have begun to consider the difficulties faced by those who 
have disabilities that are not always readily apparent, including struggles with social 
recognition, access to accommodations, decisions regarding disclosure, and problems in 
being considered ‘authentically’ disabled by self and others (Caldwell, 2010; Kooistra, 
2008; Lingsom, 2008; Samuels, 2003; Tierney, 2002; Valeras, 2010).  
Analyses of invisible disabilities are helpful for understanding mental distress. 
The prevailing assumption governing everyday interactions is that visual cues tell the 
‘truth’ about the body and that disability can therefore always be seen (Lingsom, 2008; 
Samuels, 2003; Kooistra, 2008). As Robinson (1994) claims, “the visible is never easily 
or simply a guarantor of truth,” yet the assumption that identity and experience can be 
assessed by looking persists (p. 719). Mental distress is no exception to this; given that it 
is not always easily ‘readable’ off the body, participants in my study were commonly 
assumed not to have experienced mental distress.  
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I therefore position mental distress as ‘invisible,’ though I do not employ this term 
in a strictly dichotomous sense. ‘Visible’ and ‘invisible’ are not mutually exclusive or 
discrete categories; whether or not any identity or experience is visible depends on many 
factors, including context, circumstance, audience, and interpretation. As Valeras (2010) 
argues about the visibility of disability, it can vary according to “symptomology, 
medication, time of day, clothing, or activity requirements.” This insight is applicable to 
mental distress. Many participants indicated that while their mental distress was for the 
most part not readily apparent to others, there were circumstances when it was. For 
example, Viki, a racialized, queer, gender-fluid woman, said the following about the 
visibility of what she called her “chronic mental health problems”: 
I do have scars that become visible often..., so it’s almost like I’m already 
wearing it in a certain way. I don’t want to wear it any more…, like just 
scars from cutting. I have a hard time on subways, holding onto poles, 
because I prefer not to wear sleeves. I tend to roll them up. 
Viki told me that she experienced judgment and stigma based on her scars and felt that 
she ‘wore’ her mental distress whether she wanted to or not. Mental distress was 
‘readable’ from the scars on her body that were sometimes visible, depending on her 
clothing and activity.  
 Mental distress can also be ‘visible’ through behaviour. Mary, a racialized, queer, 
cisgender woman who works for the government, explained that her coworkers question 
her based on her mood: 
There have been times that I’ve shown my mood a little bit and I am questioned 
up and down about it because, you know, there must be something wrong. If I’ve 
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had a quieter day, then I come back, people make comments like, ‘oh, you know, 
glad to see you’re in a better mood today’ kind of thing. So that’s tough. I think 
there’s a spectrum for me that’s really low, neutral, and very high. And I think 
that if I’m just neutral then I get questioned as well because people have seen me 
at that point and they wonder. And people take it personally. 
As Mary indicates, her mental state fluctuates and changes over time and becomes visible 
to her coworkers when her mood is noticeable to others. Derek, a racialized, queer, 
genderqueer person, explained that he would “fail at anything paid labour related” and 
“some volunteer positions as well” because “it seems like if you do not act in a very 
normative manner, they do not want you.” When I asked him for an example, he told me 
the following story about a job interview to be rehired for a seasonal job on campus:  
One of my problems I recognize I have to work on is I’m incredibly open and 
honest to the point where it’s not a good thing. So one of the [interview] questions 
was like, be critical of the practice of frosh [new university students]. I told them 
exactly what I was thinking. And apparently that wasn’t a good thing, because 
their faces were, I assumed that was an expression of dislike or shock or 
something along those lines. Unpleasant, negative.  
Derek explained that his response to this question was a critique of specific examples of 
sexist and homophobic behaviours he had witnessed amongst his former coworkers when 
he was working at this job the year before. He was not rehired for the position and he 
believed that both the content of his answer and his way of communicating it were seen 
as inappropriate and non-normative. This exemplifies that non-normative behaviour can 
result in being deemed ‘crazy’ and that part of acting ‘normal’ in some contexts is to 
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adhere to the status quo. Further, it is not incidental that both Mary and Derek are people 
of colour. It is possible that some behaviour is more likely to be deemed non-normative 
when displayed by racialized people rather than by white people who may sometimes be 
assumed to simply be ‘eccentric.’  
Mental distress is thus not always strictly invisible or visible. However, for most 
participants, mental distress was often not readily apparent through visual signifiers and 
they were therefore often assumed not to have experienced mental distress. For example, 
Mike, a white, omnisexual trans man, described the relationship between mental distress 
and visibility in the following way:  
I think it’s more of an invisible disability because it’s not as obvious as a physical 
disability. If you’re in a wheelchair or something like that, then you automatically 
read someone as disabled. I mean, yeah, I think for the most part I pass as not 
being disabled because it is my brain, you can’t really see that. But I don’t think 
it’s any less of a disability even though it is mostly invisible.  
Mike draws attention to the importance of what can be seen in defining who is disabled in 
daily interaction. For Mike, like most participants, mental distress was often invisible, 
though mental states fluctuate and change over time. As will be discussed more below, 
this often meant that there were decisions to be made about ‘coming out’ or disclosing 
mental distress in the workplace. 
The ‘invisibility’ of sexuality and gender identity  
 The concept of invisibility has also been applied to sexuality. Some scholars 
position queerness as an invisible difference and as analogous to some ‘invisible’ 
disabilities such as chronic illness and ‘mental illness’ (Beatty & Kirby 2006; Swain & 
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Cameron, 1999; Ragins & Singh, 2007). For example, Beatty and Kirby (2006) 
differentiate “sexual orientation” from visible “differences such as gender, race, and age” 
and liken it to invisible differences such as “mental and chronic illness and invisible 
disabilities” (p. 29). Such analogies are often extended to processes of disclosure. Swain 
and Cameron (1999) claim there is a “coming out process” in the workplace for queer 
people and those with invisible disabilities that “has no real equivalent in gender and race 
categorizations” (p. 76). 
 Such comparisons make faulty assumptions about the in/visibility of sexuality, 
gender, and race. For example, gender expression plays a role in making some sexualities 
‘invisible’ and others ‘visible.’ The participants in my study who were perceived as 
gender normative were often ‘invisibly queer.’ For example, Bettie, a white, queer, 
cisgender woman, described being seen as heterosexual in her government workplace in 
Winnipeg based on her feminine gender expression: 
Once I was like, ‘actually I’m a big homo.’ [People at work] were like, ‘oh okay.’ 
It wasn’t a big thing, but there’s an assumption that I’m straight for sure. Because 
I’m femme…, I get to be invisible…. I’m more screwed by heterosexism than 
homophobia.  
Heterosexist assumptions that equate female femininity with heterosexuality meant that 
Bettie was invisible as queer until she informed her coworkers otherwise. Participants 
who were ‘invisibly’ queer did therefore have a ‘choice’ about coming out at work. Being 
openly queer in the workplace was important to many such participants. Jen, a white, 
pansexual, cisgender woman who works in social services in Toronto, was often assumed 
to be heterosexual and found it “stifling” not to be out at work: 
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I was very clear about that at the outset because I don’t necessarily look queer 
[laughs] to everybody. I made the mistake of not being out at my previous job…. 
I didn’t feel comfortable with the people I was working with, being out to them 
because, you know, the odd comment had been made or whatever and I felt really 
stifled by that. So from the get go at this job I decided I wasn’t going to do that 
and whoever had a problem would have a problem and whoever didn’t, you 
know, wouldn’t. 
However, the assumptions embedded in analogies that position sexuality as invisible and 
gender and race as visible are problematic. Queer identities are often ascribed to those 
who are genderqueer or gender non-normative because of widely held assumptions about 
the connections between genderqueerness and queerness. Despite the widespread nature 
of heterosexism, these assumptions about the connections between gender identity and 
sexuality mean that for some queerness or ‘sexual orientation’ is not always invisible.  
For example, Michelle, a white, queer, cisgender woman who was unemployed in 
Toronto, said about her past experiences working in retail, “I feel like I usually don’t 
have to come out, I’m pretty much read as visibly gay most of the time, so people just 
know. So I haven’t really had a coming out type of talk to anyone that I’ve worked with.”  
Smith, a white, queer, trans man who works in the service industry in Toronto, discussed 
being “visibly queer” at work based on appearance: “I’m fairly visibly queer and so I 
think that was something that was pretty upfront when I was interviewed. No one was 
like, ‘oh look, it’s a straight lady’” [both laugh]. Participants like Smith and Michele who 
were read as a gender non-normative were usually assumed to be queer, often making 
coming out unnecessary. As this demonstrates, queer sexuality is not always invisible. 
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This is also something that changes over time given changes in participants’ sexualities 
and gender presentations. For example, Smith had recently begun medical transition at 
the time of the interview; it is possible that his experiences in the workplace changed 
along with his appearance.  
 It is also important to note that the norms that govern whether or not someone 
‘looks queer’ are racialized. As Laila, a racialized, queer, cisgender woman who worked 
in Toronto in an academic workplace, told me, assumptions are often made about her 
sexuality based on her gender expression and her race: 
Everyone assumes that I’m straight. It’s always been the case. Even if I tell 
somebody that I’m queer, they’ll forget the next day. It’s been such a common 
experience for me…. A lot of it probably has to do with the fact that I’m femme 
and I’m brown. If I looked to them like I was queer, so far as dressing a certain 
way, if my hair was cropped, I think that they would make different assumptions 
about me. If I fit into such a particular mold for them, as brown woman with long 
hair, dressing more femmey, they’re going to make that assumption of me being 
straight. 
 As Laila’s experiences indicates, the norms that govern how sexuality is ‘read’ off 
the body are racialized. Further, the assumption that race itself is always visible and never 
requires disclosure is based on an essentialist view of race that does not account for the 
complicated nature of racialization. As Somerville (2000) contends, “one’s racial identity 
is contingent on one’s cultural and historical location” and is not always “self-evident and 
visible” (p. 7). 
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 Likewise, assumptions that gender is always visibly ‘obvious’ does not take in to 
account genderqueer and trans people. Genderqueer people are often perceived as various 
genders, depending on the context. Derek, a racialized, queer, genderqueer student in 
Toronto, described this as follows: 
Gender wise, it’s complicated. Genderqueer is the closest I’ll get. I typically will 
identify not male, not female. Ever since I was a very small child, I was a gender 
ambiguous child. I would confuse people on the streets. ‘Is that a boy or a girl?’ 
And people constantly asking me this…. I have confused people…. One day I’ll 
pass as a butch dyke, the next day I’ll pass as a straight woman, the next day I’ll 
pass as a trans woman, the next day I’ll be a trans man, a gay boy, a straight guy. 
I’ve passed off as everything. 
Derek, like other genderqueer participants, was not always immediately visible as male or 
female, and his gender presentation was not static and changed over time.  
 Trans participants who were not genderqueer and who were consistently assumed 
to be cisgender men or women were invisible as trans and sometimes also as queer. 
Devon, a white, queer, trans man in Toronto who worked in an academic setting, 
discussed his experiences of invisibility as a trans, queer person: 
A lot of my identity has become invisible over time and so I kind of feel like I’m 
always trading off on one thing or another, no matter what I’m doing. For 
example when I go down to gay pride, a lot of people assume I’m a gay man and 
so I either have to accept that and that’s where my queerness is gonna be read. Or 
if I’m with my partner then what am I, who am I? …I feel like maybe I could 
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never really be seen for all the things that I am anymore. And that’s just a part of 
being trans.  
 As Derek and Devon’s stories demonstrate, gender identity and gender 
presentation change over time and are sometimes invisible. This is also supported by the 
Trans PULSE data, which shows that some trans people are “visibly identifiable” while 
others are not (Bauer et al., 2011, p. 1). This means that some trans participants faced 
decisions about coming out as trans at work. The Trans PULSE study argues that trans 
people who are assumed to be cisgender “are able to choose when and to whom they 
disclose information about their identity” while those who are visibly trans “do not have 
this choice…leaving them vulnerable to harassment and discrimination in the workplace” 
(Bauer et al., 2011, p. 1). While it is true that some invisibly trans people can ‘choose’ 
whether they disclose, this choice is sometimes constrained. As the Trans PULSE data 
shows, many trans people do not have identification, credentials, and references that 
reflect their current name and gender, which makes nondisclosure very difficult. Those 
who do may still have their ‘choice’ to disclose limited by other factors. For example, 
Caleb, a white, bisexual, trans man, described a retail job interview in Toronto where he 
was assumed to be cisgender but felt compelled to disclose that he is trans because it was 
difficult to answer the interview questions honestly without doing so. He was hired for 
this job, and on his first day at work he was shocked to discover that his employers had 
disclosed his gender identity to all of his coworkers. Caleb was angered by this and 
wondered how the information had been disclosed and what conversations had taken 
place without his knowledge. As he said: 
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I would like to know how this conversation came about…. Like, ‘so, you know, 
this new guy, he sounds really cool. He’s trans’ [both laugh]. If you really think 
about that, it’s kind of like informing everyone that I have a vagina or something. 
It just doesn’t, you know, it’s not something that comes up in conversation. ‘This 
is our new employee. He has a vagina’ [both laugh]. 
Caleb’s story demonstrates that trans people’s ‘choice’ to disclose is affected by more 
than their in/visibility and that trans people can be vulnerable to transphobia regardless of 
whether or not they are initially assumed to be cisgender. 
As the interviewees stories demonstrate, scholars who position queer sexuality as 
invisible and gender identity as visible do not take in to account trans people and the 
interrelationship between sexuality and gender expression. Sexuality and gender identity 
are visible according to context, audience, and the interaction between sexuality, gender 
identity, and race. However, as I have suggested, the ‘invisibility’ of sexuality and gender 
identity for many participants in some contexts meant that there was a ‘coming out’ 
process regarding sexuality and/or gender identity for those assumed to be heterosexual 
and/or cisgender. Even those who had disclosed some information or who had 
assumptions made about their identities faced ongoing decisions about disclosure. The 
factors that influence these decisions will be discussed further below. 
It is also important to note that disclosure or coming out is never “a static and 
singular event” (Samuels, 2003, p. 237). This can be heightened for those whose 
appearance doesn’t ‘remind’ those around them of their identities. However, even those 
who have come out or who have assumptions made about them have to make ongoing 
decisions about disclosure. Ragins, Singh & Cornwell (2007) argue that “those who fully 
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disclose at work still need to disclose to new coworkers, managers, clients or vendors and 
thus these employees continually face the risk of a negative reaction to disclosure” (p. 
1115). As A.P, a racialized, queer, cisgender person, shared about a retail workplace in 
Toronto:  
At my first job…where a lot of people knew me, then they sort of just like forgot, 
I guess. People kept thinking of me as straight. I sort of had to remind them and I 
don’t really want to do that because it comes off as really annoying. 
As this indicates, disclosure can therefore be seen as an ongoing process that requires a 
series of decisions about when, where, and how much to disclose. Further, sexualities and 
gender presentations change over time and as such may require ongoing disclosures. 
‘It’s personal’: Disclosing ‘private’ information in the workplace  
 Many participants found that their workplaces were characterized by self and 
others as ‘public space’ where ‘personal’ information has no place. This imperative to 
keep certain experiences and information private had an impact on what they felt was 
appropriate to disclose at work. Many participants believed that experiences of mental 
distress were considered ‘private’ and therefore an inappropriate topic in the workplace. 
As Smith, quoted above, said about mental health related information in his Toronto 
workplace in the service industry: “I think there’s an attitude of that’s not something that 
you talk about at work. Or that would be something you would talk about with your 
friends or in therapy and it’s not something that you bring to work.” Similarly, Andrea, a 
white, queer, cisgender woman, characterized her retail workplace in Winnipeg as a 
space that is seen as free of “other people’s problems”: 
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I don’t think that people really want to hear about other people’s problems 
[laughs] a lot of the time in the workplace. They’re just like, ‘you mind your own 
business and I’ll mind my business and I don’t want to hear about any of your 
crap.’ 
Jaime, a racialized, lesbian, trans person, characterized mental health related information 
as “really personal” and therefore something she would not discuss at her job in manual 
labour in Winnipeg. Allison, a Torontonian who identifies as white, queer, and 
genderqueer, told me about disclosing mental distress at her job in media: “it’s not 
something I would just, you know, out of the blue bring up.” Likewise, Barry, a white, 
gay, cisgender man in Winnipeg, said about his job in a government workplace, “You 
know, it wouldn’t be appropriate to just all of a sudden like yell out, ‘I have depression.’”  
 This was also the case regarding information pertaining to sexuality and gender 
identity. As Brock, quoted above, said about a retail workplace in Winnipeg: 
One of my workplaces was this small…company. I just didn’t feel comfortable 
discussing my sexuality with the owner. Just one of those jobs where they were 
good to me, but politically we did not mesh. So those things you can’t separate as 
much as people say you can. There is no such thing as a work life and a personal 
life; they are one and the same thing. The identity doesn’t change; it’s just your 
behaviours do.  
Brock’s comments draw attention to the distinction that is often made between 
private and public space and the accompanying expectations about what is ‘personal’ and 
should be kept private. Another participant, Donovan, a white, queer, gay, cisgender man, 
said about his academic workplace in Toronto, “I’m not going to write on blackboard that 
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I’m gay [both laugh]. You know what I mean?” Similarly, Laila replied “Oh hell no” 
when I asked her if she is out at her academic workplace in Toronto, because she doesn’t 
“talk to people about my personal life.” Jaime, quoted above, told me that there is “no 
space” for discussions of sexuality at work in her manual labour job in Manitoba: 
On the farm it was like, ugh. I don’t need to talk about my sexual orientation 
around here at all. And that was just because there’s just not any room for this, 
even though there’s this great amount of space, prairie everywhere [both laugh] 
I’m like, ‘no.’  
The extent to which information about sexuality and gender identity are considered 
‘personal’ should not be underestimated. Devon, quoted above, shared the following 
story about transitioning on the job in manual labour: 
I transitioned on the job…. It was really weird to do that because my boss never 
knew and I just started to slowly but surely changing significantly [both laugh]…. 
There’s a certain point at which all the customers thought I was ‘he’ and called 
me ‘he’ and my boss, I think it was a process of realization for him. At first he 
thought people were hurting my feelings, and then he realized that it was 
intentional. So it was this funny thing, like how you could think somebody 
doesn’t know they look like a man is bizarre [both laugh]. I’ve dressed myself 
since I was five, I know what I’m going for.… And so I think he came to realize 
that maybe that was okay with me and we didn’t talk about our personal lives or 
anything too much. 
Despite the fact that Devon’s transition was visible to his employer, this was still seen as 
part of his personal life and was not discussed in the workplace. 
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 Even participants who were ‘out’ at work still felt an imperative to censor what 
they said in the workplace. As Bowleg, Brooks, and Ritz (2008) argue, workers who are 
out still have to “make strategic decisions about when and how to disclose their sexual 
orientation to minimize negative reactions” (pp. 77-78). This was true for some 
participants. For example, Barb, a white, lesbian, cisgender woman, was “uncomfortable” 
at her manual labour job in Winnipeg because she could see that “there was a real sense 
of discomfort” when she mentioned weekend plans with her partner. This caused her to 
refrain from discussing many parts of her life with some coworkers. As she said: 
But the day to day, you know, going for lunch with somebody or taking a break 
and chatting about stuff…. I’m a person who’s pretty comfortable sharing things 
and so to sit there and not be able to talk freely about what I did last night or what 
I’m going to or whatever makes me very uncomfortable. 
This issue was exacerbated for Barb as a lesbian woman working in a male-dominated 
profession. She explained that her boss was very uncomfortable with “a strong female” 
who wore boots and is “a little rough around the edges.” This made it even more difficult 
for Barb to discuss anything pertaining to being a lesbian. Another participant, Smith, 
quoted above, told me that he is careful about what information he shares at his job in the 
service industry in Toronto: 
I think that sometimes I tend to censor the things that go on in my life, even in 
just the way of people being like, ‘what did you do last weekend?’ I’ll think about 
the things that I’ll talk about. I think that I kind of like pre-empt that by holding 
back on certain things. 
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As this demonstrates, when queer sexuality isn’t actively kept invisible as it is expected 
to be, it becomes hyper-visible; simply mentioning mundane details about a partner or 
weekend plans is seen as inappropriate, yet the pervasiveness of heterosexuality in the 
workplace goes unnoticed. 
 One popular solution to counter the imperative to keep such information private is 
to ‘come out’ in the interest of increasing visibility and acceptance for marginalized 
groups. For example, Beatty and Kirby (2006) propose that visibility holds “the key to 
social and cultural acceptance” and that gays and lesbians who come out can change the 
world “one encounter at a time” (p. 40). While recognizing that there are “short term 
difficulties” that are “risky,” they support the idea behind National Coming Out Day, an 
international day when LGBTQ people are encouraged to ‘come out of the closet’ and 
disclose their sexualities and gender identities (Beatty & Kirby, 2006, p.40). This 
perspective replicates the aforementioned assumption that LGBTQ people are always 
invisible and it minimizes the structural barriers and violence that prevent people from 
disclosing their sexualities and gender identities. It also puts the onus of social change 
and increasing visibility on LGBTQ people. While the ‘one encounter at a time’ to 
changing oppressive attitudes can be powerful, there are larger problems that structure 
these encounters. These include the widely-held assumption that everyone is a member of 
the dominant group unless there are immediately visible indications otherwise, the 
imperative to come out rather than a responsibility not to assume that everybody is 
heterosexual and cisgender, and the negative consequences of disclosure. 
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‘It’s irrelevant’: Sexuality, gender identity, race, and mental distress as ‘neutral’ 
‘Personal’ information about sexuality, gender identity, race, and mental distress 
is also often portrayed as a neutral social difference that is irrelevant to supposedly 
objective evaluations of job performance and assumptions about employee’s professional 
capabilities. However, such information is in fact tightly tied to perceptions of capability. 
Disclosing LGBQT identities and relationships in a homophobic and transphobic 
workplace can be very unsafe and have negative consequences. As Ragins, Singh, and 
Cornwell (2007) argue, “concealment may be a necessary and adaptive strategy for LGB 
workers in nonsupportive or hostile work environments” (p. 1108). For example, Barry, 
quoted above, shared the following experience about working in a homophobic 
environment in the service industry in Winnipeg: 
At my old job they weren’t going to hire this individual because he was gay. That 
made me that much less comfortable with myself at work. The guy handed in his 
resume and when he left one of [my coworkers] walks over and says, ‘Don’t hire 
him, he’s fucking gay. It’s disgusting.’ And then the manager just kind of nodded 
and tucked it under the till and kept working. At that point there were a couple 
people who knew [I am gay], so they were like ‘are you okay?’ and I’m like, ‘no. 
I want to go home.’  
It is difficult to imagine that Barry could have disclosed that he is gay to everyone in this 
workplace or that it would have been safe for him to do so. Barry’s story also indicates 
the limitations of anti-discrimination protection, which cannot fully address situations 
like this. Likewise, Aaron, a racialized, gay, cisgender man in Toronto, told me the 
following story about a homophobic manager in a retail job who assumed he was straight: 
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The manager of the first store that I worked at used to be a security guard [at a 
place where] the bathrooms were a big hook-up spot for gay men. So my manager 
would describe how fun it was to go in and scare the fags and how he missed that 
job and how it’s a lot harder now because he has to be more responsible. 
Jen, quoted above, characterized her coworkers in social services in Toronto as “close 
minded” because “they would make off-hand closed minded comments.” This caused her 
to think, “Well if you’re closed minded about that, then I probably should try my best to 
appear as normal as possible’. I would never go out of my way to appear different or 
anything like that when I was there.” 
 Indeed, the ramifications for disclosing can be many. Participants who did 
disclose or who were assumed to be LGBTQ often faced offensive comments, hostility, 
or ostracism at work. Michelle, quoted above, told me that once her coworkers in a 
Toronto retail workplace realized she is gay, “They don’t really know what to say or they 
don’t use appropriate terms. It’s not that they’re trying to be offensive, but it sometimes 
comes out that way.” She went on to say that her coworkers “just didn’t know how to 
relate.” Similarly, Andrea, quoted above, told me her coworkers at a retail job in 
Winnipeg were “both familiar and yet trying to be unfamiliar with you even if you 
worked in the same department” and that they “weren’t as friendly to me as they would 
have been if they wouldn’t have known that I was queer.” Crabitha, a Métis, lesbian, 
cisgender woman who worked in a corporate workplace in Winnipeg, discussed being 
taken by surprise by homophobic attitudes [at work] once she had disclosed her sexuality: 
I had a boss that I admired very much. He was my mentor and I loved working 
with him and thought really highly of him. One day I mentioned to him that I 
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would invite him to my wedding if I ever got married and he said, ‘I wouldn’t go.’ 
So I thought that was shocking and that hurt quite a bit. But he was honest.  
Intersectional oppression also had an impact on whether participants obtained 
work, were promoted, and retained jobs. As Ragins, Singh, and Cornwell (2007) argue, 
there are many negative consequences for queer employees. As they state, “Employees 
who disclosed more reported lower continuance organizational commitment; earned less 
compensation; and reported less pay satisfaction, more turnover intentions, and fewer 
opportunities for promotion than those who concealed their sexual identity” (p.1108). 
Barry, quoted above, discussed differential treatment in promotion decisions in his 
government workplace in Winnipeg: “There’s two of us there, both of us are fit and 
qualified, I’ve been with the company longer, and they pick the other individual and he’s 
a heterosexual male. I’m gay, it’s very known, and then they go with that person.”  
Participants also reported difficulty obtaining work. Sonja, a Métis, bi-queer, 
cisgender woman, described difficulties getting bartending work in Winnipeg due to 
gendered and racialized beauty standards: 
I have experienced difficulty getting jobs in bars as a bartender based on my 
gender presentation especially. I think a lot of bars want the boobilicious long-
haired girl who wears make-up. I’m definitely not presenting my gender that way. 
I’m definitely female but I’m not female enough, maybe, or feminine [laughs]. So 
in that industry I definitely have a concern with getting work. And I eventually 
just wrote it off. I really like bartending, I feel like it’s something I could do for 
many, many years. And just no outlet for it. Because apparently people won’t 
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come to the bar if there’s no hot blonde behind the counter. I thought it was 
alcohol that got people into the bars, you know [both laugh]. 
Similarly, Andrea said she had difficult getting retail jobs in Winnipeg based on attitudes 
regarding her gender presentation. As she said, “People take one look at my short hair 
and hairy legs and they’re like, ‘yeah I don’t think you’d be suitable for this work 
environment.’” 
This was also a concern for trans participants. Brayden, a racialized, gay, trans 
man, quit his job in manual labour in Winnipeg because of transphobic discrimination: 
As soon as they found out I was transgender, they didn’t like it…. There was two 
people that were fine with it, but the rest, everybody was just like, ‘Don’t touch 
me you’ve got a disease’ type thing…. That’s why I quit, because of that. 
Brayden’s coworkers and employers made his workplace environment so hostile that he 
felt like he needed to quit his job. Likewise, Josh, an Indigenous, heterosexual, trans man, 
was fired from his manual labour job in Winnipeg for being gendered as male by the 
customers: 
My boss found out and a few of the other people because a lot of the [customers], 
I got along with them and they’d joke around with me, and they all thought I was 
a guy. The boss found something wrong with it. He was a bible thumper and I 
went into work one day and he just told me, ‘You’re fired.’ ‘For what?’ They 
claimed things went missing. 
Brayden and Josh highlighted the effects of transphobia in these interactions, but 
it is not incidental that they are both racialized and working in manual labour, 
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presumably in non-unionized workplaces.
20
 As outlined above, racialized people face 
systemic racism and discrimination in the Canadian labour market and often work in 
precarious conditions 
 Indeed, many of the racialized participants discussed experiences of racism at 
work in many types of jobs. Laila, quoted above, described how racism is prevalent in her 
unionized academic workplace in Toronto, including white professors who don’t 
recognize racialized graduate students, despite working closely with them in various 
contexts, classes that “don’t talk about race or make it like a special topic of the week,” 
fellow graduate students who are “super racist and exclusionary,” an admissions process 
that lets in “mostly white students,” student committees dominated by white students 
“who then take positions in other committees…and maintain power in that way,” and a 
lack of support for racialized teaching assistants who have students in their classrooms 
who are “racist in really hurtful and blatant ways.” For Laila, this meant that she felt 
isolated at work: 
I don’t hang around much, that’s one of the things. A lot of people will go and 
hang out in the lounge space or go to the committee meetings or whatever, and I 
don’t do that. I just don’t feel like I want to be in that space. I don’t feel 
comfortable in that space. I feel in some ways that my presence is being 
challenged…. I feel sometimes a bit isolated in the program for those reasons. 
Mary, a racialized, queer, cisgender woman, described a job in Toronto where she felt 
“categorized” as a black woman and expected to do extra duties not included in her 
government job description: 
                                                 
20
 I did not ask participants if their workplaces are unionized. However, based on Brayden and Josh’s 
descriptions of their workplace conditions, I believe they were not unionized. 
  247   
So, and race, I wouldn’t say like discriminated against but definitely sort of 
categorized, because my position can be relatively administrative so there are 
some older white males that see this black woman as someone who has to do all 
these things and there’s a lot of things that aren’t really my job because it’s not 
technically administrative. And I’ve had someone say to me, he asked me if I 
could do something and I actually didn’t know how to do it and he said, ‘Isn’t that 
your job’ and so [both laugh] I thought, ‘Well, not really. I mean I would help you 
if I could [both laugh]. I just don’t know how to do this.’ 
Aaron, quoted above, described blatant discrimination based on race in his retail job in 
Toronto, where his manager “joked around that they only gave me the job because I was 
black and there were too many people working at that store who were white or not 
racialized enough.” Similarly, Travis, a Métis, queer, cisgender man, was told by a 
manager in social services that “the only reason” he was hired was his race. He also 
described more insidious problems in another workplace where he was one of few 
Aboriginal service providers in an agency that mainly served Aboriginal clients: 
I would almost call this racism. It’s just weird because all the clients are 
Aboriginal, or the majority of them, but very few practitioners or service 
providers are. Some of those practitioners and some of those folks don’t believe in 
the fact that Aboriginal folks need to be providing services for Aboriginal people 
or services from a cultural perspective. 
The prevalence of racism also means that racialized people who experience mental 
distress are facing increased scrutiny and discriminatory evaluation of their job 
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performance. As Marcus, a racialized, queer, trans man in Toronto, told me about work in 
the social services, 
If I am not doing my work it’s much more noticeable than my white counterparts 
who aren’t doing work and who are walking around and talking – and that’s fine – 
and if I do the same thing it’s, ‘What are you doing, you suck.’ But if I’m next to 
the [white] person who’s not doing the work, then it becomes apparent that that 
person is not doing work, but it’s not apparent unless that contrast is there. That 
made me realize, it looks like the person of colour drops the ball – and it takes 
that much to bring it back up – whereas I feel like there’s a lot more forgiveness 
with [white] folks.  
Marcus describes the double standard for racialized people in the workplace, who are 
evaluated more strictly than white people. One of the most common fears amongst 
participants was that the disclosure of mental distress would mean being seen as 
incompetent in the workplace. For racialized participants facing the racist double 
standard described by Marcus, there was an increased risk associated with disclosing 
information about mental health or mental distress. This resonates with a study by 
Ragins, Cornwell, and Miller (2003), who find that “gay people of color” are less likely 
to disclose “sexual orientation” at work than white gay people. They surmise that 
disclosing may be riskier for queer racialized people, because as a “numerical minority” 
they are already “under a microscope at work because of their race” and coming out may 
“‘add fuel to the discriminatory fire’” (Ragins, Singh, and Miller, 2003, p. 67). Though 
these authors are referring to the disclosure of sexuality, it is reasonable to speculate that 
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queer racialized people may be even more reluctant to disclose mental health related 
information as well.  
Participant narratives revealed that mental health related information was also not 
a ‘neutral’ or irrelevant factor in the workforce. Participants carefully considered whether 
or not to disclose mental health information. For some, this process began with job 
searching. Whether or not to disclose mental distress to potential employers was a high 
stakes decision that had an impact on obtaining work. David, a white, Jewish, gay, 
cisgender man who worked for the government in Winnipeg, told me that he feels 
strongly about disclosing mental health information when job searching because he is not 
able to work without access to disability accommodations: 
It scares the shit out of me, if I have to look for another job, oh my God. What am 
I gonna do? When do you disclose? This is a whole ball game for me now. I don’t 
know what I’ll do. But I sure as hell know that I’ll say I have a disability and here 
are my limitations. That I will always say. And if you can’t help me out with that, 
I can’t help you out, obviously.  
David feared that disclosing mental health information would compromise his ability to 
obtain work, but knew that working in an inaccessible environment would compromise 
his health. Angela, a white, gay, cisgender woman who worked in advertising, also 
described struggles with disclosure while job searching in Winnipeg, explaining that her 
mental health-related absence from work created a gap on her resume that was difficult to 
explain: 
The first time I got sick it absolutely destroyed my life in a lot of ways. I was at 
the peak of my career and then a lot of things happened and then I could not get 
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back to work for another three years. And then you have to deal with a whole gap 
on your resume. I was going through a lot of interviews and the biggest thing was, 
‘What is that gap?’ I’m not one to lie and sugar coat things, but I was just like, 
‘Oh I had this health issue.’ Luckily [my current workplace] didn’t ask me, ‘Why 
haven’t you been working? What have you been doing with this time off?’ But it 
does affect me maintaining employment because what if I get sick again?  
Similarly, Barb, quoted above, was unsure how to explain her absence from the 
workforce in Winnipeg and worried that her experiences of mental distress had already 
been disclosed by others, affecting her ability to obtain work: 
Now that I’m feeling a little bit better, the pressure’s on to figure out what I’m 
going to do with my life now…. What do I tell people if I decide to go someplace 
else? How do I, without lying, cover up the last two and a half years? …It’s 
Winnipeg, you don’t know who knows who…. That’s gonna be a really difficult 
thing to deal with. I guess I’m not prepared to handle it just yet.  
Those who experience mental distress are also at risk of being perceived as 
incapable of adequate job performance. Indeed, as Lapsley, Waimarie, & Black (2002) 
argue, the association of mental distress with “unreason, excess, incapacity and 
unreliability are historically entrenched attitudes in Western societies” (p. 4). This had an 
impact on whether or not participants felt that they could disclose their experiences of 
mental distress at work. Michelle, quoted above, said she avoids talking about her mental 
health in Toronto retail workplaces because she is “afraid of how that would affect your 
coworkers’ or your boss’s perception of you and your ability. That’s just scary how 
someone could then think of you as less of an employee. So I’ve never brought that up 
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with anyone.” Esther, a white, queer, cisgender woman in Winnipeg, told me she is 
“picky about which workplaces” she discusses her anxiety in, because she fears “being 
seen as incapable, or unreliable, and unpredictable.” Viki, a Torontonian quoted above, 
was also “genuinely concerned” that she would be seen as “not a full worker” and a less 
“desirable employee” if she were to be “honest” about her mental health in her social 
service job. As Caleb, a Torontonian quoted above, also told me, his capabilities at school 
were questioned by his graduate supervisor: 
It was done in a really kind of back-handed way. Basically I was questioned by a 
professor and supervisor about whether I was really truly committed to doing this 
kind of work.... I said, ‘I don’t think that me [working] at this pace means that I’m 
not dedicated to the work that I’m doing. I’m making decisions in my life that are 
healthy for me and I will continue to do this at the pace that I need to do it at’… 
Whether professors have said this or not, that’s been my fear: that they truly feel 
that I clearly can’t handle this, or that because of mental illness it renders me not 
as good as other students in the graduate program.  
As Caleb’s comments also suggest, employees are often evaluated using able-
bodied standards. The assumption and expectation that everybody is able-bodied is also 
tightly tied to evaluations of job performance. Participants were often measured against 
able-bodied standards and the invisible nature of much of the distress they experienced 
often meant they were facing suspicion and disbelief, something characteristic of the 
experiences of those with invisible disabilities (Lingsom, 2008). A.P. a Torontonian 
quoted above, described this as follows: 
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People don’t really get the whole concept of disability in general. It’s like, if 
someone is young and appears healthy, then they don’t understand why someone 
might need a lot of appointments or might not be able to do particular things that 
they think they should be able to do.  
Sonja, quoted above, described the difficulties of being measured against able-bodied 
standards and the ways in which her symptoms of anxiety were easily dismissed in her 
government workplace in Winnipeg: 
Sometimes I’ll say, ‘Okay, I’ve had chest pains for four hours now because of the 
level of stress. I’m going to have to take a break now.’ And I’m afraid people will 
roll their eyes or be disappointed and talk about how incapable I am of dealing, 
you know. I do worry about having to express my needs if they’re not in line with 
someone who’s not anxious.  
Like Sonja, many participants feared that being measured against able-bodied standards 
would result in negative repercussions and pushed themselves to continue working, often 
increasing their distress. This common concern led many participants to avoid disclosing 
mental health information unless absolutely necessary. 
Sanism, authenticity and access to accommodations 
The need to access workplace accommodations often required participants to 
disclose mental health information. As suggested by some of the stories above, however, 
the invisible character of mental distress made it difficult for the participants to be 
perceived as ‘authentically’ or ‘truly’ disabled and therefore entitled to accommodations. 
People with invisible disabilities are often thought to be making fraudulent claims to a 
disabled identity and are seen as less legitimate candidates for disability accommodations 
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(Lingsom, 2008; Valeras, 2010). Indeed, Manning and White (1995) found that “eighty-
two percent of employers would usually believe someone being off sick for a physical 
illness, compared to only 63% of employers believing someone was genuinely ill with a 
psychological illness” (p. 542).  
Struggles with being perceived as ‘authentically’ disabled are particularly relevant 
to mental distress as an invisible identity and experience because of the prevalence of 
sanist ideologies that position mental distress as a form of personal weakness that can be 
easily overcome if one would simply ‘buckle down and pull up one’s socks.’ Many 
participants had encountered this kind of attitude, which made it difficult to be seen as 
‘authentically’ disabled and in need of accommodations. Barry, quoted above, described 
the difficulties of having depression taken seriously in the workplace. He told me that if 
he were to tell his employers at his government job in Winnipeg, “I’m really depressed, I 
really need to talk to someone,” he would be told to “suck it up and get back to work.” 
Similarly, Betty, a white, cisgender, queer woman, found that having a panic attack 
would not be seen as a legitimate reason to miss work at her government job in 
Winnipeg: 
At my most recent job, I would never have called in crazy to work. Ever. I’m not 
sure if that would be seen as a legitimate reason to take a day off work, even 
though it’s way more legitimate than that I have a cold, because I’m sick. If you 
have an hour long panic attack where your heart’s beating way faster than it 
should be beating, you need to take a break after that.  
As middle-class government employees, Barry and Bettie were able to navigate this 
problem by using sick days without disclosing their experiences of mental distress.  
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Low-income participants experienced more serious ramifications. Lisa, a white, 
Portuguese, French-Canadian, lesbian, queer person, expressed frustration about not 
being able to access necessary accommodations in retail jobs in Winnipeg because mental 
health was not seen as an adequate reason. This resulted in Lisa losing several jobs 
because she was refused time off to attend mental health related appointments. She also 
described how mental and physical disabilities are treated differently at one of the retail 
positions she had to quit: 
If I have an appointment because I have dialysis every week, work will actually 
let me go. If I have an appointment for therapy, which is my well-being, which 
means that I could go to work every day, which is just as important as dialysis, 
work will not let me go. It is not okay to miss work for a therapy appointment but 
it is okay to miss work for dialysis.  
Lisa described a common concern amongst participants: mental health concerns are 
perceived as ‘no big deal’ and participants were seen as simply slacking off and making 
unnecessary or fraudulent requests for accommodations. Similarly, Raven, a Métis, trans, 
genderqueer person, asked a doctor in Winnipeg to help him receive governmental 
disability benefits based on his experiences of severe anxiety and panic attacks: 
I told him I had generalized anxiety and he was like, ‘oh I have anxiety, and I 
work.’ He was just a complete asshole, it was awful. Amongst other things he’s 
like, ‘it’s not like you’re flying a plane or something.’ I left out of there in tears. I 
was just like, ‘oh my god. Like what the fuck am I going to do, I have no fucking 
money and nobody’s going to help me and this is fucked up.’ 
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Further, Raven explained that as an Indigenous, poor, genderqueer, young person, he 
often has trouble with doctors minimizing his experiences and is sometimes perceived to 
be ‘drug-seeking.’ The underlying ideology that mental distress does not constitute 
legitimate grounds for accommodation governed all of the interactions described above, 
but the impact was softened for those who worked in more class-privileged environments 
and those who experience white privilege. 
Unfortunately, when mental distress is ‘taken seriously,’ it is often associated 
with violence and lack of control. Sanist ideologies position those who experience mental 
distress as dangerous, threatening, volatile, and even murderous (Beresford 2002; 
Holland, 2012; Steadman et al.; Tierney, 2002). Participants were concerned that these 
kinds of commonly held oppressive beliefs about ‘mental illness’ would affect their work 
lives if they were to disclose. Barry told me that he downplays or “glosses over” 
discussions of depression in the workplace because,  
When you say you’re depressed, people kinda get this idea that you were a secret 
cutter or you were like trying to drown your baby in a bathtub. [They] think of 
like the worst case scenarios and not the shades of grey that are in the middle.  
Barry feared that prevalent stereotypes about ‘mentally ill’ people as violent and 
murderous would govern his coworkers’ and employer’s perception of him. Notably, in 
Barry’s example, it is when one’s mental state becomes visible on the body through 
cutting that it is taken ‘seriously.’ Another participant, Jen, quoted above, told me she 
hesitates to disclose experiences of mental distress in her social services workplace in 
Toronto for the following reasons: 
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There’s a perception that if you have mental health, you’re deranged and you’re 
gonna fly off the handle, and you’re one step away from, you know, going nuts. 
Or that you have a defect in some way. And I think that with something like 
social anxiety or depression, it’s seen as a character flaw instead of a mental 
health issue. And that’s bad, too, because people say, ‘Well why don’t you just 
get over it,’ and that’s not helpful either. 
Similarly, A.P., quoted above, explained the ways in which she is seen as threatening, 
volatile, and incapable of doing an adequate job in retail positions in Toronto:  
Depending on how well I’m hiding it or whatever at that particular workplace, 
people either see me as a threat, like someone who could suddenly flip out on 
them for no apparent reasons, or someone who has to be sort of sheltered, like not 
be allowed to take on too much.  
Though none of the racialized participants specifically highlighted the effects of racism in 
terms of being perceived as threatening, it is important to note that racism plays a role in 
this dynamic. As Fernando (2010) argues, ideas about who poses a threat are racialized, 
with black men in particular being positioned as violent or threatening (p. 69). It could 
therefore be said that sanism interacts with racism in particular ways to position some 
people of colour who experience mental distress as particularly threatening. 
As the participants’ narratives show, many experienced a double bind; being 
perceived as ‘not crazy enough’ and complaining about nothing or being perceived as 
‘too crazy’ and therefore potentially violent and out of control. Either way, participants 
were perceived as incapable of adequate job performance. This double bind acted as a 
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powerful barrier to disclosure, resulting in difficulties with gaining access to necessary 
workplace accommodations. 
 This often meant that the participants suffered negative consequences in terms of 
their health and financial well-being. This was especially true for those who worked in 
lower income jobs with no benefits or paid sick days. Smith, quoted above, who worked 
in the service industry in Toronto, described this as follows: 
There have definitely been times in my life where I could have benefitted from 
being able to take time off. That’s not really a reality, both within the [service] 
industry and also in terms of finances. You don’t often have any kind of benefits 
package or there’s no such thing as sick days. If you take a day off, then you don’t 
get paid. 
Likewise, Rob, a white, French-Canadian, queer, gay, cisgender man who worked in 
retail in Winnipeg, described making difficult decisions about whether to sacrifice his 
health or his finances, saying that “there comes a balance of taking care of myself but 
also being able to provide for myself financially. There are times when I may have made 
a choice that wasn’t in the best interest of my mental health but rather in the best interest 
of my financial well-being.” 
 Other participants described quitting their jobs rather than disclosing mental 
health information. As Michelle, quoted above, told me about her retail jobs: 
I’ve had to quit jobs before because of times in my life where I haven’t been able 
to work. I would just flat out quit instead of saying I need time off for whatever. I 
guess out of fear or just not feeling comfortable enough to bring that up.  
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Likewise, A.P. described troubles maintaining work in retail, stating that she was only 
“able to keep a job for at most a year before it all goes to hell and I have to quit for my 
own health.” These narratives indicate that there are serious consequences to not being 
able to access accommodations, including negative effects on health and economic 
hardship, particularly for those who held jobs with no benefits and paid sick days. 
Making the workplace more accessible 
 Some participants had jobs that worked well for them and recounted positive 
experiences in the workplace. Stacey, a white, queer, person who works in the service 
industry in Winnipeg, discussed the importance of flexibility so she can follow the 
natural “swing” of her productivity. She described being able to be absent from work for 
two weeks when she’s “at ten percent” and then “going hard for two” weeks when she 
feels like she’s “at three hundred percent.”  
When I start to be creative again and feel that swing going up I can just jump right 
into the up and go, and push it and use it to my advantage. Then when I start to 
come down, realizing that I need some time off. And it’s okay because there’s that 
understanding and there’s a dialogue with where I work. And it’s like 
everything’s getting done and so it doesn’t really matter.  
The flexibility of Stacey’s job meant that she could work in accordance with how she was 
feeling while still accomplishing all of her work duties. Esther, quoted above, also 
described positive workplaces experiences at an organization in Winnipeg that provided 
small amounts of money to employees for self-care, to be spent as they wished. This 
workplace also made “room…for discussing where you were at with the supervisors” and 
treated all employees the same “regardless of how many hours per week they worked.”  
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 Travis, quoted above, described a positive work environment in the social 
services in Winnipeg where managers would not tolerate homophobic commentary and 
placed the responsibility of addressing it on all employees:  
There were actually some really good staff that would put an end to it 
[homophobic jokes]. When I first started…, the manager…pulled all the staff 
together one day and said, ‘I’ve been hearing…really derogatory comments, a lot 
of homophobia.’ She’s like, ‘You guys need to address that when it happens.’ 
…She was essentially like, ‘You guys better be on top of this, I’m not letting it 
happen.’  
The explicit sanction against homophobia made Travis feel more supported in the 
workplace. Raven, a Winnipegger quoted above, also characterized his work environment 
in social services as “supportive” and “comfortable,” largely due to the presence of 
coworkers and managers who were racialized, queer, and trans and who had personal 
experience of “mental health issues” and addictions. 
I’m like, ‘Okay, this is awesome, I feel comfortable here.’ And I think there’s 
maybe only two white people…, which is also really good…. Yeah, it’s definitely 
supportive for that. And you know, everybody’s queer and there’s several trans 
folks and we all have mental health issues and we all have addictions or have had 
addiction issues, so it’s really good in that way. 
Raven emphasized the ways in which having others at work with similar identities and 
experiences created a positive environment. Indeed, it is presumably much easier to be 
out and comfortable when one is not isolated or tokenized in the workplace.  
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 Some participants also shared ideas about the characteristics of an ideal 
workplace. Allison, who worked in social services in Toronto, expressed the desire for 
more understanding and normalizing of mental distress, where “‘diagnoses’ aren’t seen as 
labels and that they might just be things that people either deal with on a daily basis or 
things that somebody might be going through.” She went on to emphasize the importance 
of employers who are invested in “putting people over making a profit” and encouraging 
employees to “talk candidly” about mental health and respond with “understanding.” 
Similarly, Travis, who worked in social services in Winnipeg, told me that an ideal 
workplace environment would encourage discussions of mental health and self care:  
I think that that [an ideal workplace] would look like a place where folks actually 
talk about mental health stuff, but also talk about self-care and a holistic 
approach. I think that would go a long way. Especially the self-care part, even 
simple stuff like how do you deal with stress? If you’re not dealing with stress, 
well then what builds up, right?  
 Based on participants’ accounts of negative, positive, and ideal workplace 
environments, it is clear that there are specific conditions that increase workplace 
accessibility for many LGBQT people who experience mental distress. They are as 
follows: 
 flexibility with start/end time of workday and the hours when work is performed 
 being able to leave work when feeling distress without being penalized 
 time off for mental health related appointments 
 being able to take paid sick days from work 
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 up front information about what accommodations and services are available in the 
workplace and encouragement to make use of them for all workers, regardless of 
disability status 
 employers and managers who are approachable and de-escalate stress, rather than 
applying pressure 
 employers and managers who are aware and knowledgeable about mental distress 
and who work with employees to achieve maximum job performance, rather than 
expecting everyone to live up to able-bodied standards 
 employers and managers who encourage an open dialogue and positive 
relationship with all workers 
 anti-oppressive workplace climate: not only regarding mental health and 
disability, but also about race, sexuality, gender identity, and class  
 other queer, trans, racialized people who experience mental distress as coworkers 
and managers 
Most of these recommendations are consistent with the literature regarding 
accommodations and improved conditions for those who experience mental distress in 
the workplace. A Canadian study of 36 “consumers of mental health services” found that 
optimal conditions included a “friendly, respectful, communicative work environment 
with a culture of flexibility and inclusion…a relaxed, easy-going environment with a 
minimum of competition” (Kirsch, 2006, p. 27). This study also found that positive 
coworker relations and supervisors who had “qualities such as willingness to provide 
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feedback and to communicate openly, fairness, commitment, supportiveness, a sense of 
humour, and an ability to convey the worth of the employee” were crucial factors 
influencing job satisfaction and job retention (Kirsch, 2006, p. 28). Similarly, Peters & 
Brown (2009) summarize their recommendations and those of other scholars as “flexible 
work scheduling, increased supervision, working from home, being able to bank overtime 
hours for use when ill, self-paced work, longer or more frequent break periods, time-off 
for counselling, and private offices or enclosed spaces” (p. 41) 21.  These 
recommendations are similar to my own, with the main addition being an emphasis on 
anti-oppressive workplace climate in terms of all forms of oppression and 
marginalization, not just sanism. It is also important to note that making many of these 
accommodations available to all workers regardless of disability status decreases the 
pressure on those who experience mental distress to disclose mental health information 
they may not be comfortable discussing.  
However, these recommendations mostly address issues pertaining to those who are 
already employed. Given the high rates of poverty and unemployment for people who 
experience mental distress, action must also be taken to support those who have more 
difficulty attaining and maintaining employment. As Morrow et al (2009) argue, the 
“divide between employment and welfare” that typifies neoliberal forms of governance 
does a disservice to those who experience mental distress (p. 671). They suggest that 
models that combine employment with social support are far more effective and in line 
with “recovery-oriented values” (p. 666). For example, social enterprise models and 
community based supported employment offer paid work alongside “social supports such 
as on-site job coaching, personal and life skills counselling and referrals to others 
                                                 
21
 Ellison & Russinova, 1999; Fabian & Waterworth, 1993; MacDonald-Wilson et al, 2002; Mancuso, 1990. 
  263   
services” amongst others (p.667). Models such as these can go a long way toward more 
equitable inclusion of people who experience mental distress in the workforce. 
In this chapter I employed insights from scholarly work about invisible identities 
in order to analyze the work lives of the participants in my study. I have shown that 
mental distress, sexuality, gender identity, and race cannot be defined as personal, 
private, and neutral social differences that have no impact on perceptions of professional 
capabilities. LGBQT people who experience mental distress face powerful barriers to 
disclosing mental distress, sexuality, and gender identity related information at work, 
which affects their financial and mental well-being in many ways. LGBQT people who 
experience mental distress face specific challenges in the workplace, yet their struggles 
also resonate with what has been documented about those with other forms of invisible 
disabilities and the literature about disclosing ‘sexual orientation’ in the workplace. My 
analysis contributes to scholarly conversations troubling one of the central tropes of 
disability studies, that of visibility, as well as the emerging field of mad studies. While it 
is important for mad studies to become established as a field in its own right, analyses of 
mental distress can continue to expand the confines of disability studies, enhancing 
understandings of concepts such as invisible disabilities.  
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Conclusion 
Gender and sexual dissidence have a longstanding and ongoing relationship to 
concepts of mental pathology, resulting in particularly complicated relationships between 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (LGBQT) people and understandings of ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘disorder.’ LGBQT struggles for equity have in some ways hinged on 
claiming mental healthiness, albeit in different ways. Gay and lesbian activists in the 
1970s successfully advocated for the removal of homosexuality and related diagnoses 
from the DSM, while trans activists continue to negotiate a relationship with psychiatry 
in order to have access to the technologies of medical transition. While these struggles 
are different, they make the shared claim that LGBQT sexualities and genders are not 
‘disordered.’22 This distancing of LGBQT people from conceptualizations of ‘mental 
illness’ raises questions about the experiences of LGBQT people who identify as having 
experienced mental distress or ‘illness.’ 
More recently, some scholars have claimed that LGBQT people are not mentally 
ill by virtue of their gender and sexuality, but that homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia 
can create or contribute to ‘mental health problems’ (Chamberland and Saewyc, 2011; 
McIntyre, Daley, Rutherford, & Ross, 2011; Morrison, 2011; Rotondi, Bauer, Scanlon, 
Kaay, Travers & Travers, 2011; Rotondi, Bauer, Travers, Travers, Scanlon & Kaay, 
2011). Meanwhile, mad studies scholars and theorists who emphasize social approaches 
to mental distress have challenged the very basis on which any of these arguments rest. 
These scholars question the merit of the biomedical model that posits that mental distress 
is indicative of underlying biogenetic disorders that can be scientifically evidenced and 
                                                 
22
 As explained throughout, trans people must be labeled as ‘disordered’ in order to access the technologies 
of medical transition, whether or not we agree with this. 
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universally applied. Instead, they position the behaviours, experience, and thoughts that 
get called ‘mental illness’ as understandable responses to adversity and advocate non-
medical ways of addressing and responding to them (Bracken et al, 2012; Coles, Keenan, 
& Diamond; Rapley, Moncrieff, & Dillon, 2011; Tew, 2006; Tew 2011). These inquiries 
can usefully inform LGBQT perspectives about mental distress. 
Located in mad studies, this dissertation examines the biomedical model of 
mental illness and social approaches to mental distress as they pertain to LGBQT people. 
The study gives primacy to first-person accounts of people with lived experience rather 
than to medical experts, presenting the voices and viewpoints of 37 research participants 
who identify as LGBTQ and have experienced mental distress. Interviewed in two major 
Canadian cities, Toronto in Ontario and Winnipeg in Manitoba, these individuals offer 
distinct perspectives on the biomedical model of mental illness and social approaches to 
mental distress. In the first chapter I review some of the literature in mad studies, 
presenting a historiography of madness. This shows that ideas about the nature of 
madness change over time and are imbricated with perspectives on race, sexuality, and 
gender. I also examine more contemporary work in anti-psychiatry studies, lesbian and 
gay studies, queer studies, and trans studies that critique the biomedical model of mental 
illness and focuses on the impact of this model on those who have been psychiatrized. I 
argue that anti-psychiatry studies can be usefully informed by perspectives in lesbian and 
gay studies, queer studies, and trans studies that foreground LGBQT issues, while the 
latter can learn from analyses of sanism in anti-psychiatry studies. I conclude by outlining 
the methodological issues relevant to my project. 
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The second chapter argues that the biomedical model fails to satisfactorily ‘make 
sense’ of the experiences, behaviours, and thought patterns that are classified as 
symptomatic of ‘mental disorders.’ As scholars who favour social approaches to mental 
distress argue, the biomedical model presents distress as ‘meaningless’ in that social 
context is considered irrelevant or secondary to biogenetic factors (Boyle, 2013; Coles, 
2013). This results in tautological explanations for distress, whereby the symptoms 
indicate the existence of illness, and the existence of illness explains the symptoms 
(Boyle, 2013, p. 19). I present participant narratives regarding their dis/identifications 
with various terminologies which reveal critiques of the biomedical model. I argue that 
social approaches to mental distress are particularly helpful for understanding the 
experiences of marginalized groups, as they foreground and contextualize discrimination 
and structural oppression. 
 In chapter three I examine participants’ experiences with health care practitioners 
in order to look at the biomedical model in practice. I contend that biomedical service 
provision is based on inequitable power relations that can impede participants’ agency 
and self-determination. I show that practitioners are often uninformed about LGBQT 
cultures and processes of racialization and racism, further creating problematic relations 
between service providers and LGBQT people. Indeed, some practitioners pathologize 
LGBQT people by positioning sexual and gender dissidence as deviant in various ways, 
including diagnosing sexual behaviour as ‘promiscuous’ and as symptomatic of ‘mental 
illness.’ Further, the mental health system and child protective services often act in 
tandem as tools of (neo)colonial regulation. This demonstrates that mental health care is 
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an enculturated process that reflects oppressive worldviews, rather than objective 
assessments of health and illness. 
In chapter four, I examine Canada’s first national mental health strategy, 
Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada, created 
by the Mental Health Commission of Canada. This document employs the notion of 
‘recovery’ as a key concept informing changes to the Canadian mental health system. I 
focus on the sections of the strategy that deal with race, gender, and sexuality in order to 
examine how the state envisions ‘recovery’ for LGBQT people. I argue that Changing 
Directions, Changing Lives fails to advance a strong structural understanding of how 
homophobia, transphobia, racism and other forms of oppression shape LGBTQ 
experiences of mental distress, access to services, and recovery. I compare this to 
participant narratives about the conditions that facilitate addressing mental distress, 
arguing that a focus on the social and structural factors that influence ‘recovery’ is 
crucial.  
In the final chapter, I examine participants’ experiences with employment, 
arguing that biomedical conceptions of ‘mental illness’ influence how the participants are 
seen in the workplace. While mainstream discourse positions race, gender identity, 
sexuality, and mental distress as neutral forms of social difference that have no impact on 
perceptions of competence at work, I argue that they in fact influence participants’ 
opportunities to obtain and maintain work, job performance evaluations, and access to 
workplace accommodations. I draw on scholarly work about ‘invisible’ identities in order 
to show how participants must sometimes make difficult decisions about disclosing 
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information about mental distress, sexuality, and gender identity. I contend that such 
decisions are high stakes, given the impact on health and financial well-being. 
My study raises interesting questions for future research. While there is an ever 
growing body of scholarship investigating possible biogenetic causes of ‘mental illness,’ 
there is a need for studies that centre social and structural factors, particularly those that 
are critical of biomedicalism as a way of understanding mental distress. As Tew (2011) 
argues, more research is needed regarding the ways in which “adverse social 
experiences” create mental distress and how “positive experiences” can facilitate 
recovery (p.269). As my study has shown, for LGBQT people those adverse experiences 
are often related to oppression both within and outside of the mental health system. In 
terms of positive experiences, there are LGBQT-specific questions to study, such as the 
ways in which involvement in queer and trans communities might provide support and 
opportunities for positive experiences. This research must be done with a critical 
perspective that is cognizant of the encroaching forces of neoliberalism that seek to 
saddle individuals and communities with financial and caretaking responsibilities.  
There is also a need for more research that considers the complex interplay 
between social factors, biology, and embodiment. As Boyle (2013) argues, those who 
favour social approaches to mental distress focus on “life experiences and social context” 
and tend to ignore the body and the ways in which mental distress is “an embodied 
experience” (p. 6). She therefore calls for more “interactionist models” that consider “the 
inseparable, reciprocal relationships amongst the social, psychological and biological” 
and that take care not to position biology as the most authentic and “fundamental” part of 
the model (Boyle, 2013, p. 8).  
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Such research might further investigate the implications of Moncrieff’s (2008) 
drug-centred approach outlined in chapter three. As discussed in more detail there, this 
approach understands psychotropic medication as creating “drug-induced effects that 
might relieve symptoms” rather than treating an underlying disease (Moncrieff, Cohen, & 
Mason, 2013, p. 229). Further research using this approach could examine the 
interactions between biological and social factors, centering the accounts of those who 
take such drugs. As Moncrieff, Cohen, and Mason (2013) argue, “listening to what 
people have to say about the effects induced by these drugs and how they impact on their 
lives is an important source of information” that is often ignored (p. 230). 
The results of research that prioritizes social and structural factors contributing to 
mental distress could inform changes to service provision. While the predominance of the 
biomedical model of mental illness makes it difficult to conceptualize other ways of 
understanding mental distress,  it is perhaps even more difficult to imagine what ‘mental 
health’ services would be if they were informed by alternative ideologies. One of the 
more pressing questions raised by my study is what social approaches to mental distress 
would look like in practice. What services might be possible if social and structural 
factors were seen as primary causes of mental distress? What would non-medical service 
provision look like? While there are some forms of psychiatry, psychology, and social 
work that do consider social factors, they are often informed by an underlying acceptance 
of the concept of ‘mental illness’ (Beresford, 2005; Poole et al, 2012). There may also be 
psychotherapists who operate from a social approaches perspective, but psychotherapy is 
often financially inaccessible as it is not covered by provincial health insurance. 
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As Coles, Keenan, and Diamond (2013) state, “freeing ourselves from established 
conventions of ideals, actions and professional customs can leave people feeling anxious 
and uncertain in how to make sense of madness, and how to help and offer support” (p. 
xii). While there are few examples to draw on in terms of financially accessible services 
that put social approaches into practice, there are some promising revolutionary 
approaches to service provision in or originating from the United Kingdom. I devote the 
space to describing three such examples because it is so hard to imagine possibilities 
beyond the biomedical model and because of the pressing nature of the question of what 
could possibly replace or compliment biomedical approaches to service provision. 
Located in Leeds in West Yorkshire, England, the Leeds Survivor Led Crisis 
Service (LSLCS) was founded in 1999 by ‘mental health service users’ who wanted an 
alternative to services based on the biomedical model of mental illness. LSLCS offers a 
telephone helpline, support groups led by those with lived experience, and a house where 
those at “acute risk of suicide and/or self-injury” can stay (Venner & Noad, 2013, p. 
334). This service takes a non-medical, non-diagnostic, anti-oppressive approach that 
posits that “deprivation and oppression not only impact on people’s ability to cope with 
distress, but can be the cause of distress” (Venner & Noad, 2013, p. 334). Behaviours that 
are considered symptomatic of an underlying disorder by biomedicalists, such as self-
harm and a desire to commit suicide, are reframed as ways of dealing with distress. These 
behaviours are seen as making sense given the person’s circumstances, and those who use 
the LSLCS are seen as “trying their absolute best with the resources that they have and in 
the circumstances that they find themselves” (Venner & Noad, 2013, p.335). The LSLCS 
takes a ‘non-directive’ approach and manages risk through trusting service users and 
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working with them in a way that respects their agency. They have never had a serious 
violent incident, serious injury to staff or visitors, or death on their premises, despite 
working with many people in acute crisis (Venner & Noad, 2013, p. 339). 
 Similarly, the Hearing Voices Network (HVN), originating in Manchester in 
1988, eschews biomedical definitions of what the DSM refers to as ‘schizophrenia’ and 
‘psychosis.’ One of the central defining features of this form of mental distress is the 
experience of hearing voices. The HVN reframes this as “a normal human experience, 
that can be understood in the context of life events and interpersonal narratives, and 
which is often precipitated and maintained by events that overwhelm and disempower the 
individual” (Longden, Corstens & Dillon, 2013, p. 162). While biomedical approaches 
concentrate on eliminating the voices, the HVN advocates “understanding, accepting, and 
integrating their emotional meaning” (Dillon & Longden, 2012, p. 129). Support groups 
based on this philosophy have been created across 21 countries supported by Intervoice: 
The International Network for Training, Education and Research into Hearing Voices
23
 
(Dillon & Longden, 2012, p. 130). These groups are based on the shared experience of 
hearing voices rather than psychiatric diagnoses and can be led by those with lived 
experience rather than by mental health professionals without such experience. The 
groups are meant to provide a place where participants can begin the process of 
“recognizing and exploring possible meanings” that are being conveyed by the voices 
they hear in order to create a more positive relationship with them (Dillon & Longden, 
2012, p. 132). 
                                                 
23
 The Intervoice website states that the development of a Hearing Voices Network is underway in Toronto, 
ON. 
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There is also a similar such group in Quebec City at a Francophone organization 
called Le Pavois. This organization has been supporting people who experience mental 
distress in achieving their goals in terms of employment and school since 1989. In 2005, 
Le Pavois started running a group based on the Hearing Voices model called ‘Mieux 
vivre avec les voix.’ The group meets on a weekly basis and devotes the first half of the 
session to sharing experiences and the second half to education about strategies for better 
understanding one’s voices and giving them meaning as well as international research 
regarding hearing voices. The website describes the group as a place where people can 
discover alternative understandings of the experience of hearing voices that are not based 
in psychiatry and begin to establish a relationship to their voices that works best for 
them.
24
 Group members are also provided with one-on-one support from someone who 
works at Le Pavois, if they so desire. Le Pavois also offers awareness training to those 
who want to learn more about their approach, including hospitals and community centres 
(http://www.lepavois.org/services/mieux-vivre-avec-les-voix/). 
 The LSLCS, the HVN, and Mieux vivre avec les voix demonstrate innovative 
ways of implementing social approaches that provide valuable methods of addressing 
crisis and experiences of distress. These services position distress as an understandable 
response to life events and focus on finding meaning within the behaviours that manifest 
in response to such circumstances, rather than pathologizing and seeking to eliminate 
them. In many ways these services run counter to the logic that supports biomedical 
approaches, treating those who experience distress as agents in their own right who are 
making decisions that make sense within the context of their lives. Such services could 
                                                 
24
 A former participant of Mieux vivre avec les voix offers a version of this group in Ville de Trois-Rivières, 
Quebec called ‘Entendons-Nous’ (http://www.robsm.org/Voix/index.html). 
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inspire exciting possibilities for further developing such services in Canada. They could 
also inspire visions of similar services that are LGBQT-specific, which could foster the 
growth of LGBQT mad community. 
 Promoting social approaches in service provision is challenging, and as Tew 
(2011) argues, will require working to change larger social phenomena such as “social 
attitudes, media representations and wider policy discourses” (Tew, 2011, p. 170). This 
necessitates working for change beyond the mental health system in “mainstream 
services, employers, housing providers, communities and community leaders, policy 
makers” (Tew, 2011, p. 170). For LGBQT communities, this indicates a role for 
community leaders and activists in determining what would best serve LGBQT people 
and implementing changes in LGBQT-focused services in community-based 
organizations. 
There are also other interesting avenues for future research, such as the 
medicalization of various forms of experience and behaviour and the intersections with 
LGBQT lives. The medicalization of addictions, especially because they are often 
characterized as ‘comorbid’ with ‘mental illness,’ is an area rife with opportunities for 
this kind of inquiry. How might social approaches change the way addictions are 
conceptualized and recovery services are organized? There are many ways in which 
queer and trans lives are specifically affected by the medicalization and pathologizing of 
addictions, not the least of which is the difficulty that trans people who use substances 
can have in accessing the technologies of medical transition. For example, the gender 
identity clinic at CAMH in Toronto, Ontario, requires that “any mental health or 
substance use issues are well-controlled” before providing approval for hormones and 
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surgery (CAMH, 2014). As this also indicates, there is more work to be done regarding 
the intersections between those deemed ‘unwell’ or ‘out of control’ in terms of ‘mental 
health’ and access to gender transition. 
 The pathologization and medicalization of bondage, discipline, domination, 
submission, sadism, and masochism (BDSM), leather communities, and kink 
practitioners is another related area of inquiry that merits further research. There are 
many diagnoses in the DSM that pathologize these practices, including sexual masochism 
disorder and sexual sadism disorder, amongst others. As I discussed in chapter three, 
LGBQT people have a history of engaging in relationships, sexual experiences, and 
kinship ties that are outside of the heterosexual norm. This includes BDSM practices, and 
therefore LGBQT people may be particularly affected by the pathologization of these 
practices. Relatedly, alternative styles of relationships such as non-monogamy and 
polyamory may also play a role in the pathologization of LGBQT people. While I 
touched on this in chapter three, there is an area that could yield many interesting 
research results. 
Future research might also consider different intersectional questions as they 
pertain to LGBQT people who experience mental distress, such as the role of space and 
place. While my study found small but not hugely significant differences between the 
major Canadian cities of Winnipeg and Toronto, there may well be very different 
questions to explore in French Canada, on Indigenous reservations, in newcomer 
neighbourhoods and communities, in rural and small town Canada, and in Northern 
communities. Future intersectional inquiries might also foreground different vectors of 
power as they intersect in the lives of LGBQT people who experience mental distress, 
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such as class, age, and physical disability. Transnational comparisons might also yield 
interesting results, including those made with other white settler nations. For example, 
comparisons with the United States might highlight the differences between experiencing 
distress in a country with a public healthcare system as opposed to a private healthcare 
system. Comparisons with countries in the global South might investigate the effects of 
“psychiatric imperialism” (Fernando, 2010). As Fernando (2010) argues, “Euro-
American influence and political domination” in Asian and African countries has resulted 
in an imposition of western psychiatry and the “suppression of indigenous ways of 
dealing with human suffering, family problems and social disturbance” (p. 113).  
Transnational comparisons might look at the links between the ways in which this takes 
place within Canada with indigenous people and abroad. 
Another potentially interesting area of study is the ways in which having a 
diagnosis of ‘mental illness’ or experiencing mental distress affects LGBQT romantic 
and sexual relationships. Disabled bodies are often positioned as both abject and asexual, 
while those deemed ‘mentally ill’ are often perceived as dangerous and out of control 
(Anderson & Kitchin, 2000; Beresford, 2002; Milligan & Neufeldt, 2001). How do such 
stereotypes intersect with homophobia, transphobia, racism, and other forms of 
oppression? How do LGBQT people who experience mental distress navigate such 
stereotypes in the disclosure of lived experience of distress to potential partners? 
Conversely, what supportive role can partners play in addressing mental distress for 
LGBQT people? Relatedly, how do sanist notions about incapacity affect LGBQT people 
who choose to parent? Given the relatively recent shifts in cultural mores that allow for 
more LGBQT people to parent, how does sanism intersect with prejudicial beliefs 
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concerning the suitability of LGBQT people as parents? How might being an LGBQT 
person who experiences mental distress affect issues of child custody? 
 There are also interesting questions to consider regarding LGBQT people who 
experience mental distress and the ways in which biomedicalism is mobilized by the state 
to police the boundaries of the nation. If a diagnosis of ‘mental illness’ is grounds for 
denying status in Canada, how does this affect LGBQT people seeking entry in to the 
country? (Kanani 2012) How do the intersections between the pathologization of gender 
and sexual dissidence and mental distress affect LGBQT immigrants, refugees, and 
newcomers? How do Western notions of mental health and illness operate as vectors of 
racism and imperialism in immigration regulations? 
Further research might also explore the connections between mental distress and 
trauma and abuse. Some interesting work is already underway raising questions about 
whether what gets called ‘psychosis’ is in fact a response to abuse and trauma (Johnstone, 
2011; Read et al, 2005). Johnstone (2011) calls for further analysis of “the ways in which 
people (can) react to trauma” and whether these “include some of the experiences we 
refer to as ‘hallucinations’ and ‘delusions’” (p. 109). Likewise, Plumb (2005) suggests 
that certain behaviours, feelings, and states of mind that typify responses to trauma and 
abuse have much in common with diagnostic criterion for various psychiatric conditions 
including obsessive compulsive disorder, neurotic disorder, bi-polar disorder, 
schizophrenia, and borderline personality disorder (p. 122). This leads her to questions 
whether “many psychiatric symptoms” are better understood as the ramifications of abuse 
and trauma (Plumb, 2005, p. 123). The answers to these questions could also inform 
service provision; indeed, Johnstone (2011) ponders whether “psychiatric services” 
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should be based on a trauma model rather than a biomedical model (p. 109). Given that 
some LGBQT people experience abuse as part of homophobia and transphobia, these 
findings may be especially relevant to this group.  
 Further research might also consider the ways in which biomedicalism and 
neoliberalism structure institutional initiatives to address mental health concerns, such as 
those on post-secondary campuses. Research studies might consider how mental distress 
is understood and addressed in institutional contexts and the impact of increasingly 
popular ‘mental health awareness campaigns.’ As Kanani and Pilling (2014) argue, such 
initiatives tend to employ individualizing approaches that fail to account for structural 
barriers and the role of the university in creating conditions that can lead to mental 
distress. Our exploratory analysis of York University’s mental health strategy indicates 
that incidents of homophobic and transphobic violence, sexual assault, and racism on 
campus are treated as individual occurrences and as unconnected to student mental 
wellbeing. This context is erased in the university’s individualized recommendations for 
self-care to achieve good mental health (Kanani & Pilling, 2014). Future research might 
look at these issues in more depth, including more campuses as case studies and 
comparing these to other institutional contexts that might employ similar tactics, such as 
various workplace mental health initiatives. 
The biomedical model is firmly entrenched within medical settings, but is also the 
dominant way of conceptualizing mental distress in the media, public policy, popular 
culture, and mainstream discourse. It therefore has far-reaching material effects on the 
lives of LGBQT people who experience mental distress. There are many interesting 
directions for future research regarding the intersections between mental distress and 
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LGBQT lives. As Coles, Keenan and Diamond (2013) argue, once madness is understood 
as directly related to the destructive “social structures” and “hierarchies we all live 
under,” it becomes apparent that there is a pressing need to explore the ways in which  
society can be restructured more equitably (p. xvi). Given the longstanding and ongoing 
relationship between ideas about ‘mental pathology’ and gender and sexual dissidence, 
these are issues of great importance to LGBQT people. Indeed, LGBQT communities can 
be seen as a place for such restructuring to continue. 
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Appendix A 
 
Explanation: The research participants were between the ages of 20 and 49, with 51% in 
their 20s, 35% in their 30s, and 14% in their 40s. In terms of gender, 49% of participants 
identified as female and 38% identified as male. Of the female participants, 17% also identified 
as trans and/or genderqueer, as did 50% of the male participants. The remaining 5% of 
participants did not specify either male or female, identifying simply as trans and/or genderqueer. 
Many participants used more than one term to describe their sexuality; 62% identified as queer, 
22% as gay, 13% as lesbian, 8% as bisexual, 5% as pansexual/omnisexual, and 3% as 
heterosexual. The participants also used many terms to describe their race and ethnicity, but 
broadly speaking, 59% of participants identified as white, and 41% identified as racialized. In 
addition to identifying as white, 5% identified as French Canadian, 5% as Eastern European, 3% 
as Western European, 3% as Scottish, and 3% as Jewish. Of the participants who are racialized, 
11% identified as black, 11% as Métis, 11% as mixed race/biracial, 5% as Aboriginal, 3% as 
brown, 3% as Korean, 3% as East Asian, 3% as South Asian, 3% as Middle Eastern, 3% as 
Indonesian, and 3% as Muslim. Just over half of the participants (51%) identified as low income, 
                                                 
25
 I use the term ‘trans’ as an umbrella term that includes trans, transgender, transsexual, and genderqueer 
people. 
Age 20s: 51% 
30s: 35% 
40s: 14% 
Gender female: 49% (32% non-trans, 17% trans
25
) 
male: 38% (50% non-trans, 50% trans) 
neither male nor female: 5% 
Sexuality queer: 62% 
gay: 22% 
lesbian: 13% 
bisexual: 8% 
pansexual: 5% 
heterosexual: 3% 
Race/Ethnicity white: 59% 
racialized: 41% 
Class low income: 51% 
middle class: 49% 
Disability physical or mental disability: 51%  
able-bodied: 49% 
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and the remaining 49% identified as middle class. In terms of disability, 51% of participants 
identified as having one or more physical and/or mental disabilities. It is important to note that 
the percentages for sexuality and race do not add up to 100 because many participants identified 
with more than one term. 
 
